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i. Abstract  
The challenge of defining terrorism has long preoccupied domestic 
and international lawyers alike. The rising presence of the terrorist on 
the global stage has muddled the lines between security, politics and 
law leaving the courts to solve intricate puzzles and maintain delicate 
balances. All the while people and states have engaged in ever more 
heated arguments and ever more stringent policies to tackle a 
phenomenon the heart of which remains opaque. Presupposing 
definitions as linguistic/legal reflections of essential realities is 
misleading and conceals the role played by legal processes in creating 
terrorist realities. 
Developing a theoretical and methodological toolkit drawing on 
Assemblages and Actor Network Theory this thesis traces the 
stabilisation of two concrete terrorists through a Terror Court 
Assemblage (TCA). Deploying a slow ethnographic method of 
tracing actors through interviews, participant observation and 
judgment analysis the argument is that the terrorist is made through 
intricate and contingent processes of stabilisation and choreography. 
When successful the choreography of actors in the TCA produces a 
naturalised terrorist whose participation in the carrying of the 
concept of terrorism is crucial. Against a backdrop of fuzzy, 
heterogeneous and fluid relations the terrorist emerges out of the 
successful Terror Court Assemblage as a stable and very real 
(arte)fact articulated by a smooth chain of reference. Understanding 
the terrorist as a processually stabilised entity made to speak by an 
intricate TCA does nothing in itself to diminish the impact of 
terrifying incidents. However tracing the terrorist as a product of 
judicial processes and translations rather than as their input permits a 
critical appraisal of debates surrounding agreed definitions of 
terrorism as red herrings and opens new vantage points on where 
intervention is most promising. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Field Diary Entry: 20/03/13 10:00 
A few days ago Rajat, a junior lawyer in a small firm based in Delhi, invited me 
to join him at Tis Hazari Sessions Court. With its own metro station, Tis 
Hazari Court is a bustling utilitarian complex of buildings. Crossing the 
pedestrian bridge from the metro to the court, I come past a few pavement hawkers 
selling with equal zeal peeled cucumbers, sunglasses, clip-on ties and legal texts. 
Here I have to cross the first layer of security, which keeps the outer courtyard 
clear of beggars and obvious weapons. A half-hearted pat down and glance into 
my bag later, I am inside the yard. It is full to the brim with lawyers advertising 
their services with shouts and old black boards propped up against their 
typewriters. They are selling affidavits and other legal documents in a manner 
oddly similar to the hawkers outside. There is a determined throng of people 
pushing their way towards the court doors and the inner layer of security. The 
check here is more intensive and involves a functioning metal detector as well as a 
thorough rummaging through the things in my bag. There is a metal door, going 
onto an open courtyard with a drain to the side, which also serves as the drain for 
the toilet facility one door down. To my great delight there is also a slowly rotating 
wall mounted fan. 
1.2 A Few Preliminary Remarks 
These, my first steps into the Tis Hazari Sessions Court in Delhi, are 
also my first concrete steps into this project.1 The record of my 
impressions on that first day as part of my field diary guides the way 
                                                
1  Throughout this work I am using the first person 
pronouns following Annemarie Mol’s example. (A. Mol 
2010) This work does not come out of nowhere. By 
editing it so that it appears to be of universal validity 
handed down out of nowhere I would engage in one of 
the processes of stabilization and reification that we 
will encounter throughout this inquiry. I therefore use 
“I” in reference to me, “we” in reference to you dear 
reader in combination with me and the text, and “this 
inquiry/this work” for processes that are driven by the 
task I set for myself. “I hope [this use of the “I”] will 
evoke the concerns of the self-reflexive turn, that in 
seeking to move from universalist pretensions, stages 
the author as one of the sites where the text is 
situated” (A. Mol 2010, 254). 
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through this introduction. Each excerpt introduces an important 
aspect of my work. So in the first vignette I recount how I first 
encountered the court. It shows at once the puzzling complexity of 
interaction taking place in and around the court, the strong, layered 
delineations between localities of the court complex. The snapshot of 
my diary also features various elements of importance throughout 
this thesis. For example the impact of mundane objects, like a fan, on 
tasks, like waiting and observing. It also illustrates the routine 
interactions between legal professionals and members of the security 
services, as in the security checkpoints. Finally and perhaps most 
importantly there is an important aspect of this thesis reflected 
throughout this introduction with it’s eight vignettes and that is the 
tension between sequential accounts and the non-sequential way that 
sense making works. In other words, throughout this thesis I ask the 
reader on occasion to embark blindly with me on an episode, section 
or chapter, which falls increasingly into place as the reader progresses. 
The reason for this is that reading and writing are sequential activities 
which follow the clear pathway of the text, whereas researching and 
understanding proceed in leaps and bounds, both forwards and 
backwards. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari to whose work, I am 
indebted for the scaffolding of this work speak of this tension as that 
between arborescence and the rhizome. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004) 
Arborescence is a force that drives along set pathways and vectors, 
such as the branches of a tree shooting, reaching towards the light. In 
contrast, the rhizome expands laterally and with complex connections 
between each of its parts, it is an expanding force but not one with a 
clear directionality. It is the reflection of this tension in my work that 
sometimes requires the reader to bear with me for a passage before 
that passage falls in place through the connection made in the next 
one. 
1.3 Field Diary Entry: 20/03/13 10:15 
Since Rajat has not shown up, I look around. The picture is dominated by the 
black and white of the legal profession. But there is also a surprising amount of 
police Khaki, and of the plain whites of those dressing up to come to court. It is 
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clear that the senior lawyers are in the abode of their power, sweeping through the 
corridors at full speed with a little bubble of space and numerous assistants 
running behind, carrying files or fending off supplicants trying to get a word in 
sideways. Watching the unfolding sceneries, dominated by unwritten rules I only 
begin to grasp, for a while I turn my attention to the case I am about to attend. I 
have been told that for the last three years, every Wednesday the prosecution has 
been bringing forward their witnesses. The incident is the explosion of several 
bombs in 2008 and one was found which didn’t go off.2 The locations were very 
central with Tilak Marg, Connaught Place and the M Block of GK Market 
being the presumed targets, or at least the places where the bombs did explode. 
There are all told 13 accused, but only two are held in custody in Delhi, the others 
are in two different jails in Gujarat. My attention returns to the people around 
me, there is a multitude of human interactions, handshakes, hugs, handholding, 
laughter, conversation, but interestingly I notice that it is always between officers 
amongst themselves, lawyers amongst themselves or either group with civilians, 
there is almost no interaction visible between lawyers and police officers. 
1.4 Context 
Not a day passes without some atrocious act between humans taking 
place. Daily around the world people die in violence, some of those 
deaths are attributed to terrorism.3 Many more are not attributed to 
terrorism.4 Those attributed to terrorism are often explained by some 
invisible root cause 5  of terrorism or individual psychological 
phenomenon. 6  Research abounds on the enabling factors for 
terrorism, poverty,7 ideology,8 religion,9 psyche,10 education levels,11 
                                                
2 While the actors I spoke to related only two bombs 
and one dud, newspaper reports of the incident speak 
of a series of five blasts. (M. Singh 2008; PTI 2011). 
3 The American START organisation of the University 
of Maryland even maps them out every year. (START 
2015). 
4  For an outlining of issues and areas that are not 
talked about as terrorism see (Chomsky 1987). 
5  There is a very wide literature on root causes of 
terrorism for some interesting contributions and 
critiques see (Akhmat et al. 2014; Alan B. Krueger 
2007; Bjørgo 2005; Campana and Lapointe 2012). 
6 See for example (Ginges 1997; Koseli 2007). 
7 See for example (Koseli 2007). 
8 See for example (McBride 2011). 
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radicalisation,12 group dynamics13 and other root causes. As well as 
practical and often secret manuals on how to counter it, from tactics, 
profiling, airport security, layered security models, intelligence, 
surveillance, interrogation, prosecution memos, special courts, 
detention camps, special laws, definitions to UN Resolutions.14 The 
questions that remain unanswered include: why are some incidents of 
violence terrorist and others not? Who are these terrorists? Why are 
they always the other guys? Some of the legal literature focuses on 
definitions,15 others focus on othering,16 positionality and labelling.17 
While these contributions are important and insightful, I am left 
wondering why these processes of labelling, othering and positional 
definitions are sometimes successful but fail on other accounts. My 
inquiry explores how, going beyond labelling, an actor network works 
to solidify and stabilise a terrorist. The work of the actor network, the 
efforts of translation, stabilisation and inscription that go into the 
successful actor network are what makes the terrorist terrorist. It goes 
beyond labelling as the process is laborious and extends beyond a 
limited speech act. But it also shifts the locus of where the terrorist 
comes into existence from the dust, smoke and debris of the 
                                                                                                         
9 See for example (Greenfield 2012; Masters 2008). 
10 See for example (Rios 2007; Smelser 2007). 
11 The correlation identified by some authors between 
education levels and terrorism is, complex, 
counterintuitive and often controversial (Sinai 2007; 
Sukarieh and Tannock 2016). 
12 Radicalisation is commonly used for the process of a 
person becoming a terrorist, it is therefore an 
interesting parallel to this work, for select examples 
see (Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass 2014; Botha 2015). 
13 See for example (Miller 2007; Jacuch, Speckhard, and 
Pick 2009). 
14 See for example (Herschinger 2013). 
15  Sidestepping the stuck controversies surrounding 
legal definitions of terrorism is one of the motivations 
for this work nevertheless there are many very 
valuable contributions in this area. See for example 
(Hardy and Williams 2011; Bruce 2013; Escribano 
Úbeda-Portugués 2011; Golder and Williams George 
2004; Greene 2014; Grozdanova 2014; Ruby 2002). 
16 See for example (Herschinger 2013). 
17  See for example (Bob Fick 2004; Ansari 2007; 
Appleby 2010; Moghadam, Berger, and Beliakova 2014; 
Simmons and Mitch 1985; Weinman 1985). 
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explosion site to the dimmed, stuffy and complexly coded 
environment of the courtroom and legal office. As the second 
excerpt from my field diary above shows, this environment is not 
only complex but also dominated by two groups in particular, those 
whose profession it is mainly to work with the law and those whose 
main occupation is related to security.18 They come together in the 
court. In this work I combine four elements; terrorism, India, courts 
and assemblages. When I set out for this study the focus was on 
special counter terrorism laws in India. It was this focus that initially 
brought me to Tis Hazari. However during my fieldwork I was time 
and again confronted with connections between actors and on-going 
processes that the theories I had touched upon before could not 
explain. From security laws my focus shifted to processes in and 
around courts. My attention moved from counterterrorism to the 
terrorist. An all India outlook was increasingly pruned to focus on a 
select few cases and assemblage thinking helped me work out the 
terminology and theoretical scaffolding of my work. The 
transformation from a broad-brush macro project to an almost 
archaeological micro project has also changed the contribution that I 
seek to make. In this thesis I demonstrate how the choreography 
between security and law stabilises the terrorist in court. The terrorist 
as the embodied carrier of the terrorism theme is a legal, political and 
popular category. An assemblage encompassing security and law 
contributes to the curating of the widespread consensus about who is 
a terrorist and who is not, and for that matter what incident is 
terrorist and what is not. 
1.5 Field Diary Entry: 20/03/13 10:30 
By now Rajat arrives, and after hastily smoking a cigarette in the courtyard and 
answering some of my questions, and politely laughing at my observations, we head 
inside the Courtroom. Except for the prominent chair of the Judge, designed with 
remote similarity to King Edward’s Chair and covered with a cut out piece of red 
                                                
18  For a discussion of the concept of security see: 
(Weldes et al. 1999) and (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 
1998) as well as (Nye and Welch 2012). 
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carpet, situated on an elevated pedestal behind a shoulder high wooden barrier to 
the floor of the court, nothing is quite as I expected it. There are two computers 
from the 90’s in the room, which seem oddly out of place both with the early 
twentieth century wood work on one side and the ultra modern sleek of the flat 
screens of the videoconferencing equipment on the other side. Except for this there 
is a big metal cupboard locked with a padlock, which I am told contains files and 
evidence, a couple of shabby sofas and a few rows of chairs. Slowly the advocates 
filter in, and begin grouping themselves at the barrier, towards the left of the judge, 
close to the keeper of records. I am told that today two witnesses are being heard, 
when I express my surprise at the rate of the trial, one meeting a week, two 
witnesses a meeting, a few hundred prosecution witnesses, I am told that no one 
has a real interest in getting these trials over with. Judge Narender Kumar has a 
very good reputation, meaning he is considered hard working, has a good 
knowledge of the law and is fair-minded to all sides. When I ask again why parts 
of the accused are only present via videoconferencing, I am told that the accused 
themselves also do not want to be in jail in Delhi, because the jail in Gujarat is 
much nicer. While the FIR against them was filed in Delhi, the charge sheet was 
issued in Mumbai, and there are simultaneous proceedings against them in Delhi 
and in Gujarat. While Rajat only nods knowingly when I ask him about why the 
same accused can be tried for the same offence, in this case membership in an 
illegal organization, in two different courts at the same time, there seems to be 
something odd about the entire situation.  
1.6 Argument 
Terrorists are not unveiled in the dust and rubble of an explosion, 
they are stabilised and articulated through processes that reach from 
before19 to the aftermath of an incident.20 This stabilisation takes 
place under tension between legal/law and order assemblages and 
security assemblages. The court is the location where these are 
choreographed, a chain of reference is crafted and the individual 
terrorist is made to be, speak and act. This stabilisation takes hard 
                                                
19 For example by attributing narratives of becoming to 
individual terrorists as in (Sarangi and Alison 2005). 
20  For a very interesting overview of sociological 
approaches to understanding terrorism see (Turk 
2004). 
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work and is precarious. However once it has been successful various 
layers of inscription naturalise it and make the process of its making 
invisible. It is because of such efforts that we are confronted with 
widespread agreement on who the terrorists are despite no agreed 
definition of terrorism. In addition to effort this stabilisation makes 
use of various human and non-human actants that come together in 
an assemblage. 
Terrorists and terrorism are socially constructed. They are not 
naturally occurring categories of beings or relationally independent 
phenomena. Instead they arise out of relations between actors. Or 
even more precisely they are made to arise between actors by a range 
of actants and hard work. Terrorist facts are articulated through a 
crafted chain of reference. Before we return to this central point a 
few preliminaries. The terror phenomenon is a composite of material 
and ideational components. The terrorist body is the trace around 
which the ideational frame of terrorism is stabilised. Three caveats; 
first, nothing below should be construed as to diminish the horror 
and impact of terror on victims and people around the world. 
Second, the claim that the semantics of terrorism arise relationally 
between victims and perpetrators does not intend to distribute 
responsibility or somehow make the victims share the blame. Third, 
that something is constructed and artificial does not mean that it is 
any less real or weighty than if it were natural. 
This being said, both the terrorist and terrorism come into existence 
relationally. To use the paraphrase of an old question; if a bomb 
blows up in the woods and no one is watching – is it terrorism? Has 
to be answered with a definite no. In fact some bombs, for instance 
when thrown from a plane, blow up in market places killing dozens 
of civilians and yet it is not terrorism. We have to start from 
somewhere, and as the majority of cases of terrorism do, let us start 
with an incident. The incident is intensely terrifying for those in its 
immediate vicinity. Such a moment of terror can become terrorism, 
but it can also become something else. Instead of an Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED) it may be a gas pipe that blew up, instead of 
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terrorists gunning down civilians it may be a turf war between gangs. 
At the moment of terror a great deal of indeterminacy remains. It is 
in the aftermath that the material and ideational components of 
terrorism are assembled, or not. Links and connections need to be 
crafted between events, that do not yet have meaning and 
significance, and carriers of meaning and significance such as texts or 
other repositories of articulation. At the moment of terror the 
indeterminacy also means that both the terrorist and terrorism are 
still precarious. A large number of studies focus on the role played by 
the media, police, politicians, etc. in constructing and maintaining 
terrorism in the aftermath of a moment of terror.21 The moment of 
terror is translated into terrorism and thus stabilised in time. This 
stabilisation is nowhere as apparent as with 9/11, which is now even 
used to demarcate two world eras. The translation of a moment of 
terror into terrorism with its ramifications that reach backwards and 
forwards in time is the result of a successful group formation. This 
relative stability that terrorism acquires is the result of a multitude of 
choreographed processes between actants. 
Similarly, the way in which the incident is inscribed onto a person to 
make them terrorist is also the result of a number of translation 
processes. Again it is important here to keep in mind that this is not a 
moral evaluation: it is entirely possible to remain agnostic about the 
morality of the deed, and the responsibility of the individual when 
describing the processes of translation and stabilisation that serve the 
inscription.22 All the while realising that even before 9/11 a strong 
moral condemnation of terrorism existed.23 The interesting question 
that this work addresses is how does the suspect become a terrorist. 
                                                
21  Examples include: (Balfour 1993; Donohue 2003; 
Gillespie and O’Loughlin 2009; Held 1997; Miller 
1992; Nagar 2010; Noorani 1992; Rohner and Frey 
2007; Sinai 2007; Slone 2000; Udupa 2009). 
22  For a very good discussion about the roles of 
arguments about morality and its l inks to globalization 
see (Devji 2005). 
23 Studies about the morality of terrorism also abound, 
for an overview from before the frenzied Global War 
On Terror (GWOT) see: (Corlett 1996) or more 
critically (Baudrillard 2003). 
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Stabilisation takes place and translations are necessary to imbue the 
individual with the phenomenon. This process may be the same for 
murderers and a range of other crimes, but with terrorism the 
consequences are more far reaching. There is no global war on 
murderers per se, while the Global War on Terrorism has defined a 
decade of world history.24 Instead of wide sweeping macro statements 
this investigation looks at the micro level of becoming terrorist.25 
Two specific case studies from India are used supported and 
contextualised by a number of interviews and other relevant incidents 
to offer a description of how the individual becomes the terrorist. To 
have a relatively clear boundary around the object of the investigation 
I am focusing on how the courts, and the court cases relating to two 
incidents of terrorism are used to stabilise, articulate and inscribe a 
chain of reference which leads to terrorist facts speaking for 
themselves. It is important to note that while one of these cases is 
post 9/11 the other one is from the nineties. Neither one of them 
uses pre-scripted categories of terrorism, but rather the accused 
emerge as terrorists out of the relations between a number of actants 
including human actors, objects and legal machines.26 My argument is 
that the material and ideational aspects of terrorism have to be 
brought together at the micro-level for a group delineation terrorist-
non-terrorist to take hold. This bringing together involves hard work 
and multiple translations in an assemblage, which articulates a chain 
of reference to make the terrorist speak. 
                                                
24 The impact of the GWOT has been debated with 
zeal almost since its inception. See for example (Bose 
2005; Davis 2008; Köchler 2008; Mazari 2007; Feyyaz 
2009; Bacevich 2007) 
25  Becoming is a highly complex concept. For a 
discussion reflective of how I use it here see (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 173). 
26  By this I mean that no special law using 
terrorist/terrorism as categories was in place during 
the first case study, whereas the second case study 
deliberately did not use the available law. In both case 
studies the prosecution relied on regular criminal law 
to make their points. 
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1.7 Field Diary Entry: 20/03/13 10:45 
From what I can tell, by now the videoconferencing equipment is showing a split 
screen with a small group of accused, sitting on a crowded bench in front of a light 
blue wall on one side and another handful of men sitting in front of a red wall on 
something which looks like garden chairs and stools. I am struck by how normal 
they look, they are all wearing beards, but otherwise their attire of multi-coloured 
t-shirts evokes neither prison uniform nor visible signs of fanatical zeal that I 
naively expected. Chatting amongst themselves, sometimes squinting slightly past 
the camera, even laughing occasionally, I am struck by exactly how different these 
accused are from what I had expected. Clearly the routine of the trial, every 
Wednesday, for an hour or so over years, probably followed by appeals and 
reviews, has buried the edge of the potential death sentence standing at the end of 
it, in the boredom of prison routine. The men are young, perhaps in their late 
twenties early thirties, they are going to be much older by the time this trial nears 
its end. My attention is suddenly drawn from the screen to a small man, sweeping 
into the room, greeting everybody, making a few jokes and settling in, on the 
opposite side of the flock of defence lawyers. When I ask, the whispered answer is, 
that this is Rajiv Mohan, one of the most feared prosecutors in Delhi, the 
favourite of Special Cell, he is at the moment particularly busy because he is also 
the chief Public Prosecutor in the December 2013 Rape Case, which shook Delhi 
and the wider world. There a few young men in plain clothes who are milling 
about Rajiv Mohan, and who I am told are part of Special Cell, wearing no 
uniforms, nor any visible weapons, no one can tell me why exactly they have come 
to court, except to say, that they are under no legal obligation to be there. The case 
at hand, I am now told also has something to do with the Batla House 
encounter27, which followed it shortly after Special Cell took over and during 
which the alleged head of the conspiracy, Atef Amin, and some police officers died. 
                                                
27 The Batla house encounter, 19th September 2008 is 
perhaps one of the most controversial incidents of 
recent Delhi Counter Terrorism operations. A number 
of people were shot under very suspicious 
circumstances, including police officers and alleged 
terrorists. It is peripheral to this inquiry but more 
information on it can be found here: (‘Batla House 
Encounter: BJP Stages Protest, Accuses Congress of 




It has been one of the most controversial episodes in the recent history of Special 
Cell, described as a “fake encounter” by many commentators. 
1.8 Reader Relevance 
This inquiry matters because only if we understand the socially 
constructed nature of the terrorist, can we avoid playing into the 
hands of certainly dangerous social forces.28 Terrifying violence, the 
politicisation of fear29 and the playing with public perceptions are all 
very real evils in this world.30 But treating all terrorist alike oblivious 
to the processes of their making does nothing for our ability to work 
towards a safer and better world. This task is therefore both humble 
and hubristic. The aim of this investigation is to do away with the 
black box of ‘the terrorist’ that results in blanked fear and hatred 
leading to torture memos and policies such as ‘we do not negotiate 
with terrorists’ and to terrorists always only being the other guys.31 
Instead of this black box with its immense baggage I propose a more 
nuanced and slower appraisal of what is a step-by-step process of 
making a terrorist. By de-reifying the process of stabilising the 
terrorist we can gain an understanding of the phenomenon as socially 
constructed, precarious and relational but nevertheless real and 
impactful. In itself such a destabilisation, is not much, it is always 
easier to wreck something than to build something up. But the 
destabilisation opens the possibility of avenues for intervention. If we 
understand the terrorist and terrorism as emerging out of relations 
between actants encompassing human actors and a wide range of 
non-human actants, we gain new points of leverage for intervention. 
                                                
28 While the idea that terrorism is socially constructed 
has received some attention (Turk 2004; Vertigans 
2011) I focus on the concrete stabilization of the 
individual terrorist rather than the phenomenon. 
29  A powerful argument for this is made in (Prantl 
2008). 
30 Examples of all three of these problematic aspects 
can be found in the edited volume by (Raju 2004). 
31  There is a l ively debate about the appropriate 
reactions to terrorists and government policies reflect 
changing attitudes. See some examples from (Raven-
Hansen 2008; Sharma 2009; Neumann 2007; Blum and 
Heymann 2010; Browne and Dickson 2010; Waldron 
2004). 
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An assemblage/actor network approach allows this inquiry to 
sidestep easy and fallacious claims about counter-terrorism, ranging 
from incompetence, to incongruence, chaos and conspiracy and thus 
to show the emergence of the terrorist as a precarious and laborious 
process which is however entirely based in a delicately balanced 
choreography of ordinary steps and practices. This laborious, 
precarious and ordinary nature of the stabilisation of the terrorist 
adds further credence to the instinct to be careful about claims of 
extraordinary-ness and emergency in response to terrorism. 
1.9 Field Diary Entry: 20/03/13 11:00 
It is 1100 the judge is arriving and all stand. He makes no comment to me but I 
am the only visitor. Inside the room the windows are barred and boarded up, to 
allow the small AC to do its semblance of work. The proceedings begin, and I 
quickly realize where the action is. The lawyers, including the Prosecutor are in 
one big scrum in front of the judge, each pressing in to reach the judges attention, 
screaming and shouting in order to make their point. The judge is engrossed in his 
reading and only occasionally absentmindedly nods or waves his hand. While the 
din, and the swift moving back and forth between English and Hindi make it 
difficult for me to understand everything it is clear that this has not yet anything to 
do with the substantive proceedings, but rather that the list of witnesses and the 
schedule for today are being discussed, debated and negotiated. In a moment of 
quiet, the Prosecutor, motions me forward and tells me to sit on one of the Sofas in 
the first row. While he is grinning widely, he does not bother to even look at the 
judge before ordering me about the courtroom. While I am thankful to now have a 
comfortable seat allowing me to overhear even what the judge quietly tells his 
scribe, I quickly realize that this is not merely courtesy, but rather that the accused 
are now brought in and take over the back row. The two accuse in Delhi, are 
significantly more threatening looking than the ones seen on the flat screens. Not 
only are they very tall and bearded, but they are also surrounded by at least a 
dozen heavily armed police officers. The antique jumble of Second World War sub 
machine guns, First World War rifles, and knock offs of modern assault rifles 
made in China, display an anachronistic weaponry which oddly clashes with the 
modern flat screens and the smart phones of the lawyers.  Once the accused are 
brought inside, and two unarmed offices sitting at each of their sides, the rest moves 
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out of the room, and bars the door from the outside. While it sinks in that these 
men are suspected number one enemies of the state, I realise to my surprise that the 
accused and the officer to their left are holding hands, fingers entwined in an out of 
place intimacy. While I am trying to gauge this strange display, Rajat whispers in 
my ear that it has to do with security concerns in the light of the Supreme Court 
guidelines that accused were not allowed to be shackled inside the Court. The judge 
is listening to the second witness, some difficulties with the Teleconferencing 
equipment not withstanding he dictates the record steadily. While the witness 
speaks in Hindi, the judge translates the statement into English for the record, 
this is simultaneous to the speaking of the witness, the defence and the prosecution 
are barging in to offer suggestions how this word or that sentence should be 
translated differently. 
1.10 Literature Relevance 
Studies about terrorism abound. Even before 9/11 the terrorism 
literature was a prolific field and it has exploded since.32 With several 
dedicated journals, hundreds of books and thousands of articles the 
depth of engagement with some issues is impressive.33 Nevertheless, 
and this is perhaps a pre-programmed ‘disciplinary’ failure, the vast 
majority of accounts treats terrorists as given, discoverable entities. 
Where does Terrorism come from? This is a question most often 
answered with a mobilisation of political, social, theological, 
economic or psychological arguments.34 Terrorists are deterred,35 pre-
empted, 36  profiled, modelled, 37  contextualised, 38  countered, 39  and 
                                                
32  A great example of pre-9/11 literature is (Gearty 
1997). 
33 At the time of writing (26th of August 2016) a search 
of the term ‘Terrorism” on www.jstor.org results in 50 
289 results, while the SOAS library has 1031 books in 
its catalogue with terrorism in the title. 
34  See for example (Moghadam 2009) on the most 
extreme form of suicide terrorism and (Forest 2006) 
for an overview. 
35 See for example (Alex S. Wilner 2015; Das and Roy 
Chowdhury 2014; Ginges 1997; Dugan and Chenoweth 
2012). 
36 See for example (Goede 2008). 
37 See for example (George 2003; Lafree, Dugan, and 
Korte 2009). 
38 See for example (Tan 2006). 
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prosecuted.40 More rarely does the investigation touch upon how they 
make themselves. If it does, most often it focuses on radicalisation 
processes, group formation, indoctrination or disillusionment as 
processes of making the committing of terrorist acts plausible 
avenues for individuals.41 Inquiries aimed at investigating how ‘we’ 
make terrorists often smack of conspiracy theory.42 But between 
revisionist narratives of controlled explosions at the World Trade 
Centre, cruise missile attacks on the Pentagon and speculative 
scrutiny of the undoubtedly murky relations between the USA and 
Saudi Arabia there are a number of productive avenues for thought. 
Ranging from plausible accounts of the framing of individuals for 
acts they did not commit, over governance through maintaining a 
climate of fear, to the effect of speech acts and labelling theory on 
attaching the terrorist label to individuals. 43  Without wanting to 
critique labelling theory in an exhaustive way, the relative stability 
seen in the casting of terrorists suggests that there is more at work 
than symbolic interactionism.44 The transportability of terrorists and 
the operation of the terrorist category across time can be adequately 
explored under a framework of assemblage thinking and Actor 
Network Theory (ANT).45 
The harder questions, and more appropriate to ask than the question 
about the origins of terrorism, are; what is the relation between the 
                                                                                                         
39 An exploration of counterinsurgency is provided in 
(Sitaraman 2013) and contains many parallels to 
counterterrorism. 
40 See for the Indian context(Ganguly and Fidler 2009; 
J. Eckert 2012; Ghosh 2002) but also more widely and 
overlapping with counter-insurgency (Dixon 2012; 
Arquilla 2007). 
41 For example there is a large literature focusing on 
the role of rational choice in terrorist and counter 
terrorist decision making (Alex S. Wilner 2015; Bryan 
Caplan 2006; Ganor 2015; Etzioni 2010; Ellingsen 
2009; Fussey 2011). 
42 See (Jones 2010; Keenan 2006; Knight 2008). 
43 For example (Beyer 2009; Moghadam, Berger, and 
Beliakova 2014). 
44 For the beginnings of labeling theory and symbolic 
interactionism see (Mead 1964) but also more recently 
(Hacking 1999). 
45 For an introduction see (Latour 1999). 
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terrorist and terrorism? Why is this relation so consequential but also 
ephemeral in nature? Why is it that some people commit frightful acts 
and are not terrorists, whereas others engage in inane activities and 
become terrorists? What lies at the heart of the extraordinary 
repercussions that becoming a terrorist has for the individual? To 
find out more about these questions this inquiry ventures to the final 
arbiter of societal truth, the courts.46  
To take stock again before we dive in: we have a series of terrible 
incidents, a category the definition of which is continually embattled, 
an idea of an act – terrorism – which is considered the scourge of our 
time, an indeterminate group of people who become the embodiment 
of that embattled definition and the carriers of that idea and a 
frenzied, Sisyphean determination to eradicate both the carriers and 
the idea in the Global War on Terror in order to stop the incidents. 
The majority of studies in this regard treat the terrorist as 
exogenously given at the time of the incident. Their focus is on a 
becoming that takes place before the incident. A smaller share of the 
literature investigates the becoming through labelling. The risk with 
the first group is to jump straight from the incident to the war like 
mode of eradicating the enemy. The problem however remains that 
as long as we treat terrorists as black boxes rather than as a 
relationally constructed and stabilised group we are unable to 
perceive all the actors involved in their making and thus intervene 
where this intervention is most likely to be successful. Furthermore, 
without giving thought to the distributed agency in the assemblage 
action it is easy to misunderstand what makes terrorist facts. 
Therefore in this inquiry we are going to explore the becoming 
terrorist of two very concrete individuals, Nasir and Aftab, on their 
way through the Indian courts. The extraordinary repercussion this 
becoming terrorist has for them personally is belied by the mundane 
yet complex choreography of relations that stabilises them through 
the court. Furthermore the persons dropping on the wayside of the 
                                                
46 This draws both on my experience during participant 
observation and on literature such as (Shourie 2001; 
Merry 1994; Valverde 2005). 
 30 
road to terrorism as the cases percolate up through the courts 
illustrate the precarious nature of this stabilisation. Up to the point of 
the final and successful stabilisation at the Supreme Court by what 
time the initial translations and the laborious process of stabilisation 
has become all but invisible. Nasir and Aftab have become 
naturalised terrorist cogs that can be made to spin in macro 
explanations of terrorism and used to mobilise the determination to 
fight them at all cost. 
Some alternative understandings of terrorism focus on terrorist 
groups as organisations highlighting crossovers. For example 
Flanigan shows how the tactics employed by the Mexican drug cartels 
are similar to those of recognised terrorist organisations such as 
Hamas and Hezbollah (Flanigan 2012). The focus on groups is also 
evident in some strands of the literature focusing on group 
psychology (Tsintsadze-Maass and Maass 2014). Yet the field is split 
on psychological approaches. The focus on the psychology of 
‘irrational’ terrorism brings us closer to the individual terrorist, but 
many psychological explanations continue to focus on the making of 
the terrorist in the build up to the incident. (Rather than in the 
immediate aftermath as I am trying) Furthermore psychological 
studies of terrorists are “virtually unanimous” in their assessment of 
terrorists “primary shared characteristic [being] their normalcy” 
(Richardson 2007, 14). The conspiratorial literature which we have 
briefly encountered above aside there is a legitimate share of the 
literature which focuses on individuals becoming terrorists due to the 
framing by security organs. This has been a hot topic in the context 
of India particularly in respect of the attack on parliament on 13th 
December 2001 (Roy 2006).  
Of course there is another literature that plays a role here, this 
literature focuses on processes of law, articulations of social realities 
and the production of facts through the crafting of chains of 
references. The immediate aftermath of the incident and the legal 
process, through which the terrorist is determined, involves an array 
of actors who are invisible in standard accounts of terrorism. To 
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venture into the non-standard accounts, building on ANT and 
Latour’s seminal study of the Conseil D’Etat the role of files, 
circulations and associations can be made visible. (Latour 2004) 
Further the role of early conversations between actors in determining 
the path of a case and its facts adds to the layers of circulations 
visible. (Scheffer, Hannken-Illjes, and Kozin 2007) Ultimately the co-
articulated terrorist taking place between security and law requires a 
look at the accounts the actors themselves deliver of their role in this 
process. It becomes clear throughout this study that while building 
on Latour’s ethnography of the Conseil d’Etat gives us a tremendous 
leg up in tracing the terror court assemblage there are elements here 
which go beyond the slow, hesitant and deliberate passage of law 
described in his study. Therefore, while building on Latour, I do not 
zoom in on the processes described at length by him and his 
disciples, but rather use those processes as juxtaposition to what we 
observe in the TCAs under scrutiny to focus on the interplay between 
modalities of law and modalities of security. 
1.11 Field Diary Entry: 20/03/13 11:15 
Occasionally a major spat develops but otherwise the judge, slowly and calmly 
dictates his translation of the witness statement. While it is tempting to only follow 
the slow droning voice of the dictating judge, it is clear that in the process of 
translating the bursts of sentences and fits of words, coming from the witness in 
reply to the prosecution prompts or the judges questions, are not only changed in 
tone by the translation taking place. While the judge checks back with the witness 
from time to time to ensure that the words used are understood and clear to them 
as well the cacophony of prosecutorial suggestions and the objections of the defence 
lawyers is creating such a din that the judge has to intervene repeatedly to ensure 
that the accused are still able to hear and understand what the witness is saying. 
1.12 Methodological Relevance 
Understanding the mechanics of terrorist becoming in the light of 
assemblage thinking also has a methodological impact. Assemblage 
thinking allows us to look at the process of making the terrorist in the 
court. It also allows us to understand the role objects play in the 
 32 
stabilisation processes taking place and how the terrorist can be 
stabilised beyond the moment of terror that is the incident. 
Assemblage thinking is the amalgamation of Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) and assemblage as used by Deleuze and Guattari. “Conjoining 
the two approaches […] brings the tried-and-tested ANT toolbox of 
concepts to bear on empirical studies of the emergence of order and 
disorder in a more-than-human world” (Müller and Schurr 2016, 
226). Using the Court as the location for tracing the assemblage 
allows the temporal delineation of the case studies as specific legal 
cases with a beginning and an end. The court setting allows us to 
circumscribe our actants and to look at a more or less contained 
process in which nevertheless pressures from society, state, 
international and religion are reflected.47 Furthermore the Courts are 
a likely starting point for this investigation because they are often 
perceived as arbiters and makers of societal truth (Fennell 2013; 
Dasgupta 2006). Using the court as a space for the containment of 
the case study also brings in an engagement with the law. This in turn 
allows me to use the definitions of terrorism in law and the 
benchmark for process provided by the law on procedure. The 
constant debate surrounding the definition of terrorism stands in 
tension with on one hand the often all-encompassing definition in 
specific domestic jurisdictions and on the other hand the coherent 
application that can be observed.48 Since starting from the aggregate 
phenomenon to say something about the practices has not yielded 
satisfactory results I turn this method on its head. In this enquiry I 
have attempted to study up rather than down. Starting with a mind 
set of respect for my ‘objects of study’, interview partners and 
participants during my observations. The important thing to keep in 
                                                
47 These four areas of relevance build on the triangle 
model of plurality conscious law as developed in (W. 
F. Menski 2006a) and later developments of the kite. 
(W. Menski 2011) 
48  For debates on the definition of terrorism see 
contributions by (Hardy and Williams 2011; Bruce 
2013; Escribano Úbeda-Portugués 2011; Golder and 
Williams George 2004; Greene 2014; Grozdanova 
2014; Ruby 2002; Herschinger 2013; A. Schmid 2004; 
A. P. Schmid 2012). 
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mind for me was that each one there, even the illiterate Chaiwalla or 
the ill-tempered driver knew something about the collective I studied 
that I didn’t. This belief, while certainly challenging at times, ties in 
with the naivety that ANT scholars mention frequently and with the 
deeply ingrained respect that serious veteran scholars bring to their 
work. “[G]iving an explanation should not be confused with 
substituting a phenomenon for a social one” (Latour 2007, 102). 
1.13 Field Diary Entry: 20/03/13 11:30 
At 1130 there is another unclear point in the statement of the witness, it is 
resolved through a debate between prosecution and defence lawyers, with the judge 
deciding the final version to go into the record. As I am surprised at the large 
amount of plainclothes people attending the court today I am told by Rajat that all 
of them are police officers, when I express my further surprise at the lack of 
uniforms, Rajat tells me that while police in principle are obliged to wear uniforms 
at all times on duty, there are a number of exceptions, resulting in almost nobody 
wearing them. The exceptions include Special Cell, CBI and retired officers. 
1.14 Plan 
In order to make my argument in this thesis I am proceeding in eight 
chapters. This introduction is chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 combines insights from assemblage thinking with elements 
from Actor Network Theory to set the theoretical frame for this 
work. It deploys my own theoretical device, the Terror Court 
Assemblage to understand the operation of stabilising the terrorist. 
The Terror Court Assemblage draws on a theoretical register 
influenced by assemblage thinking and Actor Network Theory to 
gather the tools necessary for the subsequent case studies. In addition 
to building up our toolkit and vocabulary for the study, the second 
chapter also provides a first example drawn from the judgement in 
the Mumbai Attack of 26th of November 2008. This example helps 
illustrate the way in which the TCA works. 
Chapter 3 turns to the role theories play in the assemblage. Far from 
being in competition with assemblage thinking, other theories used to 
make sense of terrorism play a role in the assemblage. The role of 
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territorialisation of the assemblage is explored and how theories play 
a role as actants in their own right. All four macro-theoretical 
directions that we encounter in the chapter - systems theory, critical 
legal studies, exception/emergency and sovereignty, power and 
governance - play roles in the assemblage. Brought in by actors 
themselves they play a role in shaping and influencing their causality 
expectations, their perception of legitimate actors and the roles they 
play, these theories leave traces and thus have a bearing in the 
assemblage. 
In chapter 4 the concrete method for the case studies and the 
fieldwork is explored. This ties in the theoretical framework of 
assemblage thinking with methodological implications of doing 
fieldwork. In this chapter, I also explore the case study approach and 
the tracing of actants through participant observation and interviews. 
The fifth chapter draws on the interviews to sketch the productive 
‘mess’ out of which the terrorists are assembled. Drawing 
predominantly on the interviews, and to a lesser extent also on the 
participant observation this chapter maps the pre-existing legal 
assemblage and the pre-existing security assemblage as well as the 
heterogeneity of the background for the Terror Court Assemblage. In 
this chapter I follow actants to trace the connections they are making. 
This juxtaposition of the confusing picture that emerges as backdrop, 
highlights how surprising the smoothness and stability of the 
emergent terrorist is. These accounts of how actors portray their own 
involvement in the assemblage highlight the different strategies the 
human actors employ to deal with distributed agency. As part of this 
chapters the actors interviewed also speculate on the elements of the 
chain of reference which articulates the terrorist facts that run 
counter to the expectation of the passage of law. Therefore their 
contributions highlight the role that modalities of security, quick, 
prehensile and reactive play in shortcutting the slow, deliberate and 
hesitant legal detour. These speculations are by no means uniform, 
but the themes of detour/shortcut and slow and deliberate/ quick 
and prehensile are reoccurring, shedding some light on the micro 
 35 
stabilisations taking place during the crafting of the initial chain of 
reference.  
The first case study in chapter 6 explores the becoming terrorist of 
Nasir. Drawing mainly on the judgments and my participant 
observation this chapter follows the series of stabilisations and 
translations that lead to the emergence of Nasir as terrorist. Despite 
the incident for the Nasir TCA taking place in 2002 whereas the 
incidents for the Aftab TCA took place earlier in 1997/1998 I begin 
with Nasir because the choreography involved is slightly less 
complex. Nasir is stabilised in a series of translations and connections 
but there is only a single incident in respect of which he is stabilised 
as terrorist. 
In contrast the seventh chapter turns to the stabilisation of Aftab. In 
the Aftab TCA a number of incidents are established as a series 
before actants are successfully choreographed to stabilise Aftab as 
terrorist. This case study is more complex than the first due to the 
greater number of moving parts. It reinforces the role of actants for 
the stabilisation of terrorists as well as the tensions between the pre-
existing legal assemblage and the pre-existing security assemblage. 
These tensions are overcome through a successful choreography of 
relations, which stabilises Aftab as terrorist. 
Following a brief summary of the argument, the conclusion in 
chapter eight provides an outlook that goes beyond the stabilisation 
of terrorists in the Terror Court Assemblage. In this chapter I offer 
some thoughts on the theoretical and practical implications of this 
work for future research and policy evaluation. Not only does an 
opening of the black box of the terrorist allow a better identification 
of avenues for intervention but listening to actors’ speculation shows 
the tension between the scripts and modalitites drawn upon. Drawing 
on the work of Kyle McGee it becomes clear that in the co-
articulation of the pre-existing legal assemblage and the pre-existing 
security assemblage normative tensions arise. (McGee 2014) Tensions 
which result in some surprising shortcuts in the otherwise slow and 
meandering chain of reference that the TCA uses to make the 
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terrorist facts speak for themselves. These shortcuts where the 
passage of law as we know it from Latour would lead us to expect 
detours are only visible when paying microscopic attention to the 
crafting the chain of reference at the lower courts. Each vinculum, 
linking an insignificant event to a body of texts, has to be scrutinised 
to see how, when these micro-stabilisations are bundled together they 
result in chain links, the stability of which we would struggle to 
explain purely by recourse to the modality of the passage of law. 
Drawing on this observation and on the actors’ speculation in the 
interviews I bring out the tension between modalities of law and 
modalities of security in articulating the assemblage and ultimately 
making the terrorist fact speak for itself. 
1.16 Field Diary Entry: 20/03/13 11:45 
There is some commotion, the room is sealed and the nervousness of the police 
officers visibly increases. Before I can ask what is happening, I can see one 
plainclothes officer carrying two Tupperware boxes, with yellow lids and so much 
brown postal tape around them that they look like misshapen bees. The officer 
shows the boxes first to the reader and then presents them to the witness who 
under the supervision of the judge and the Argus eyes of the defence breaks the 
little leaden seals and begins to unceremoniously unwrap the brown tape. By now 
Rajat has whispered to me that this is the bomb that did not go off. After glancing 
at the bomb the judge is satisfied that it was indeed put there at some time after it 
was recovered by the bomb disposal squad and that it is the same bomb as the one 
the expert put in the box. While there are complaints from the side of the defence 
that the chain of custody was broken, that it was not sealed properly and 
immediately, the judge dismisses this and records only the identification of the 
witness. While this is going on, the seal on the room has been lifted, and whereas 
the bomb is still sitting on the desk in front of the judge, there is a constant trickle 
of defence lawyers into and out of the room. 
1.17 Wider Outlook & Link Chapter II 
The contribution of showing how a terrorist is made and maintained 
sidesteps stuck debates about definitions, positionality and 
politicisation of terrorism while at the same time opening the black 
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box of the terrorist. The far-reaching effects that accepting someone 
as terrorist has, should make everybody extremely cautious about 
taking the terrorist as reified category for granted. Knowing that the 
black-box of the terrorist can be taken apart to look at the 
mechanisms normally hidden within does away with getting stuck in 
rhetorical deliberations about one man’s freedom fighter being 
another man’s terrorist. Nevertheless in order to illustrate the power 
dimensions of the successful assembling of a terrorist we should be 
weary of following other broad-brush explanations of macro 
phenomena, from theology, psychology, sociology or even military 
strategy. Through this inquiry I illustrate how step by step the 
stabilisation of the terrorist remains precarious until the point when it 
is successful and then conceals the process of its own making. The 
case studies are specifically from India, but the mechanism of 
stabilisation, whether it works through the courts, the media and 
parliaments or within a family or group of friends follows similar 
patterns. More importantly while the case studies are very specific, 
microscopic choreographies, it is through many processes like the 
ones described and analysed that terrorism gains its current form. 
Finally, showing in two examples, that terrorists are not inputs for 
processes in courts but their outcome has consequences for the ways 
in which we as a society conceive of our strategies to minimise the 
number and impact of terrifying incidents in our midst.  
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Chapter 2 – Assemblage Thinking and the 
Terror Court Assemblage 
2.1 Terrorist Assemblages 
In this chapter I explore assemblage thinking and actor network 
theory and begin to set out the tools required for tracing the making 
of terrorists in Indian courts. In the process of doing this assemblage 
thinking originally associated with the works of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari (e.g. 2004b) is brought into tension with Actor 
Network Theory (ANT) chiefly associated with Bruno Latour.49 This 
chapter also touches upon and draws from other interpretations 
including the works of John Law, Kyle McGee and Thomas Scheffer. 
Fundamentally assemblages and ANT emerge out of the same 
intellectual tradition. Their most important contemporary intellectual 
siblings include science and technology studies (STS). 50  Some 
controversy exists regarding the relationship between ANT and 
assemblages. John Law is one of the primary champions of their 
similarities (John Law 2008). Whereas Graham Harman regards 
Deleuze and Latour as pursuing separate interests, the first in flux 
and flow and the latter in specific entities (Harman 2009, 30 & 31). 
To pursue an inquiry into the making of the terrorist requires theory 
and method to be attuned to both circulations in flux and the 
working of specific entities. Therefore I follow the example of Martin 
Müller and Caroline Schurr who are amongst the latest to focus on 
“the fertile space in between” ANT and assemblages instead of 
getting bogged down in their differences (Müller and Schurr 2016). 
Out of this fertile space I assemble a toolkit that draws from both 
Assemblages and ANT focusing on faire-faire, making-do and 
                                                
49 The acronym ANT is how most ANT scholars refer 
to the theory. A great discussion of the problems with 
the naming of the theory and the acronym can be 
found in (Latour 1999). 
50 There is some overlap between Assemblages, ANT 
and STS, but to explore the making of terrorists in 
Indian courts STS is only of peripheral importance. 
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making-speak. Using this toolkit I can trace the chains of references 
that articulate the terrorist through the Terror Court Assemblage. 
Going beyond the processes of detournenement and hesitation of 
Latour’s seminal ‘La Fabrique du Droit’ I zoom in on the tensions 
and stabilisations that give rise to the judgment in which terrorist 
facts speak for themselves. (Latour 2004) To achieve this I turn first 
to the literature on ANT and Assemblage, before sketching the 
Terror Court Assemblage as my frame of reference and linking it to 
examples from the 2008 Mumbai Attacks. 
2.2 Actor Network Theory 
Predominantly coined by Latour, ANT developed out of his 
sociology of associations. As a theory therefore its ambit is much 
wider and more fundamental than the legal field although there are 
fruitful applications of ANT in law as we will encounter below. The 
first concepts to be drawn from ANT are relational materiality and 
performativity (John Law and Hassard 1999, 4). These two concepts 
are prerequisites not only for the working of ANT but also for the 
central claim of this thesis that the concrete Terrorist is made after 
the dust settles and not prior to the explosion. Our attention is 
therefore drawn both to the relations in which the terrorist arises and 
the performance that is required to maintain stability. The third key 
concept that I explore in this section is translation. As a final step in 
this section I turn to some limitations of ANT and what they mean 
for this project. 
2.2.1 Relational Materiality and the Anchoring Chain of 
Reference 
Starting from a common point of departure with assemblage thinkers 
John Law sets out one of the first elements of ANT. 
 [In] a ruthless application of 
semiotics [ANT] tells that entities take 
their form and acquire their 
attributes as a result of their 
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relations with other entities. In this 
scheme of things entities have no 
inherent qualities: essentialist 
divisions are thrown on the bonfire 
of the dualisms (John Law and 
Hassard 1999, 3). 
Following this insight it has to be conceded that the terrorist does not 
exist out there as an essential entity waiting to be unveiled. In the 
absence of stable circulations of meaning no terrorist exists. However 
and this is very important: 
 [I]t is not in this world-view, that 
there are no divisions. It is rather 
that such divisions or distinctions 
are understood as effects or outcomes. 
They are not given in the order of 
things (John Law and Hassard 1999, 
3). 
So while there is no essential terrorist naturally occurring in the order 
of things, terrorists do exist and are stable blocks of our everyday life. 
They come into being and are maintained in existence in relation to 
other entities. The coming into being of a terrorist fact as a stable 
block that can be transported and thus used in other contexts is 
shaped by constant negotiations, enrolments and associations 
between actors. These tensions pass through trials. “Trials are ‘in the 
middle’ of networks: they are what occur between elements in the 
active negotiation of alliance-building, in this way constituting them 
as elements and are integral to the extraction of continuity from 
multiplicity and heterogeneity.” (McGee 2014, 4) A sequence of 
successful trials creates a chain of reference, which constitutes the 
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choreography of a fact. As the workings of the assemblage churn on 
this chain of reference on which the fact stands is increasingly made 
invisible giving rise to a seemingly stand alone fact. The fact, in our 
case the terrorist, speaks for itself however this fact could only come 
into existence through the relations that are embedded in its chain of 
reference. The sleight of hand, which enables the TCA to articulate 
the terrorist, is making invisible these chains of reference, to make 
the terrorist speak itself, seemingly as a standalone fact. Yet this 
stability only holds fast through movement, the constantly performed 
circulation of references. Terrorist facts therefore need to be 
performed. 
2.2.2 Performativity and Vincula Juris  
[E]ntities achieve their form as a 
consequence of the relations in 
which they are located. But this 
means that it also tells us that they 
are performed in, by, and through 
those relations” (John Law and 
Hassard 1999). 
Therefore terrorists as entities with a form come into existence 
through the performance of terrorist relations. However this also 
means that: 
[E]verything is uncertain and 
reversible, at least in principle. […] 
there has been much effort to 
understand how it is that durability is 
achieved. How it is that things get 
performed (and perform 
themselves) into relations that are 
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relatively stable and stay in place. 
[…] Performativity which 
(sometimes) makes durability and 
fixity. […] If relations do not hold 
fast by themselves, then they have 
to be performed (John Law and 
Hassard 1999, 3). 
Continuous performance is therefore required to stabilise the 
terrorist. The stability that seems so elusive in the above quote is 
achieved through embedding the on-going circulations of terrorist 
performances into a wider assemblage.51 Latour introduces us to the 
concept of vincula juris, which are little bonds between insignificant 
events and a corpus of texts. (Latour 2010, 274) In the words of 
McGee vincula are “little connective/selective translations”. (McGee 
2014, 163) Actors engage in making vincula to allow the passage of 
law and through this cause a juridification of an ecology of practices. 
In our case vincula create bonds between a corpus of texts, most 
prominent a body of laws engaged in a pre-existing legal assemblage 
but also of other texts, and a series of insignificant events. It is 
important to note here that insignificant does not mean unimportant, 
but rather that the event prior to the vincula does not signify itself. 
The event is made to speak its significance through the link with the 
body of text which, for example, turns an overheard conversation 
into the legal category of the meeting of minds. In the process of 
these translations “[e]verything is transformed, or re-created. The rich 
diversity of associations composing the very substance of things is 
stripped away, and a new, slimmer version – one capable of fitting in 
the dossier – is fashioned.” (McGee 2014, 164) So far the existent 
accounts of ANT in Latour and McGee, however when looking at 
                                                
51  In this case the a pre-existing legal assemblage, 
however it is entirely conceivable that a similar project 
zooming in on for example policies, media, training, 
education etc. would produce very interesting results.  
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the making of terrorists in court there are gaps in the chains of 
reference underlying the dossier that the actors fill with reference to a 
pre-existing security assemblage to which we will return in Chapter 3. 
We have already touched upon it briefly above, but in order to have 
continuous performance another concept is required. Translation has 
taken a back seat in some aspects of ANT but is crucial to assemblage 
thinking. In the process of making relational materiality and 
performativity clearer I will have to engage in translations therefore it 
only makes sense to insert it here before revisiting relational 
materiality and performativity. Translation is even more important as 
I begin to investigate how relative stability is achieved. 
2.2.3 Translation 
The concept of translation is of continuous importance. I need it 
immediately here to explain the difficulty of extrapolating a position 
for ANT and subsequently to apply the assembled toolkit to the 
stabilisation of the terrorist. Translation is also necessary to account 
for some of the transformations observed in the case studies. 
Drawing on Law and Hassard, translation as I use it encompasses 
three components (1999). A translation is a process that makes two 
things that are not the same equivalent. Secondly this making 
equivalent has consequences. Thirdly it is a practiced process that 
requires work. This work is continuously necessary and while it may 
be more or less visible, the moment it ceases or is disturbed too 
drastically the translation fails. As such translations can have 
successful phases and unsuccessful phases. 
For example sensory information is translated into an account that is 
then translated into evidence in the form of a witness statement. At 
its most basic “translation is the process or the work of making two 
things that are not the same, equivalent” (John Law and Hassard 
1999, 8). This is a precarious process. Additionally to the risk of 
failure there is also a risk that the consequences of this making 
equivalent are unpredictable. This danger is described by John Law as 
traduction/trahison using a word play on the French similarity 
between translation and betrayal (John Law 1999). Translation is a 
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perennial part of interaction but always involves work. A simple 
example: Yesterday two dogs chased me. Focusing on only the 
simplest translation in this event, the similarity between canines was 
sufficient to overcome the differences between a Chihuahua and a 
Rottweiler. The material differences not only of a very small and 
harmless dog and a very large and dangerous one, but also of the very 
different experience of being chased by one were made equivalent by 
translating both into dogs. The similarities are highlighted and the 
differences suppressed. This example is extremely simple yet the 
simplicity does not mean that we are talking about mere labelling 
here, translation, despite its common usage is not limited to a 
separate linguistic realm. Both in ANT and in assemblage thinking 
material and symbolic expressions coexist heterogeneously, 
preventing translations from privileging one over the other. Another 
example can perhaps help to make this clearer. In a seminal article 
about the scallops of St Brieuc Bay Michel Callon defines translation 
as “a general process […] during which the identity of actors, the 
possibility of interaction and the margins of manoeuvre are 
negotiated and delimited” (Callon 1984, 6). Translations occur 
between the scallops, oceanic currents in St Brieuc Bay and the new 
technologies introduced by actors. The human cannot be privileged 
over the non-human and by extension translations cannot be limited 
to a semantic realm as in labelling theory.52  
We now have two components for translation at hand; the first is a 
process of making two entities that are not the same equivalent. The 
second is that this process (when stable) has consequences that set 
the scope for ensuing possibilities. Annemarie Mol powerfully 
identifies a third dimension to processes of translation in her research 
                                                
52  Callon goes on to identify instances where 
researchers insert themselves into the case study and 
translate it for their purposes. The concept of 
translation as I use it also has implications for my 
methodology as I, as the researcher, author and 
translator of this inquiry must constantly remain aware 
of the translation that I am engaging in. 
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on how three different instances of arteriosclerosis 53  are more 
different than the textbooks suggest (Berg and Mol 1998). Their work 
contributes to translation as they show how the practitioners make 
links over differences, through hard work, in order to achieve an 
important end. She reaches the conclusion that ultimately “practices 
are all we have, that there is nothing above or underneath them” 
(Berg and Mol 1998, 163). These enacted and enforced links stand in 
contrast to the “nice […] smooth story [in which] One thing leads to 
another. There are correlations […] between different aspects of 
arteriosclerosis, which are all, to be sure, expressions of the 
underlying disease. It is a nice smooth story, but not one that 
necessarily works in practice” (John Law 1999, 9). The pinnacle of 
translations is the operation of a blackbox. “[T]he black box is said to 
act as a single unit and prevent other actors from glimpsing the 
working of its parts – or even that it possesses parts. It receives an 
input and produces a fully predictable output.” (McGee 2014, 7) 
Translations that occur inside of the black box are removed from 
view and scrutiny. Far removed from the initial example about the 
two dogs it shows the continued important of translation as a 
concept. It is important to keep in mind the three components of 
translation as I begin to make the links between ANT and our own 
exercise in assemblage thinking. In doing this I am making two 
things, which are not the same equivalent. I am setting in motion a 
process that sets the scope of the possible findings for this research 
and for the sake of practicalities I am working to make links. I am 
translating ANT into the project and need to ensure not to betray any 
part in the process. Equipped with these new analytic tools and the 
warning about traduction/trahison I can begin by translating 
relational materiality and performativity. 
                                                
53 If one looks in the dictionary Arteriosclerosis is a 
disease of the veins. However Mol’s point is that it 
really is either a bundle of symptoms suffered by 
patients and translated by the physician or traces on 
the microscope of the pathologist and that although 
we maintain continuity between those two they are 
mutually exclusive. 
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2.2.4 Relational Materiality and Performativity Translated 
What does John Law mean when he says, “that entities take their 
form and acquire their attributes as a result of their relations with 
other entities”? (John Law and Hassard 1999, 3). His question 
requires translation to become immediately relevant to this inquiry. 
To generate new insights about the making of terrorists let me first 
return to our acquaintances the two dogs from above. One of them 
was a very small and harmless Chihuahua and the other one was a 
very large and dangerous Rottweiler. The simplest insight from 
relational materiality is that very small and very large only come into 
existence relationally. Equally the Chihuahua is only harmless in 
relation to a fully sized human being, or perhaps in comparison to a 
Rottweiler. This insight is neither particularly novel nor ground 
breaking. It becomes more relevant for this inquiry by extending it to 
the often-used adage that ‘one man’s (A) terrorist (C1) is another 
man’s (B) freedom fighter (C2)’. So what are we talking about? We 
have three people: A, B and C. In the relation between A and C, the 
latter becomes terrorist (C1). In the relation between B and C, this is 
different and C2 becomes a freedom fighter. In a universe consisting 
solely of A, B and C and the researcher, and containing only two 
avenues of categorisation, terrorist and freedom fighter, the inquiry 
would more or less predictably conclude with the above-mentioned 
adage. 
However, we find ourselves in a world populated by a significantly 
larger number of people, interactions amongst countless actants 
(human and non-human actors) draw together and fall apart in 
precarious and contingent relations. Relations are precarious, i.e. they 
can fail. This is not to say that relations are interrupted completely, 
but rather that the quality of relations can change dramatically to the 
point where the erstwhile relation is completely muted. So for 
example the most common relation between people and newspapers 
is one of information translations. It is the news part of newspaper 
that is in the foreground. Newspaper is also an excellent fire starter 
however and so the relation between person and newspaper could 
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also privilege the paper aspect of the newspaper and use it to get the 
BBQ started. A newspaper is neither essentially an extension of the 
voice of the editors and journalists nor is it essentially a fire starter.54 
However it has the capacities to enter into sets of relations in which it 
becomes one or the other. The realm of virtual capacities is only 
suspended in the actualisation of particular relations. That ‘relations 
are precarious’ means that the actualisation of a particular relation is 
not the default in and of itself. However in a specific network of 
relations certain propensities are facilitated whereas others are made 
more difficult. If we assume for simplicity’s sake the Rottweiler’s 
disposition makes it a fifty-fifty chance of either enduring my 
investigation in a docile manner or of chasing me around the block 
then both relations are equally likely. However if we introduce 
another set of actants, for example concepts of ownership, liability, 
public health and safety regulations, a dog owner, the state as well as 
a leash and collar, then it becomes much less likely that the dog will 
have a chance at chasing the researcher. There is however one big 
caveat. I would argue that the researcher could not any longer 
responsibly claim to be studying anything about the dog without 
taking into account the assemblage in which the ‘studyable’ dog 
becomes possible. This interrelation between networks of continually 
working precarious relations is what I mean by contingency. The dog 
as object of study is contingent on a host of other relations, changes 
in which affect other relations in the network. The assemblage dog-
as-subject-to-public-safety-regulations interacts with the assemblage 
canine-hunter-human-prey making dog-as-object-of-study actual. In 
addition to these relations being precarious and contingent the 
example illustrates one more thing. In assemblage thinking actants are 
not limited to actors as traditionally understood in most other 
                                                
54 This draws on an ontology inspired by Meillassoux 
and Harman. One of their points, which is of 
importance for this inquiry, is that while entities have 
an essence this essence does not interact and is 
therefore not something accessible to the senses, 
properties, capacities, forms and attributes are real and 
accessible but only come into existence relationally to 
an other entity. 
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theoretical frameworks. Rather assemblage thinking refuses the a 
priori delimitation of action to the “ ‘intentional’, ‘meaningful’ [that] 
humans do” (Latour 2007, 71). If we go back to our example of the 
dog, if the owner holds the dog back from attacking the researcher 
with a leash this changes the relations between the three. Following 
Latour’s logic, the leash is an actant, as holding back an angry but 
leashed Rottweiler is not at all the same thing as doing so with your 
bare hands. The leash is in this case an actant; its participation in the 
action changes something important about the action. This is not the 
same as claiming causality. “ANT is not the empty claim that objects 
do things ‘instead’ of human actors: it simply says that no science of 
the social can even begin if the question of who and what participates 
in the action is not first of all thoroughly explored, even though it 
might mean letting elements in which, for a lack of a better term, we 
would call non-humans” (Latour 2007, 72). Identifying these 
heterogeneous, human and non-human, actants is a part of the 
scientific enquiry rather than something taken for granted. Therefore, 
for the purposes of our inquiry, we have to keep an open mind to 
interrelations between heterogeneous actants. Nevertheless 
interrelations between humans and non-humans are not the core 
focus of this enquiry, having been done at length in La Fabrique du 
Droit rather the focus here is on how the terrorist is made to act, 
speak and emerge as a stand-alone fact in the judgment. This requires 
us to remain attuned to interactions between humans and non-
humans but to build on these associations while zooming in on 
something else. The focus is on the joint crafting of the terrorist fact 
between the slow and deliberate passage of law with its hesitant 
modality and the fast, prehensile and shortcut prone modality of 
security. 
Despite this dramatic increase in complexity we are faced with 
relatively stable categories of ‘terrorist’. True enough, they are 
contested at the edges and change over time. Individuals and 
organisations move through transient phases of terrorist relations 
with their surroundings. The African National Congress, Hezbollah, 
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Pablo Escobar, Anders Breivik, the PLO and Mac Maharajah are just 
a few examples of actants that have transiently been in relations in 
which they were terrorist. (As well as political, criminal, insurgent, 
revolutionary) Yet despite examples of transience terrorist relations 
are often persistent and widespread. Actors such as Al Qaeda, 
Lashkar-e-Toiba, Abu Sayyaf Group, Boko Haram, Al Shabab are 
terrorist in their relation to large swathes of the mainstream public, 
media and academics. 55  Again, I am not making an essentialist 
argument about what these entities are, but only about what they are 
in relation to other actants. In the absence of a consensual definition 
of terrorism that could be consulted to decide who is a terrorist and 
who isn’t, terrorist relations are surprisingly stable. That relations can 
be transient but can also be relatively stable is a result of the next 
aspect of the assemblage approach. In assemblages relations need to 
be performed. Actants are the performance of their relations with 
other actants. This performance is inherently contingent and 
precarious but can be stabilised through translations. Keeping in 
mind the definition of translation as “a general process […] during 
which the identity of actors, the possibility of interaction and the 
margins of manoeuvre are negotiated and delimited” (Callon 1984, 6). 
How does the performance of relations work which results in stable, 
widespread and persistent A – C1 type relations (Terrorist) and 
supress B – C2 relations (Rather than to stick only with the freedom 
fighter example here, B – C2 relations can be all relations in which C 
is not terrorist). In this respect assemblage thinking offers an avenue, 
which bypasses the agency versus structure debate. We cannot 
explain C1 the Terrorist solely based on their position in a 
system/structure nor should we consider them a fully autonomous 
free agent who can turn around what they are with a single conscious 
decision. This assemblage account is close to discursive accounts but 
differs slightly methodologically as it only follows the traces of 
                                                
55  On example which is particularly pertinent in the 
Indian context is that of the Maoists/Naxalites whose 
position is continuously redefined between terrorist 
and insurgent (Misra 2002; Rajagopalan 2007; N. 
Goswami 2014) and (Jeffrey, Sen, and Singh 2012). 
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actants and recognises the important role non-humans play as actors 
and mediators.56 
2.2.5 Critiques and Limitations of ANT 
Traditional ANT accounts do not customarily rely on interview 
evidence in tracing their networks and following their actants. As 
such the role that interviews play in this thesis goes beyond a 
traditional Latourian exploration of the passage of law. The inquiry 
here builds on Latour and ANT to the extent that we arrive at a point 
of puzzlement. When tracing the TCA we are able to follow the 
meandering detours of the passage of law up to the point when we 
encounter a surprising shortcut. The chain of reference is seemingly 
interrupted and legal actants, which we would have expected to be 
connected, articulated and inflected, are left seemingly as a loose end. 
This we have to then consider in juxtaposition with the stable facts of 
terrorism. The chain of reference cannot be interrupted as it 
functions to articulate the terrorist facts and makes the terrorist 
speak. The interviews are included to allow the participant actors to 
speculate on these lacunae in the expected chain of reference and to 
shed some light onto how the actors themselves make sense of the 
heterogeneity between modalities of law and order, which we expect, 
and modalities of security, which are surprising when encountered 
during the passage of law. The TCA is unique in this sense as it 
includes these modalities novel to the passage of law as described by 
Latour and the interviews allow us to use a different angle to shed 
some light on the apparent gaps in the chain of reference. Other 
challenges to ANT remain of course from other perspectives. 
                                                
56  Foucauldian discourse theory as well as other 
discursive traditions should be understood as parallel 
rather than antagonistic projects to this one. Deleuze 
himself published on overlaps between their theories 
(Deleuze 2006). The usefulness of the actor network 
lies in its analytic toolkit as well as the role of objects, 
inscriptions and diffuse causality which make it a very 
good fit for analyzing legal proceedings. While there 
are abundant readings on bio-power in terrorism 
studies, there is a relative dearth of scholarship on 
Foucault and the law, excellent exceptions include 
(Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009). 
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2.2.5.1	Challenges	Arising	Internally	from	ANT	
Internally Actor Network Theory is deeply ambivalent as it tries to 
reconcile two contrary pulls, between generalizability and 
concreteness. The weight of academic practices, such as those aimed 
at making theories transportable and generalizable, exerts a 
gravitational pull on ANT. As a result it has been condensed into a 
nameable, transportable and centralised Actor Network Theory. 
For the naming of the theory, its 
conversion into acronym, its rapid 
displacement into the textbooks, the 
little descriptive accolades – or for 
that matter the equally quick 
rubbishings – all these are a sign of 
its respectability. Of its diffusion. 
Or, perhaps better, its translation 
(John Law and Hassard 1999, 2). 
 The other pull exerted on assemblage thinking is the Fliehkraft57 of 
assemblage as a living thought practice. Deleuze and Guattari use the 
metaphors of arborescence versus the rhizome, or territoriality versus 
nomadism to describe “the tension between centring and 
displacement” (John Law and Hassard 1999, 2). Fliehkraft highlights 
the force of flight, the propensity of bodies to escape. We can 
understand celestial bodies, like the moon, as balanced in equilibrium 
between the centrifugal force of their orbit and a gravitational pull, in 
the moon’s case of the earth. If that equilibrium is upset in one 
direction or another the celestial body comes crashing down or loses 
itself in empty space. Assemblage thinking, has a force of flight, which 
is constantly capable of interaction and re-arrangement, elusive and 
impossible to pin down by the gravity of academic circumscription 
                                                
57 Its l iteral translation from German is force of flight, 
as in escape. 
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exerted by actor-network theory. Making it crash down to earth surely 
makes for easier inspection but makes it impossible to observe it in 
flight. The thesis needs to be maintained in a more or less stable 
orbit. The gravitational pull of academic practices enacted in actor 
network theory is needed to keep the argument in sight of known 
academic ground. The force of flight of assemblage thinking allows 
the observation of the role of objects/actants in the uneasy fusing of 
a security assemblage and a rule of law assemblage in the terror court 
assemblage. The underlying tension that John Law has described as 
“the performance of an irony” in the making “of a fixed point in 
order to argue against fixity and singularity” runs through this entire 
work (John Law and Hassard 1999, 3). It is not a tension we can 
avoid and therefore we can only acknowledge it and occasionally 
revisit its implications throughout the course of this inquiry. 
Now, to perform the irony, we need to look into two questions. First, 
what is assemblage thinking? Second, how can we use it and to what 
end? 
While building on Deleuze and Guattari the most important influence 
of this work is from Latour. In his La Fabrique du Droit Latour 
diligently traces the passage of law through the meandering hallways 
of the French Conseil D’Etat. Much more than merely an account of 
French administrative law his study forces us to consider the role of 
non-human actors in speaking the law. The focus on files, shelves 
and the mundane objects of organisation such as paperclips and 
rubber bands is skilfully paired with an account of manners of 
speaking which creates vincula between insignificant events and a 
corpus of texts to articulate the legal means (moyens) and facilitate the 
emergence of legal facts. (Latour 2004, 183) Rather than to emulate 
this method too closely or to attempt to replicate his findings in the 
context of the TCA, I am building on this concept of the passage of 
law as the expected element of the TCA. Yet the emergence of 
terrorist facts, an articulated terrorist made to speak for itself through 
the TCA, includes components, which are surprising in their 
modality. The manners of speaking highlighted by Latour for the 
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passage of law are slow, meandering, hesitant and marked by detours. 
In contrast throughout the articulation of terrorist facts we are time 
and again confronted with a modality of security, quick, prehensile 
and prone to shortcut if not short-circuit the modality of law. The 
challenge therefore is to allow both modalities to co-exist in our 
account of the chain of reference which articulates the terrorist. 
Both DeLanda’s Assemblages 2.0 (2006) and subsequent ANT are 
relevant to this work to some extent, yet critiques of both 
interpretations of assemblages highlight important limitations. This is 
relevant for this thesis because despite having achieved a centre stage 
position in social theory assemblage thinking and its contemporaries 
are still occupying a niche in the study of law.58 The limitations 
therefore are all the more relevant, as assemblages in law still require 
novel translation and a maverick spirit. 
2.2.5.2	External	Challenges	to	ANT	
Externally assemblage thinking and ANT are criticised for a host of 
reasons. There are two challenges to that need to be acknowledged 
because of their relevance to this inquiry. First, findings in ANT are 
hard to come by, as they require the following of actors over some 
time. Despite this dedication of time and resources there is no 
guarantee that ANT will turn up a novel or surprising conclusion. 
The meticulous following of actants and their traces is slow work. 
This is relevant to this project because the terrorists often are so fast 
moving, developments unfold at high speed, but the focus of the 
research needs to remain on the two cases studies. 
The second challenge is that even if the findings produce a novel and 
interesting conclusion, ANT does not offer itself for generalisation 
per se. While the conclusion in chapter 8 provides a forward-looking 
perspective, ANT is not the right tool to gain predictive power over 
                                                
58 Important forays of course include Latour’s seminal 
works that are however more often approached from a 
sociological or anthropological direction rather than 
by self-identified lawyers, for scholarship firmly 
established in the law schools see for example works 
by Alain Pottage and Yan Thomas. 
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actants. It may however help to make the basis on which other 
people base their predictions a little bit sounder. To achieve this 
method is absolutely crucial. 
2.2.5.3	 The	 Troubled	 Line	 between	 Theory	 and	Method	 in	 both	
ANT	and	Assemblages	
 “[A]ctor-network theory is about writing accounts of performances, 
actions, utterances.” (McGee 2014, 47) Further significant 
contributions by Ian Buchanan (2015) and John Law (2004) advocate 
that the separating line between theory and method has to be 
problematized and questioned. In applying assemblage thought to 
terrorism trials in India this thesis draws on assemblage thought to 
fine-tune theoretical foundation and methodological approach so as 
to allow the actors I encounter to draw the boundaries of relevance 
themselves. These boundaries of relevance are not always what I 
would have expected. The surprise of the researcher is something 
which has to be taken into account, when we focus on the crafting of 
chains of reference (facts). The chains of reference crafted through 
vincula articulate the judgment in a way which allows it to speak the 
law (dire le droit) in Latourian ANT. However in the TCA the 
judgment is a co-articulation of law and terrorism. The judgment 
makes the Terrorist speak, their motive, intent, background and wider 
context are all articulated through the judgment. Terrorist facts are 
made to speak, in tracing this passage we encounter moments of 
surprise. Instances where from our understanding of Latourian ANT 
we would expect detournement and hesitation, but instead of the 
“uncertain, meandering, twisting, and unsteady path toward the 
threshold or point of no return called decision or judgment” we 
encounter a shortcut. (McGee 2014, 138) In chapter 5 the interviews 
allow actors to speculate about the factors contributing to the 
messiness and unpredictability of co-articulating the terrorist through 
a TCA. Applying assemblage thinking is not without its pitfalls. 
[A]ssemblage theory makes two 
kinds of error in their appropriation 
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of Deleuze and Guattari: (1) it 
focuses on the complex and 
undecidable (Actor Network 
Theory); and/or (2) it focuses on 
the problem of emergence 
(DeLanda). 
Ian Buchanan goes on to argue that assemblage is actually better 
understood as a “working arrangement” (Buchanan 2015, 383) one 
which is not static and in which work should not be understood as 
mechanic causality. 
In other words, the obvious 
mechanical explanation of various 
machines is precisely not what 
Deleuze and Guattari had in mind 
when they conceived of the concept 
of the assemblage and its forerunner 
the desiring-machine (Buchanan 
2015, 384). 
In the context of a legal assemblage the fallacious mechanistic 
understanding would be to attempt to understand the court as a 
machine with procedural law as its rigid blueprint. This thesis 
distances itself from mechanical understandings of both the court 
and the law in favour of treating the specific court as an assemblage, 
in the sense of a working arrangement. The complex, the undecidable 
and the emergent play a role in the understanding of the Terror Court 
Assemblage (TCA), however giving heed to Buchanan’s warning 
none of them is given primary focus aimed at making a generalisation 
in this work. Instead the specific, contingent and unpredictable takes 
precedence over the general and deductible.  
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2.3 Totalities and Assemblages 
India is a country with a long history of counter-terrorism laws. 
These together with other actants form old and new conceptual lines. 
These conceptual lines include for example understandings of law 
and order reaching back to well before independence, conceptions of 
security drawing a link between colonial administration and currently 
disturbed areas. These lines change their configuration. Apparently 
coming together in direct consequence of the shocking attacks and 
their global aftermath to poly-causally give rise to conceptions of 
terrorism. Both the assemblage and its predecessor the rhizome are 
theorised in elusive and non-linear fashion by Deleuze and Guattari a 
rhizome first stands in contrast to the “classical conceptual 
architecture” in order to allow “immediate connections between any 
of its points” It is therefore a way of thinking and presenting 
thoughts that stands in contrast to traditional forms of arguing a 
single point in a more or less linear fashion. While being preliminary 
to assemblages this point has implications for this project that 
transcend the divides between theory and method, writing up and 
researching. Using the idea of the Rhizome, and this holds true for its 
successor the assemblage, enables an appreciation of relations that is 
not limited to mono-causal claims of cause and effect. Later and even 
more evasively the idea of the assemblage is most often defined 
through what it is not. Or perhaps rather through what it does 
instead of what it is. We can start by putting three key concepts into 
context. Assemblage thinking: 
 “Offer[s] a detailed and complex 
‘open system’ which is 
extraordinarily rich and complex. A 
useful way into it is to follow the 
concepts of coding, stratification 
and territorialisation. They are 
related in the following manner. 
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Coding is the process of ordering 
matter as it is drawn into a body; by 
contrast, stratification is the process 
of creating hierarchal bodies, while 
territorialisation is the ordering of 
those bodies in ‘assemblages,’ that is 
to say, an emergent unity joining 
together heterogeneous bodies in a 
‘consistency’”(Smith and Protevi 
2013, 4.2). 
Importantly the bodies ordered in the assemblage come together and 
form something that is more than merely the sum of its parts. 
Assemblages have emergent properties (DeLanda 2006). 
2.3.1 Relations of Interiority and Exteriority 
Understanding the difference between relations of interiority versus 
relations of exteriority is required as a preliminary step to make sense 
of the Deleuzian theory of assemblages as interpreted by DeLanda. 
In relations of interiority the components do not have an 
independent existence. They can be fused into a seamless totality. For 
example Terrorism/Counter-terrorism are in a relation of interiority 
as neither one of them can exist without reference to the other. This 
may be a controversial point in respect of terrorism as some may 
argue that terrorism has an existence independent of its relation to 
counter-terrorism. Yet while all can imagine an incident of terrorism 
without an appropriate counter-terrorist response, what becomes 
terrorism, as contemporarily understood, requires the backdrop of 
counter-terrorism, appropriate or inappropriate, as it would stay an 
atrocity or even an incident in its absence. Terrorism and counter-
terrorism constitute the terms of their relationship without an 
independent existence. Their relation defines their properties and 
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their identity; therefore they can be fused into a totality. As such they 
give rise to emergent properties, but are not decomposable.  
In contrast an assemblage incorporates relations of exteriority. These 
are relations where the actants retain properties and identities 
independent of the specific relation in question. Importantly when in 
an assemblage, that assemblage remains decomposable and does not 
cease to exist when components are taken out of a specific relation. 
The components interact but they retain their own identity. Most 
assemblages contain actants that stand in relations of interiority as 
well as exteriority. This also means that components/actants feature 
in more than one assemblage all the time and that each assemblage is 




2.4 The Tools Of The Assemblage 
Laws against terrorism are a controversial topic, in India as much as 
anywhere else. The multi-layered critiques aimed at the intersection 
between law and order, security and terrorism come from all sides of 
the political spectrum. Often the critiques are in opposition to each 
other, questioning laws for an abundance of something the lack of 
which is criticised by the next person. Assemblage thinking provides 
two ‘parameters’ that impact and reflect the relations between 
components allowing me to chart these critiques. The two parameters 
are territorialisation and coding (DeLanda 2006). These two 
parameters can be understood as reflecting the critiques along two 
axes – two different directions of territorialisation on one and 
different degrees of coding on the other. These two axes stand in 
tension with each other. In the next sub-sections (2.4.1 and 2.4.2) I 
explore what this means for this inquiry. The final section of the 
chapter (2.8) specifically turns to how the critiques of terror laws can 
be mapped along these two axes as they undergo competing 
deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation pressures – between security 
and law and order. 
2.4.1 Territorialisation 
The degree to which an assemblage is territorialised/deterritorialised 
describes the strength of delineation of the assemblage. A highly 
territorialised assemblage sometimes called strata by Deleuze and 
Guattari, is one that has clear boundaries whereas a deterritorialised 
assemblage is in flux (Young, Genosko, and Watson 2013). The 
differentiation between relative and absolute deterritorialisation can 
be understood in relation to the subsequent re-territorialisation. Some 
form of reterritorialisation immediately follows relative 
deterritorialisation whereas absolute deterritorialisation is a more 
permanent breaking down of boundaries. In relative 
deterritorialisation no radically deterritorialised spaces exist, only 
shifts in the boundaries of different territorialisations. In this thesis I 
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always mean relative deterritorialisation when I use the term 
deterritorialisation. 
It is not as so many have argued; that a new form of political violence 
entered the fray on 9/11.59 Nor is it that the responses to this ‘new’ 
terrorism have changed the world by making it more or less secure, 
more or less free. Rather the political rhetoric, academic discourse 
and contributions of counter-terrorism-experts have combined 
conceptual lines in new configurations through terrorism. These lines 
of reasoning are in tension within the law and order assemblage that 
also brings together various strands of making the world intelligible. 
This legal assemblage is generally considered to be further removed 
from day-to-day politics. But it nevertheless has become a space of 
utterance, reinforcing a particular worldview privileging a certain 
territorialisation. One of the dimensions of assemblages is along the 
axis of territorialised/deterritorialised. The legal assemblage is 
generally highly territorialised, whether it is a court building or legal 
language it is usually clear when one enters it. In the most 
straightforward way we can understand territorialisation as the 
increasing of delineations and boundaries in physical space, illustrated 
by the checkpoint before the court building. Yet territorialisation also 
goes beyond the physical dimension and can take place in the 
ideational realm. Both civil law and common law traditions usually 
teach their students to approach new problems by linking them to an 
existing body of texts. Territorialisation becomes the narrowing of 
the possible and de-territorialisation becomes “the movement by 
which something escapes or departs from a given territory” (Parr 
2010, 72). In other words an emergent possibility of newness could 
be the departing from precedence or law. In Smith’s and Protevi’s 
definition Territorialisation consists of “the theory of ‘territories’ or 
sets of environmentally embedded triggers of self-organising 
processes, and the concomitant processes of deterritorialisation 
(breaking of habits) and reterritorialisation (formation of habits)” 
                                                
59 For a good discussion of the ‘new terrorism’ theme 
see (Neumann 2009). 
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(Smith and Protevi 2013). The way in which files are compiled and 
circulated through the legal assemblage of the Conseil D’Etat has 
been explored at length by Latour and remains one of the best 
examples of what Smith and Protevi mean. (Latour 2010) 
Importantly none of the triggers by themselves give rise to 
territorialisation. Rather it is the circulations, for example of files, 
which territorialise and delineate the boundaries of the assemblage. 
The intermeshing between modalities of law and modalities of 
security also resembles territorialisation although the intermeshing of 
these is highly fluid. As the judgment percolates up the courts 
however the editing to render modalities of security, and in fact the 
entire chain of reference, increasingly invisible is a territorialising 
effect of the legal assemblage.  
2.4.2 Coding/Decoding 
The second parameter of assemblages is the degree of 
coding/decoding present. Coding/decoding relates to the way in 
which information entering the assemblage is processed. Assemblages 
are organized along the axis of coding/decoding. In Deleuzian 
thought, coding “performed by genes or words supplies a second 
articulation, consolidating the effects of the first [territorialisation] 
and further stabilising the identity of assemblages” (DeLanda 2006, 
15). When talking about social assemblages the axis of 
coded/decoded indicates the presence and intensity of rules about 
the interactions between parts. “The more formal and rigid the rules, 
the more these social encounters may be said to be coded” (DeLanda 
2006, 16). When speaking about courts we generally expect 
institutions with clear hierarchical structures, highly formalised, with 
specific procedural laws and strict standards of interpretation. 
Therefore most courts are highly coded assemblages. The identity of 
the court, bound up with its purpose, jurisdiction and building on the 
devolved authority of the sovereign is clear-cut, stable and maintained 
through both territorialisation and coding. DeLanda defines coding as 
“processes in which specialised expressive media intervene, processes 
which consolidate and rigidify the identity of the assemblage or, on 
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the contrary, allow the assemblage a certain latitude for more flexible 
operation while benefiting from genetic or linguistic resources” 
(DeLanda 2006, 19). The role of coding resurfaces in the parts of this 
thesis dedicated to a discussion of procedural laws in the TCA and 
their implementation. This role of coding and decoding is of the 
outmost importance, running closely parallel to the role of 
territorialisation and deterritorialisation in the TCA. Courts 
traditionally are highly codified assemblages, in which there is very 
little room for latitude or flexibility on the part of the components 
and participants. However in the case of the TCA, examples of 
deviation from the coding and disruption of the regular coding 
abound. In tandem with the deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation 
evident this has the potential to destabilise the working of the 
assemblage.  
2.5 The Window on the Assemblage  – Last Stop before the 
Terror Court Assemblage 
The window on the assemblage that is offered by this thesis follows 
the judgment to the crafting of the chain of reference, which 
articulates the terrorist fact. Drawing on Latour for inspiration I 
zoom in on the way that vincula are used to create bonds between 
events and texts that form the basis for the chain of reference that 
makes the terrorist speak. The judgment as immutable mobile makes 
the workings of its own generation invisible. As part of the TCA, 
vincula serve to link the incidents to a body of texts which allows 
them to travel and inscribes a significant into them which is then 
choreographed into the judgment which articulates the terrorist by 
making them act, making them speak. Actors are crafting bridges 
between incidents and the body of texts, but once established the 
bridge works both ways. All of a sudden the text has the power to 
transform, judge and inform the practice. This results in tensions 
between detours and shortcuts. The modalities of law, detour and 
hesitation stand in tension with the modalities of security, shortcut 
and prehension. Where we expect a shortcut we find a detour and 
sometimes a detour leads nowhere but shortcuts to another part of 
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the chain of reference. The pressures of the pre-existing legal 
assemblage, and the pre-existing security assemblage make 
themselves felt exerting enrolling pressures on the actants. Human 
actors are aware of the occasional contradictory pulls of these 
pressures and my interviews touch upon their speculations on how 
these tensions fit together. I am employing the ANT register of 
vincula, chain of reference and the passage of law to show how the 
terrorist fact is articulated in the two case studies. The judgment is 
particularly important in inscribing and transporting the chain of 
reference which makes the facts speak for themselves, at the same 
time the lacunae in the chain of reference at the heart of the 
judgment are perplexing. The interviews serve to allow the human 
actors engaging in the TCA to speculate about how the lacunae arise 
and how they are overcome to create a stable and solid chain of 
reference.  
2.5.1 Emergent Properties 
An assemblage is more than a mere collection of parts, the parts 
which come together in an assemblage give rise to properties which 
are irreducible to those of its parts (DeLanda 2006). These emergent 
properties of the assemblage are what set it apart from a mere 
collection of things. The coming together of the parts is more 
powerful in an assemblage than in a mere collection of random 
actants that do not enter into tense relations with each other. The 
emergent properties coming out of an assemblage of parts can be 
either implicit or explicit. In the case of a court assemblage the ability 
to pass legally valid judgment can be understood as an explicit 
emergent property of the functioning of the court. The blueprint of 
procedural law ensures that if it is followed the judgment has legal 
validity, and safeguards are in place to ensure this. The judgment’s 
legitimacy is an intangible property emergent out of the interactions 
of the components and of the legal assemblage with a wider social 
assemblage. The continuous reaffirmation of the legal assemblage as 
both separate from other social relations and of superior legitimacy 
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on the other hand is an implicit property. 60  These emergent 
properties are the properties of a whole, which arise out of the 
constant interaction of the parts; both the whole and the parts must 
exercise capacities. Properties have to be distinguished from 
capacities. While, properties are actual, they are independent of the 
content of our minds, even if our minds may be required for them to 
have meaning or to come into existence, once they exist they are 
actual. The blackness of the robe of the judge is a property, the heat 
in the courtroom, the elevation of the chair of the judge, the weight 
of the gavel are all properties of a specific court. Properties this court 
retains even it is transferred to a museum, or a TV set and the judge 
replaced by an actor. Capacities on the other hand, while always real 
can be virtual as well as actual. The court has the capacity of judging 
someone either guilty or innocent. Incidentally these capacities would 
be different for the court in the museum that instead might have a 
capacity to educate or entertain. However either of these capacities 
only becomes actual when it is exercised. Until then it is virtual in the 
Deleuzian sense of real but not actual.61  Capacities are also always 
relational. Judging requires someone to be judged. Actualised, or 
emergent capacities therefore by necessity are a double event 
(DeLanda 2012). They cannot exist without a counterpart, something 
with the capacity to interact (affect). Hence the capacity of the court 
to judge only becomes emergent when someone/thing else has the 
capacity to be judged. These emergent properties are novel, but they 
are imminent in the parts. If they stop interacting the emergent 
properties cease as well.  
                                                
60  For one of the earliest accounts of this see 
(Thompson 2013). 
61  There is an ongoing philosophical dispute about 
Deleuzian realism and his concept of the virtual. For 
the purposes of this work here I use virtual as 
encompassing all real possibilities, including the ones 
that are mutually exclusive, whereas the actual is that 
section of the virtual which becomes actualized. 
Deleuze himself discusses this relation in his 
Dialogues with Claire Parnet (Deleuze and Parnet 
2002, 179). 
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2.5.2 Material Components 
An assemblage is composed of material and expressive components 
(DeLanda 2006). Material components begin relatively 
straightforward. In the case of the assemblage of an Indian Terror 
Court the material components would include: The building of the 
court and the court room, the technology in that room, air-
conditioning, computers, tables, chairs, sofas, manacles, the bodies of 
the people present, the paper of their files, their robes etc. But it also 
includes the lathis, uniforms and weapons used in the investigation 
and enforcement of the judgments, the physical pieces of evidence, 
their storage and the technologies used in their analysis. The bodies 
of people in the street come to protest something about the case and 
their cardboard signs. The further afield the material components are 
the more it becomes obvious that understanding their relations 
cannot really be divorced from tracing the parts of expressivity. 
2.5.3 Expressive Components 
Expressive parts of the assemblage encompass the symbolic and 
traces based on language. For example everybody rising when the 
judge enters as well as the laws and the procedures recorded in law. 
The killing of someone in an encounter with the police also enters 
the assemblage as an expressive trace. That ‘encounter’ is an 
expressive part of the assemblage, as it can be understood only 
through reference to the ways in which the laws are circumvented in 
police practice. As both are expressive, another example of an 
expressive component of the assemblage of terror courts could be 
that magistrates use discretion in the application of the procedures of 
law, whereas they strictly adhere to the expression of the law. 
Expressive components are all actants that are ephemeral and 
concerned with meaning primarily. 
2.5.4 Irreducible and Decomposable 
The irreducibility and decomposability of assemblages helps me 
counter one specific potential criticism. Many of the tensions traced 
in the case studies are not unique to cases out of which terrorists 
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emerge. That assemblages are irreducible and decomposable means 
that the relevance of the findings to the making of terrorists is not 
undermined by parallel tensions in other trials. The irreducibility 
means that the emergent properties cease if actants of the assemblage 
are considered in isolation. Decomposability means that the parts of 
the assemblage under scrutiny can also be components of other 
assemblages as well as being assemblages in their own right. That 
assemblages are decomposable shows that while we are interested in 
looking at the assemblage that stabilises terrorists in courts that does 
not preclude the relevance of components also being part of other 
assemblages. For instance the legal assemblage as a whole struggles 
with corruption and incompetence, but even if this component is a 
part of other assemblages, it does not make it any less relevant. Very 
often the decomposability of an assemblage allows the researcher to 
make many useful connections between seemingly disconnected 
assemblages. However, we need to be careful lest the proliferation of 
assemblages continues exponentially. Courts dealing with terrorism 
are assemblages, which are not seamless totalities. For example laws 
of procedure, formulated as part of the wider legal assemblage, 
interact with it as components and “suppl[y] a prototype of the kind 
of hybrid(ising) action that is at work in ‘circulating reference’” 
(Pottage and Mundy 2007, 19). Those courts engaging in the making 
of terrorists also have emergent properties that go beyond the sum of 
the properties of the components. For example the assemblages 
giving rise to terrorists components from the wider legal assemblage 
enter into tension with actants from the security assemblage 
preoccupied with fighting terrorism. 
2.5.5 What Assemblages Don’t Do and Why They Matter After 
All 
To apply assemblage to law and terrorists is fruitful because it allows 
me to trace the emergence and stabilisation of the terrorist. However 
after the discussion above it is equally important to understand what 
assemblages do not do. Vexingly for most people interested in 
terrorism “Assemblages aren’t interested in solutions because 
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‘solutions’ tend to be given as representations rather than as 
contingent processes” (R. Kennedy et al. 2013, 62). Accordingly it is 
not the aim of this inquiry to provide an answer to the question of 
what terrorism is in the abstract. Neither on how counter-terrorism 
legislation can be made more appropriate to the problem. It is not 
even about a critique of some aspect of these laws, but rather about 
how courts work to interact in a wider multitude of contingent 
processes as part of a terror court assemblage which gives rise to the 
terrorist. The focus is on how the territorialising effects of the two 
assemblages, legal assemblage and security assemblage, play out in the 
court to stabilise concrete terrorists. Keeping in mind that 
“Assemblage appears to operate as an orientation to the possibility of 
uncertain shifts in the processes being discussed” (McFarlane and 
Anderson 2011, 162). The very attributes of assemblages that make 
them so appropriate for talking about the social world, indeterminacy, 
contingency and fluidity also make any account worked through 
assemblages heterogeneous and elusive. Yet the interesting question 
that assemblages help us understand is the question of who acts. That 
agency is distributed throughout the assemblage helps us to 
understand the multi-layered nature of terrorism. Ultimately the 
vexing question of the widespread agreement of who terrorists are in 
light of disagreement about terrorist definitions points us to the 
existence of a discriminating mechanism. Terrorists are made to 
speak their motive, histories and identities through an elaborate 
assemblage where no one actor has control or oversight. Yet this 
requires the crafting of a chain of reference which is then inscribed 
into the judgment and itself is built on vincula between insignificant 
events and a body of texts. The assemblage matters because it is 
through the assemblage that the chain of reference which articulates 
the terrorist fact is brought together from modalities of security and 
modalities of law. Whereas the latter are inscribed with increasing 
weight into the judgments percolating up the courts.  
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2.6 The Terror Court Assemblage 
The Terror Court Assemblage (TCA) is the core theoretical and 
methodological frame of my argument. Treating certain courts as 
assemblages that articulate the terrorist contributes both to the 
understanding of what the terrorist is in practice and the functioning 
of courts preoccupied with matters of security. While taking place 
under circumstances suggest a similarity to the passage of law as 
described by Latour the Terror Court Assemblage is not fully coded 
and territorialised by the pre-existing legal assemblage. Nor do actants 
of the wider security assemblage completely translate the space of the 
courts I use as examples and case studies. Instead within the TCA a 
careful choreography of territorialisations, between security 
territorialisation and law and order territorialisation, plays out to 
assemble the judgment through which terrorist facts are articulated 
and made to speak for themselves. Using the tools of the assemblage 
discussed throughout chapter 2, I can then follow the traces of the 
actants to show the connective translations and interplays that allow 
the terrorist to be articulated with the weight of the law.  
2.6.1 The TCA And Its Application In India 
This section demonstrates the relevance of the TCA to both India 
and terrorism. At the same time this section makes the transition 
between the fuzzy concept of terrorism to the concrete terrorist.  
“One may well say that Deleuze and 
Guattari do not call for our strict 
adherence to their ideas (this is 
certainly true), but such an 
argument misses the more general 
point Deleuze and Guattari make 
about concepts, that they should 
have cutting edges. It should always 
be possible to determine with 
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precision the specific characteristics 
and features of a 
concept”(Buchanan 2015, 383). 
What is the concept in our case? It would be easy, and obvious, to 
claim that terrorism is the concept. However, there are a few 
difficulties with that approach. Terrorism tells an incomplete tale. It is 
incomplete in the sense that it does not entirely make sense standing 
on its own. There is no  
“distinct, coherent class of actors 
(terrorists) who specialize in a 
unitary form of political action 
(terror) and thus should establish a 
separate variety of politics 
(terrorism)”(Tilly 2004, 5). 
 We cannot fully accept terrorism as a concept, because it always 
remains politically embattled and positionally deployed. It is always 
the others who are the terrorists. Nor is it possible to understand it 
purely as a tactic of violence as it cannot fully be captured in the 
language of a military manual without discounting the normative 
baggage of terrorism’s use. Legal and policy definitions are 
consistently controversial and get us no closer to grasping the 
implications of their application.62 Understanding it by looking at the 
images flooding the airwaves is certainly powerful, but at best 
incomplete and at worst openly manipulative. Terrorism brings 
together various conceptual lines, drawing boundaries between 
friends and enemies, them and us, inside and outside, ordinary and 
extraordinary. When these lines come together in court, it opens a 
space for the retelling of one of a number of stories constituting (and 
                                                
62  For an overview of the definitions, controversies 
and avenues of current definitions see (A. Schmid 
2004; Scharf 2004; A. P. Schmid 2012). 
 70 
re-constituting) the relationships between the citizen and the state.63 
As well as how these categories are constituted. Following any one of 
the conceptual lines that come together in terrorism too doggedly, as 
assemblage-as-method would inspire us to do, leads to a partial story 
which is inherently incomplete as each one is haunted by some 
unseen elements in order to make sense. Following the concrete 
terrorist in the making is the solution. To appreciate the extra-
ordinary laws against terrorism is only possible through an implicit 
understanding of what is ordinary. Similarly grasping the moral 
outrage at terrorist violence brings with it an implicit yet palpable 
tension with the much larger number of people who ‘just’ die in 
traffic on any given day. The practices and codes of the legal 
assemblage stand in tension with the violence in the streets, the 
international human rights lobby and American arms sales to 
Pakistan, to name only a few actants in the security assemblage. All 
these relational tensions come together in the Terror Court 
Assemblage. Their kaleidoscopic combination is then choreographed 
and affixed, through the assemblage as working arrangement, onto a 
concrete body gaining a cutting edge and making them terrorist. The 
assemblage articulates terrorist facts through a carefully crafted chain 
of reference. Following the concrete terrorist in making fits well with 
Latour’s advice; to be careful, to stay myopic and slow in the 
exploration of an assemblage and to avoid drowning in a proliferation 
of assemblages.64 While some aspects of the terrorist assemblage have 
been explored to some depth, pursuing terrorism through a terrorist 
assemblage has yet to make a contribution to the mainstream 
academic literature on terrorism (J. Puar 2007). Furthermore, the 
                                                
63  The connection between the exception and the 
relation between citizen and incomplete national is 
explored in (Bora 2010). 
64  The myopic and slow method is something of a 
theme with Latour found in many of his books and 
comments, but not as a limitation. Rather, being 
“obsessively myopic […] allows us to see features of 
society, which we have taken for granted before” 
(Latour 1998). 
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application of assemblage thinking to Indian Courts engaged in 
making terrorists has never been done before. 
This approach faces a number of challenges. First and foremost 
thinking through assemblages can be perceived as counterintuitive to 
the usual formats, methods and purposes of most of the literature on 
terrorism and counter-terrorism laws. It is indeed with some 
vehemence that the existing applicants of assemblage thinking 
criticize the part terrorism studies plays in creating what they call 
heteronormativity, white supremacy and nationalism (J. K. Puar and 
Rai 2002). The literature on terrorism and the laws to counter it in 
India is so far lacking any engagement with assemblage. 
However the application of assemblage thinking to the terrorist 
promises insights and novel understandings. First bringing together 
the laws that purportedly define terrorism together with the practices 
and technologies that counter it enable us to open the blackbox of 
terrorist facticity to show the articulating chain of reference which is 
crafted through the TCA to make the terrorist speak. Secondly the 
combining of conceptual lines with the utterances they make possible 
make this application relevant to much more traditional areas of legal 
and political thought. Opening a space to subsequently question the 
relationship between the citizen and the state, the governance 
function of law as well as tense relationships between states, 
international structures, justice and legitimacy. 
The tension between security assemblage and legal assemblage in 
Indian terror courts showcases how the invocation of terrorism 
creates the space to reconstitute the relationship between the citizen 
and the state. It brings terrorism to bear on law, assembling, 
choreographing the fusion of two grids of intelligibility, security 
(from the security assemblage) and rights (as one aspect of the legal 
assemblage) that purportedly touch upon all Indians. In other words 
driving terrorism home. This sweeping reach cannot be explained 
satisfactorily by only looking at the security assemblage, nor can it be 
comprehensively explained by focusing solely on the legal 
assemblage. It cannot be fully broached in the seemingly a-politicised 
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and self-referential legal assemblage. Only when terrorism is invoked 
do the debates, deliberations and considerations take on an all India 
perspective. For example tying together of two conceptual lines, 
national security and human rights, in the court through the 
invocation of terrorism creates a space. Judges and commentators use 
this space for the re-invocation of a number of stories. 
Encompassing critique and praise, these stories cement and reaffirm 
the relation between citizen and state, security and law as well as 
between concrete incidents and terrorism. This terrorism tells an 
incomplete tale. Because ultimately it is not a tale in and of itself, but 
rather terrorism emerges out of a host of assemblages tying concrete 
bodies to terrorism and stabilising them as terrorist. The court works 
in an assemblage of tensions between conceptual lines sometimes 
giving rise to re-iterations of various tales about the state as guarantor 
of liberties, freedom and security and the citizen and sometimes 
giving rise to entirely new combinations. Occasionally the assemblage 
of terrorism and court works to make a singular entity out of the 
state, an entity that makes an attack on a few, an attack on the whole. 
To be Indian means to be attacked by terrorism, to be attacked by 
terrorism means to be Indian. However, assemblage thinking goes 
beyond thinking about identity and representation in fixed terms and 
ultimately, citizen and state, are only one facet of an ever-working 
arrangement.65 
2.6.2 The Final Tools of the TCA 
One of the difficulties in using the TCA to better understand how the 
terrorist comes into existence is that it requires the diligent following 
of traces. Every aspect of method and theory becomes interlinked 
and important. There are natural limitations arising out of such work. 
The purpose of this entire chapter is to lay out the theoretical toolkit 
necessary to follow the actors and to make sense of their interactions 
                                                
65  Relations between state, power and identity in 
respect of South Asia are discussed by Muppidi in 
(Barkawi and Laffey 2001). 
 73 
while striking the balance between translation and betrayal discussed 
in 2.2.3. In order to do this I need to complete the toolkit. 
2.6.2.1	The	Role	of	Work	in	the	Assemblage	
Ian Buchanan interprets assemblages as working arrangements 
(Buchanan 2015). Work, effort and the actions of actants function as 
the glue that stabilises tense relations in the assemblage. By this I 
mean the quite concrete work that goes into transporting for example 
a file from one courtroom to the next, or to look up a case of 
precedence that is then brought into the assemblage. But work in the 
assemblage is also the telling of plausible stories, the rearranging of 
traces and the production of artefacts to support one particular 
narrative of reality. This could for example be the work undertaken 
by the forensics teams and their analysis to translate traces of 
gunpowder residue into texts that are admitted into evidence. 
2.6.2.2	Tense	Relations	and	their	Stabilisation	
In the assemblage relations amongst actants are tense. They are both 
constantly performed and thus instable as well as pushing and pulling 
on all other actants. Translations, coding and territorialisation all play 
a role in how the circulation that lies at the heart of the assemblage 
plays out from one moment to the next. When the tensions between 
actants are subdued and made invisible, I speak of stabilisation.  
When the stabilisation takes the form of a connection between a 
body of texts and an otherwise insignificant incident I am referring to 
it as a vinculum.  For example in the process of analysing the above 
mentioned gunpowder residue the forensic team may have 
disagreements about the interpretation of impurities. Once a decision 
has been made either way a report is produced which is very unlikely 
to reflect the tensions. The tense relations have been stabilised. Or 
rather, since this is not fixed mass but a circulation, they are 
transitorily stable. 
2.6.2.3	Choreography	and	the	Skilled	Navigatoion	
In the example above and in the TCA some actants work towards 
stabilisation. It could be the head of the forensic unit who has an 
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interest in producing a transportable outcome (the report that can be 
passed on to court). Or in the case of the TCA it could be the judge 
who has an interest in arriving at a judgment. In the case of the TCA 
the Judge plays a crucial role in facilitating the choreography of the 
security assemblage and legal assemblage coming together (Shankar 
2009). Skilled navigation between territorialising assemblages is 
necessary. Otherwise the court risks becoming bogged down in the 
legal intricacies of terrorism, whereas the members of the security 
assemblage engage in extra legal operations. The idea of the judge as 
skilled navigator draws on the skilful legal navigator. Building on the 
concept by Ballard the skilled cultural navigator focuses is able to 
skilfully manage the tension of two differing cultural influences in 
their everyday life (Ballard and Banks 1994). This concept is then 
expanded, chiefly by Menski, to the context of individuals navigating 
differing legal expectations on their behaviour (Menski 2006; Shah 
2007; Shah and Foblets 2016). This concept is very useful in 
understanding the way the judge balances and navigates the 
intricacies of the tension between the legal and the security 
assemblages. 
2.6.3 The TCA and the Link to India 
Treating the court in a terrorism trial as an assemblage combines 
material components and expressive components. Additionally there 
are parameters along coded/decoded and 
territorialised/deterritorialised axes. The interactions of the parts of 
the terror court assemblage give rise to emergent properties. Perhaps 
the most visible emergent property of the TCA is its virtual capacity 
to pass judgment. Therefore the judgment becomes a key player in 
both case studies (chapters 6 and 7). The properties and capacities of 
the judgment in the well known case relating to the 2008 Mumbai 
attacks provide an example that is the focus of this section. 
Considering the judgment of the Session Court in relation to the 
Mumbai Attacks of 2008, its properties are quickly listed. It is a 
document of 1588 pages of text, printed in double spaced lines and 
black ink. The page format is that of legal paper which makes each 
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page 216 x 356mm in size. Each page contains the page number, case 
file (S.C.No. 175/09) and date (Judgment dt. 6.5.2010) in the header. 
That the version used for quick reference in this research is a PDF 
document raises a number of other assemblages to relevance. It is 
quite possible that there are some additional properties of the 
judgment, which are not listed here, however as a rule the properties 
are both actual and enumerable. These properties play an important 
role in tying the judgment into the pre-existing legal assemblage and 
in making it work as part of the passage of law as described by 
Latour. 
The capacities of the judgment form a potentially infinite number of 
virtual (real but not yet actual) capacities, which emerge only in 
interaction with something that can be affected. In Deleuzian terms 
the judgment has affects (capacities to affect and be affected). These 
affects are innumerable as they are dependent in their actualisation on 
encountering another component with corresponding affects. 
Another way of putting this is that all capacities of the judgment are 
relational. The sentencing part of the judgment illustrates this well. 
On Page 1578 of the judgment it is written: “5) The accused No. 1 is 
further convicted of the offence punishable u/s 302 r/w of Indian 
Penal Code and u/s 302 r/w 109 and 120B of Indian Penal Code and 
is sentenced to death and is further sentenced to pay a fine of 
Rs.10,000/- (Rs. Ten thousand only) i/d to suffer S.I. For one 
month. He shall be hanged by neck till he is dead.”66 This part of the 
judgment has the virtual capacity to effect the killing of the accused 
No.1. Clearly this is relational in respect of Accused No.1. as it 
requires from him to contribute his capacity to be killed in order for 
the virtual capacity of the judgment to become emergent. A number 
of further parts are clearly required so that virtual capacity of the 
judgment to kill can become actual. In this sense the affective 
properties of the judgment are also relational to the executioner. The 
executioner is called upon to manipulate the properties of wood, 
rope, gravity, to create a machine with the virtual capacity to kill and 
                                                
66See Kasab Sessions Court Judgement. 
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then to feed the accused’s body into the machine causing a disruption 
in the interaction of the organs of the condemned body. This makes 
both the judgment’s and the machine’s virtual capacity to kill an 
actual capacity. One more layer of complexity is that the two 
sentences extracted from the judgment (in their interaction with the 
whole) also have the capacity to interact with a number of other 
assemblages. In this interaction disrupting, or deactivating, 
components of other assemblages that normally operate in society to 
prevent the disruption of one human body’s function by another 
(killing). Neither of the above observed emergent capacities is 
however unique to the TCA. 
The above illustration of the properties and capacities of the 
judgment and the relevance of assemblage thinking to the judgment 
as a part of the TCA consists of a relatively straightforward scenario. 
Yet, it is more complex and more insightful to look at the Judgment 
as a component of the TCA in the process of narrating a story. This 
approach is contrary to “The traditional legal strategy of story-
beginning [that] looks to when ‘the trouble’ began, and fans out in 
the direction of legally relevant facts” (Scheppele 1988, 2094). In the 
Kasab Case the court begins its account with a brief history of the 
official Indian version of how Jammu and Kashmir became a part of 
independent India. The wide-angle view, which is according to 
Scheppele is often used by judges to grant more sway to outsider 
accounts, is in this case used to tie in the account of the events into 
wider struggle, with a clear and historic we-they separation 
(Scheppele 1988). This shows how the judge navigates the 
territorialising pulls of the legal assemblage and the security 
assemblage. Territorialisation is evident in physical terms in 
delineating and defining the borders between India and Pakistan. But 
also in a non-spacial territorialisation where segments of expressivity 
relating to Jammu and Kashmir and the border dispute there enter 
into the TCA. If therefore the components in their interaction which 
make the TCA a court have as emergent properties that the virtual 
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judgment has both legality and legitimacy then these emergent 
properties extend to the actual judgment as well.  
2.7 The Judgment Between Expressive And Material 
Components 
The judgment in the Kasab case further contains very long and rich 
descriptions of the radicalisation of some of the accused. The 
judgment is set up in such a way that it makes the terrorists speak 
their own histories. There are also many parts of the testimony that 
the judge deems unnecessary to the furtherance of the case. These 
parts are subsequently left out, even if their traces are not. The first 
parts of the judgment tell a story which is mainly based on the 
confession of the primary accused. This is followed by an extensive 
appraisal of the witnesses; almost 800 pages of witness statements are 
taken and discussed from a total of 654 witnesses. This is followed by 
an in depth discussion of the applicable procedural and substantive 
law. An international dimension is evident in the beginning and the 
end of the judgment. Moreover, the recording of evidence and the 
discussion of its admissibility are focused on regular legal process and 
procedure. As discussed above the judgment of the TCA 
incorporates both material and expressive components. Additionally, 
it interacts with and is in constantly changing relations with a number 
of other assemblages of which it is a component. In turn these 
assemblages contribute to the performance of the contingent 
capacities of the judgment to be legal and transportable. Two parts of 
the Kasab judgment illustrate particularly poignantly that there are 
fluid, sometimes expected and sometimes unexpected constellations 
arising from the tensions between the TCA components.  
2.7.1 Here, There, And The International 
The first component of the TCA that comes to the fore in the 
judgment illustrates the decomposability of the TCA as well as how it 
is territorialised. The judge ties a wider international discourse into 
the narrative of the judgment, choreographing the tension between 
security and legal assemblage. Yet even as they interact with and 
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become part of the TCA components from both these assemblages 
retain their independent identity. Two quotes from the Kasab 
judgment illustrate this choreographing: 
“The organization [LeT], it may be 
noted, is banned in India under 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) 
Act, 1967. It is also banned in 
Pakistan, United Kingdom and 
many other Countries. The wanted 
accused No. 1 - Hafeez Mohammad 
Saeed @ Hafiz @ Hafiz Saab has 
been listed as Major of Lashkar-e-
Taiba. The United Nations Security 
Council has also listed the wanted 
accused No.2- Zaki-Ur-Rehaman 
Lakhvi as one of the senior 
members of Lashkar-e-Taiba.”67  
And: 
 “It is the case of prosecution that 
the wanted accused No. 2- Zaki-Ur-
Rehaman Lakhvi is listed as terror 
group’s chief for anti india [sic] 
operations. The prosecution has 
also alleged that the new outfit 
named as Jammat-Ud-Dawa has 
                                                
67 Kasab Sessions Court Judgment p.10. 
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also been recently declared as 
terrorist front by United Nations as 
per its Resolution No. 1267.”68 
Both quotes show how the judge ties material and expressive 
components from both the legal and security assemblages into the 
TCA. More importantly it illustrates how the choreography maintains 
their interactions and fluidity. The body of a person, or rather the 
body of the ‘wanted’ accused No. 1, is virtual in the sense that there 
might be an actual body that is wanted but is not present there. 
Material components also include the paper on which the Security 
Council resolution and UAPA are printed as well as the implicit 
material components standing in the background. The expressive 
components interact, merge and create tensions in manifold, 
innumerable and complex ways with each other and with the material 
components. One example of this is visible form the two quotes 
above. They create a tension between the absent bodies of Hafiz 
Mohammed Saeed and Zaki-Ur-Rehaman Lakhvi as subject to the 
legal assemblage on one side. Both are then also tied into an 
international security assemblage of counter terrorism resolutions on 
the other. In this kaleidoscopically arranged world relations are 
dichotomous and militarised. States, India, UK, USA and more 
ambivalently Pakistan, are pitted against a shadowy, militarised and 
organised enemy.69 This dichotomy is reinforced by the invocation of 
the rule of law, through the indication that these organisations are 
banned through legal instruments, sanctioned and supported by the 
UN. The working assemblage behind the Kasab judgment powerfully 
works in the opposite direction to the warnings made by Charles Tilly 
that: 
“A remarkable array of actors 
sometimes adopt terror as a 
                                                
68 Kasab Sessions Court Judgment p.11. 
69  For a discussion of international Indian security 
relations see (Budania 2003; A. Gupta 2008). 
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strategy, and therefore no coherent 
set of cause effect propositions can 
explain terrorism as a whole. […] 
Most terror occurs on the 
perpetrators’ own home territory, 
and nonspecialist – zealots – inflict 
a significant share of the terror that 
does occur outside of home 
territory. The fact does not diminish 
the horror of September 11. But it 
does warn against analysing terror as 
if it consisted of closer or more 
distant approximations to that 
terrible series of attacks on the 
United States. […] Terrorism is not 
a single causally coherent 
phenomenon” (Tilly 2004, 11). 
Other parts of the judgment clearly display a different stance on 
Pakistan, painting a world of states governed by rule of law, coming 
together in international organisations, besieged by a militaristic and 
organised enemy. The absence of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed’s70 body in 
the courtroom only adds to the power of this narrative, as all his 
properties are as virtual as his body, while his alleged capacities are 
grimly present in the courtroom. This reduces the room for empathy 
through shared properties, such as a body, and increases the space of 
the expressive. It further also opens the space for the TCA to speak 
                                                
70 Alleged mastermind behind the Mumbai Attacks and 
leader of Jama’at-Ud-Da’wah as well as Lashkar-e-
Taiba. 
 81 
authoritatively on behalf of the terrorist and ultimately to seemingly 
make them speak. 
The TCA territorialises in the following way: on the one hand, the 
body of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed is subsumed making him more 
terrorist and less human. On the other hand, the boundary between 
the states and the terrorists is strengthened and the delineation is 
imbued with the moral weight of terrorism. As a consequence the 
states are grouped together as a territorialised entity in opposition to 
the outside. The TCA with its component international discourse 
becomes more territorialised. 
2.7.2 The Bhelwala Who United India 
A second component of the TCA is concerned with the portrayal of 
various people in the judgment. This is exemplary to understand the 
value of assemblage thinking for this thesis. The portrayals and non-
portrayals of tensions between groups are integrated in a wider 
narrative. That narrative is intermeshed with the deterritorialisation of 
one aspect of the attack, the attackers chose targets that would mainly 
affect the wealth, to reinforce another, the attackers were terrorists 
the victims Indian. In other words, the tension in terrorist-citizen 
relations transcends the tension in rich-poor relations.71 
The targets of the terrorist attacks on Mumbai were presumably 
chosen for their symbolic importance. The fact that this coincided 
with a high number of victims who were financially well to do as well 
as internationally connected, perhaps contributed to the massive 
global media attention that the unfolding events received. The 
imagery of the events underlined the clear (economic) 
territorialisation of the five star hotels as their own assemblages. Both 
the Oberoi and the Taj hotels that were targeted have clearly defined 
mechanisms to make them inaccessible to the majority of Mumbai 
residents. The economic territorialisation, which is a component of 
the attacks, clashes in the judgment with the attention that is given to 
the story of one person introduced as Gupta Bhelwala. While Gupta 
                                                
71 For a very complex economic history of India see 
(Rudolph 1987). 
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Bhelwala does not make a bodily appearance in the courtroom he 
plays a significant role in the case. Gupta Bhelwala is introduced into 
the case with the cryptic sentence: “One Gupta bhel vendor was 
selling bhel near the [rear] gate [of the Cama Hospital].” 72  This 
account, provided by another witness (P.W. 103), is taken in stride by 
the court who makes Gupta (a common last name often used by 
entire communities) the first and Bhelwala (Person selling Bhel) the 
last name of that person. According to the witness account, Gupta 
Bhelwala is shot. However, all the traces we would expect in a legal 
assemblage are not there. There is neither a record of him being 
processed at a hospital nor was his body identified on site. He is not 
brought into court, leaving P.W. 103 to speak for him. None of this 
in itself is necessarily remarkable in the context of a TCA. However, 
Gupta Bhelwala appears again in the sentencing stage when Justice 
M. L. Tahaliyani exhorts the extreme brutality of the terrorists with 
the sentence: “The accused has not spared even the poor Bhelwala 
who had not even come in his way at Badruddin Tayyabi Road.”73 
(The rear gate of Cama Hospital leads onto BT Road) The Judge then 
goes on to conclude that in light of such brutality “the chances of 
accused being reformed or rehabilitated are nil”74 and to impose a 
veritable series of death sentences. The nameless Bhelwala who was 
shot by the terrorists becomes part of the reasoning of the judge to 
impose the harshest penalty possible. In the TCA, India’s poor, 
invisible to the point of not having a name or a body which can be 
produced before the courts, have nevertheless left their traces on the 
judgment, obliviously cementing the territorialisation of the whole of 
India against the terrorist other. The portrayal of the terrorist as 
preying on rich and poor alike without a chance at reform, 
rehabilitation or redemption is instrumental in the deterritorialisation 
of the TCA along economic lines and the simultaneous 
reterritorialisation along Indian/terrorist lines. The Bhelwala is ideally 
positioned for this role in the TCA because of his imaginary power. 
                                                
72 p. 370 Kasab Sessions Court Judgment. 
73 p. 1570 Kasab Sessions Court Judgment. 
74 p. 1570 Kasab Sessions Court Judgment. 
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This power can bring to life images to the vast majority of Indians 
from their own streets and experiences. It is an image that has the 
capacity to conjure a plurality of tastes in a delicious ensemble and 
peaceful strolling along a market. That the virtual embodiment of this 
image was shot by the terrorist drives terrorism home. This injection 
into the familiar and domestic creates a direct tension between the 
individual and the terrorist. 
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2.8 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has established a conceptual and terminological horizon 
for this thesis and translated ANT and assemblage thinking into the 
TCA. As such, it is aimed at offering a novel path to explore how the 
terrorist is made. I have touched upon role of the skilful navigators in 
choreographing the tensions between the pre-existing legal 
assemblage and the pre-existing security assemblage. The 
choreography of tensions in the TCA, while easily negligible 
individually all contribute to terrorism being performed in a more or 
less stable manner. Perhaps most importantly for the following 
section assemblage thinking not only permits but also requires the 
inclusion of theoretical accounts of terrorism and their effects on the 
assemblage. So far the section has translated Terrorism/Counter-
terrorism in Indian Law into the same ontological universe as 
assemblage, while devising a toolkit and vocabulary to explore the 
case studies. Such a translation is challenging and bountiful. It is 
challenging as it questions accepted epistemologies in many ways and 
thus moves into uncertain territory. It is bountiful because it sidesteps 
the dichotomies that inhibit exploration. To explore micro 
stabilisations in the assemblage allows us to explore and question the 
grand picture, which all too often is bogged down by chasms between 
agency and structure, law and security, terrorists and citizens, fact and 
value. In this novel and uncertain territory, new intensities emerge 
and become visible, challenging and rewarding the inquiry. In the 
process of thinking about the role of laws and courts to counter-
terrorism in India, assemblage thinking can tentatively bring to light 
how how vincula within the TCA stabilise, perform and articulate 
terrorist facts. Making the terrorist speak and act in wider social 
relations. More unorthodoxly the section then turned to Gupta 
Bhelwala in the TCA and tensions between virtuality and actuality in 
relation to terrorism and poverty that force us to consider that 
Latour’s vincula may operate as shortcuts as well as detours and 
create their little bonds between unexpected actants.  This illustrates 
the power of assemblage thinking as it permits to approach various 
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components of an assemblage without a hierarchy of importance thus 
making visible aspects, tensions and facets which would generally be 
dismissed. 
The next chapter focuses on how the TCA does not silence one 
mainstream critique of terrorism laws at the expense of the other but 
rather highlights their productive tension. We are thus capable of 
perceiving the critiques as components of the assemblage engaging in 
relations of de-territorialisation creating emergent spaces from their 
affects. In line with assemblage thinking this approach doesn’t 
provide a grand answer to an essential question but rather destabilises 
dichotomous assumptions about the nature of terrorism and law. In 
doing so we can see the roles that theories as well as legal and 
academic inquiries and practices play in stabilising performances and 
thus making actants appear less precarious. This makes inroads into 
explaining why contrary to the above-mentioned adage, most places 
most of the time One Man’s terrorist is also Another Man’s terrorist. 
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Chapter 3 – Facets of the Assemblage 
3.1 Chapter Introduction: The Role of Theory in the 
Assemblage 
Within the TCA relations between components are theorised 
together with practices, constitutive of social relations (Bourdieu 
1977). This chapter explores critical debates, theoretical models and 
theory inspired tools that are used to make sense of counter terrorism 
laws and their courts. Their inclusion is essential for the case studies 
and interviews, as the tensions between these theory components and 
practices are integral to the TCA. Different theorisations of terrorism 
and law are expressive components in the assemblage. Different 
explanatory avenues to explain the intersection between law and 
terrorism are actants in their own right. The theories leave traces in 
the assemblage and give rise to tense relationships with other 
components. The first two sense making endeavours on this 
intersection are formulated from a position that reflects the tension in 
the TCA between the legal assemblage and the security assemblage. I 
therefore call them the liberal critique and the security critique. 
Actors who take part in the everyday working of the TCA formulate 
these two critiques. The second set of theories plays a slightly less 
direct role but also informs the everyday workings of the TCA, but 
because of their high level of abstraction I have termed them macro-
theories. 
The implicit claim of these theories is that their relation to the other 
components of the assemblage is one of explanation and description. 
However, the theories about terrorism and law stand in a more 
complex relationship with practices of terrorism and law. Within the 
assemblage theories give rise to and inform a whole array of practices. 
They also make sense of/in specific facets of the assemblage. Within 
the assemblage each theoretical approach offers a partial view. These 
specific theoretical tools are useful because they highlight one facet75 
                                                
75  By facet I mean a sub assemblage within the 
assemblage. In other words a circulation between 
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but this usefulness is limited because it also leaves some components 
of the TCA unexplored. 
Theories also actively cast shadows. This is one of the reasons why 
assemblages are such an enriching way to think about terrorism laws, 
since they allow putting other explanatory frameworks into context 
by following actants who enter into relations with other actants, 
without forcing theoretical purity. Each theory has an important role 
to play while it remains crucial to recognise the explanatory pull these 
theories exert and to recognise that the assemblage continues even in 
the blind spots of these theories. It is not always possible to recognise 
and appropriately contextualise observations and interview questions. 
Nor is it possible to do so with patters of thought that are often 
implicitly informed by theoretical frameworks. Another advantage of 
the TCA is that it only requires me to engage with theories as far as 
they play a role in the assemblage. In other words only as far as they 
leave traces and thus become actants. 
This chapter proceeds in two sections. The first section focuses on 
the central and polarised debate between security and law. At first 
sight, the TCA is often seemingly suspended between these two 
poles. However it soon becomes clear that this debate is only one 
facet of the TCA. Albeit one that easily moves itself to centre stage as 
actors are making sense of their own position within the TCA and 
between the territorialising tensions of the pre-existing security 
assemblage and the pre-existing legal assemblage. The second section 
turns to macro theorisations of the intersection of terrorism and law. 
The TCA includes a layer of commentators who theorise the 
operation of some of its facets and feed back into its practices. The 
sense making endeavours of intellectuals, academics and activists play 
a role in the TCA. The discussion of macro theories as actants 
demonstrates how their insights are usefully applied within the TCA. 
Interviewed actors have referred to these theories occasionally to 
make some facet of the TCA understandable to me. Following those 
                                                                                                         
actants which is more or less territorialized but also 
plays a role in the wider assemblage. 
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actors and the traces that they leave behind permits the analysis to 
understand both the two critiques and the four macro-theories as 
actants in the TCA. This inclusion of explanatory frameworks is not 
contrary to assemblage methods as it is encountered through the 
traces left behind rather than as invisible macro explanatory 
frameworks. 
The TCA offers the possibility of showing how all above mentioned 
theory facets stand in tension with each other. As is often the case in 
writing inspired by Deleuze and Guattari, the sections stand in a 
rhizomatic relation to each other. While they are presented in a 
sequence this should not be considered a straightjacket. A better 
metaphor would be that of the kaleidoscope, in which mixing up the 
order and the tension between cutting edge blocks, can produce a 
new and mesmerizing picture. The role of this chapter is to highlight 
the unique usefulness of the TCA in making visible the tensions 
between seemingly separate ways the intersection between terrorism 
and law. The way that macro theories are shown to play a role in the 
assemblage is not an exhaustive account of these theories. The focus 
on how they work as facets of the TCA makes it impossible to do 
them justice as theories in their own right. The eclectic selection of 
components is informed by the specific traces encountered during 
this research and therefore only offers a rudimentary snapshot of 
tensions relevant to the arrangement of this inquiry. 
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3.2 Working Courts between Security and Law and Order 
Critique 
Starting from the common point of departure, that the status quo is 
not ideal, both critiques address similar problems in different 
directions. For the law and order critique, terrorism is first and 
foremost a law and order problem that needs to be addressed as such. 
For the security critique terrorism is first and foremost a security 
problem and that shapes the view the proponents of this critique take 
on desirable developments to the status quo. 
3.2.1 The Law and Order Critique in The TCA 
Laws play an important role in the TCA. They are actants that code 
and territorialise relations in the assemblage. Indian laws against 
terrorism have been analysed, criticised and defended from a number 
of vantage points. One set of substantial critiques is summed up here 
as the law and order critique. Under the heading of this critique a 
number of concerns are voiced, ranging from processes and 
procedures, to the rule of law and rights. Critiques from these angles 
abound, focusing on both “law’s words [and] law’s deeds and effects” 
(U. K. Singh 2007, 15). The breadth of these critiques combines a 
large number of theoretical strategies and applied methodologies. 
Some embrace analysis of legal texts while others combine empirical 
research and case studies in their approaches. (Srivastav 2005; U. K. 
Singh 2007). Contributions come from a wide variety of backgrounds 
including academic journals, think tank analysis, commission reports 
and a wide array of journalistic or personally motivated contributions. 
As with so many topics that grip the public imagination, everybody 
has an opinion on terrorism and by extension many feel strongly 
about how it is dealt with in law. At the heart of the law and order 
critique of counter terrorism and its working through the courts and 
through the laws in India lie three very simple a priori contentions. 
First “[T]errorism is a threat to democracy” (Srivastav 2005, ix). This 
core contention lies at the heart of the extreme urgency with which 
terrorism is dealt with by many democracies. Secondly “Anti-terrorist 
laws are a way of combating terrorism” (Srivastav 2005, ix). As part 
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of being law and order oriented democracies the fight against 
terrorism needs to be undertaken within the framework of law. And 
third “If conceived unwisely and applied irrationally, such laws can 
damage democracy more than terrorism” (Srivastav 2005, ix). This 
assessment is informed by the core values of democracies, such as 
freedom of expression or free and fair trials which have been 
curtailed for the sake of combating terrorism (Wilkinson 1986). A 
curtailing which runs the risk of coring the very concept meant to be 
protected. This section proceeds by paying close attention to each of 
the three contentions in turn.  
3.2.1.1	Terrorism	Is	A	Threat	To	Democracy	
Most people implicitly accept the assumption that terrorism is a 
threat to democracy. It is indeed so often repeated as a mantra of 
politicians of all stripes and colours that it is very difficult not to 
accept it at face value. As Singh puts it, “[a]ll anti-terror laws brought 
into the statute books after 9/11, have lofty claims, drawing from the 
so-called ‘international consensus’ over the Bush doctrine of 
‘spreading democracy’, assuring ‘enduring freedom’ and liberty, and 
‘making the world safe for democracy’.” Both the security critique 
and the law and order critique perceive of terrorism as a threat to 
democracy. This link with democracy implicitly underlines the 
particularly condemnable nature of terrorism as a threat not only to 
individuals but to the political system.76 It is important to note that in 
this framing of the issue it is not the ‘state’ in terms of its policies and 
institutions that is under attack, but rather a unified entity of people 
and state which is attacked for their very identity and values. This 
portrayal of the situation is endorsed in the US “by an alignment of 
liberal political commentators, philosophers and historians who 
celebrate American interventionism as the only antidote to terror” (U. 
K. Singh 2007, 23). This leads to a situation where according to some 
commentators “[t]he ‘emergency suspensions of rights’, and the 
‘admissibility’ of torture ‘in cases of necessity’ were the prerogative of 
                                                
76  A very important contribution confounding this 
separation is (Baxi 2009, 169 & 170). 
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liberal democratic governments, even if it trampled upon the rights of 
citizens” (U. K. Singh 2007, 24). The critique of these developments 
by proponents of the law and order critique are twofold. On one 
hand they are sceptical of what they see as the “delineation of the 
moral community constitutive of the ‘us’ has figured in debates of 
anti-terror laws worldwide” (U. K. Singh 2007, 24). In which 
“[s]ignificantly, ‘liberty’ and ‘security’ occur as the binary nodes that 
fashion the alignment of forces and arguments in the debate” (U. K. 
Singh 2007, 24). This line of critique is principled and aimed at the 
risks of framing the debates surrounding terrorism and law as a zero 
sum game between security and liberty. The second strand of this 
critique decries that the most vulnerable are disproportionately 
affected by the implementation of drastic security measures against 
terrorism. In this critique a line is drawn between “those who belong 
to the moral community - the depository of freedom and security - 
from those whose rights to be free and secure may be dispensed 
with” (U. K. Singh 2007, 24). Therefore outsiders and foreign 
nationals are the primarily target of such endeavours during which 
the security of all citizens is weighed against that of a voiceless and 
alien minority (Cole 2003). In addition there is the potential for far 
reaching consequences when the state can easily “label people as 
terrorists, or their sympathisers, placing them ‘outside the moral 
community’ as non-citizens, ‘to whom human rights have no 
relevance’” (U. K. Singh 2007, 24). 
The proponents of the law and order critique accuse their opponents 
of conflating terrorists with their means to affect their moral and legal 
identity as outsiders and non-holders of human rights. The conflict 
between citizen on one hand and terrorist on the other risks 
becoming a Manichean struggle for survival. This conflation of ends, 
means and person, may on the one hand generate the public will 
necessary to implement stringent counter measures and therefore be 
a very necessary part of protecting a society from acts of terror. On 
the other hand, it also runs the risk of curtailing the available options, 
by limiting those that are thinkable and plausible. The assumption, 
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shared between both the security critique and the liberal critique, that 
terrorists are the enemies of democracy, may very well be accurate in 
any number of cases. Yet to accept it as an unquestioned assumption 
poses an unacceptable risk through the consequences it has for both 
the conception of policy and law to protect society. This risk is 
further exacerbated for cases at the fringe of a positional and vague 
definition of terrorism. This operation of terrorism laws to further 
disenfranchise the already vulnerable calls attention back to the 
crucial but embattled role that definitions of terrorism play for 
proponents of a law and order response to terrorism.77  
3.2.1.2	Anti-Terrorism	Laws	Are	A	Way	Of	Combating	Terrorism	
The first step for something to enter the legal domain is to be 
rephrased in legal terms. Therefore most accounts of anti-terrorism 
laws in India begin with a few words on the definition of terrorism 
(A. Goswami 2002). Some suggest considering terrorism as the 
peacetime equivalent of a war crime (Scharf 2004; A. Schmid 2004). 
Others point to the flurry of legislative activity following 9/11 which 
includes United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, the UK 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001. 78  Perhaps most 
prominently these definitions point to the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act, 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act 2001) which is 
complemented by President Bush’s Military Order paving the way for 
the trial of Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Bravin 2014). 
The USA PATRIOT Act, 2001 in Sec 802 amends Section 2331 of 
Title 18, United States Code to redefine domestic terrorism as 
activities that: 
                                                
77 For a discussion of the relationship between law and 
order and counter terrorism, see various contributions 
from the symposium on the matter published in the 
Cardozo Law Review 27(5) March 2006, and on 
definitions in particular (Begorre-Bret 2006) in the 
same volume. 
78 For a nuanced assessment of the impact of this see 
for example (Goede 2008). 
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 “(A) involve acts dangerous to 
human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or 
of any State;  
“(B) appear to be intended -  
“(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population;  
“(ii) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or 
coercion;  
The USA PATRIOT Act, 2001 with its definition of terrorism in 
many ways set the tone for similar acts or the addition of 
amendments around the globe that followed in its wake. In the case 
of the United States, the definition in Sec 802 does not create new 
crimes per se, but rather fundamentally loosens the restrictions placed 
on government in the process of investigating, building a case and 
making that case before the court (ACLU Undated). This has effects 
on the ability of accused to defend themselves against allegations 
brought by the government. Many of these restrictions are in place so 
that in an adversarial system the individual is not at a disadvantage in 
comparison to the wealth or resources at the disposal of public 
prosecutors. 
In India the response to 9/11 included the promulgation of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) on 24 October 2001 by 
the government of India. The government largely based the 
provisions on a previously rejected counter-terrorism law, drafted by 
the Indian Law Commission.  This was passed into law by parliament 
in an exceptional joint sitting of both houses of parliament on the 
28th of March 2002. Chapter II, Section III, (1) states that: 
(1) Whoever,— 
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(a) with intent to threaten the unity, 
integrity, security or sovereignty of 
India or to strike terror in the 
people or any section of the people 
does any act or thing by using 
bombs, dynamite or other explosive 
substances or inflammable 
substances or firearms or other 
lethal weapons or poisons or 
noxious gases or other chemicals or 
by any other substances (whether 
biological or otherwise) of a 
hazardous nature or by any other 
means whatsoever, in such a 
manner as to cause, or likely to 
cause, death of, or injuries to any 
person or persons or loss of, or 
damage to, or destruction of, 
property or disruption of any 
supplies or services essential to the 
life of the community or causes 
damage or destruction of any 
property or equipment used or 
intended to be used for the defence 
of India or in connection with any 
other purposes of the Government 
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of India, any State Government or 
any of their agencies, or detains any 
person and threatens to kill or injure 
such person in order to compel the 
Government or any other person to 
do or abstain from doing any act; 
(b) is or continues to be a member 
of an association declared unlawful 
under the Unlawful Activities 
(Prevention) Act, 1967 (37 of 1967), 
or voluntarily does an act aiding or 
promoting in any manner the 
objects of such association and in 
either case is in possession of any 
unlicensed firearms, ammunition, 
explosive or other instrument or 
substance capable of causing mass 
destruction and commits any act 
resulting in loss of human life or 
grievous injury to any person or 
causes significant damage to any 
property, commits a terrorist act. 
Explanation.—For the purposes of 
this sub-section, "a terrorist act" 
shall include the act of raising funds 
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intended for the purpose of 
terrorism. 
In addition to the wide-angle terrorism definition contained in part 
(a), this act also makes membership, fundraising and support of or 
for an unlawful organisation tantamount to terrorism (b). However, 
there seems to be an objection to considering violent acts terrorism if 
they have been committed for the sole purpose of monetary gain, 
introducing a yet another distinction between crime and terrorism.79 
While POTA is no longer in force, cases begun under it carry on in 
the courts despite the definitional controversy. These two definitions 
are illustrative of the way in which laws are understood to facilitate 
and enable the combating of terrorism.  
3.2.1.3	Such	Laws	Can	Also	Be	A	Threat	To	Democracy	
The third proposition of the liberal critique is that overly draconian 
laws endanger democracy. On the one hand the laws passed by 
parliament run contrary to best human rights practice and rule of law 
(in the case of India, contrary to the constitutional promises). (Bakshi 
2013) On the other hand, the danger originates from the practical 
implementation of these laws by the security organs and by the 
courts. 
The above definitions of terrorism demonstrate that the potential for 
abuse is inherent in far sweeping definitions. The possibility of abuse 
is amplified by the prospect of banning entire organisations and 
making their entire supporters terrorist. The impact that this could 
have on both democratic politics and the protection of the civil and 
political rights of the members of the targeted organisations could be 
substantial. It follows logically that the scope of these laws is 
understood by many critics from the law and order point of view to 
be endangering a number of liberal values. 80  Ranging from free 
                                                
79  An example from the literature that draws this 
separation into question is (Flanigan 2012). 
80 A very active voice of these critiques is the Peoples 
Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) who have a wide 
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speech and freedom of association, to limiting the possibility of guilt 
by association and circumvention of due process. Besides giving the 
state great leeway in pursuing perceived terrorists, this also has the 
potential of impacting negatively both on the electoral process and 
wider perceptions of human rights and rule of law. There are a 
number of instances in India where counter terrorism laws were used 
against political opponents (Banks and Baker 2015). Terrorism and 
the TCA show affects with everyday politics. In other words the TCA 
and everyday political events are susceptible to being influential upon 
each other. 
The second potential threat to democracy from terror laws lies in 
their implementation. The roles that state agencies play in 
implementing these laws are notoriously secretive and often decried 
for malignancy. Whether it is the case of the Terrorist and Disruptive 
Activities Prevention Act (TADA) frequently used against relatively 
harmless individuals who ran foul of the local police and magistracy 
(Amnesty International 1994). There are many reports that abuse in 
POTA detentions or the notorious Armed Forces Special Powers Act 
(AFSPA) in force in Kashmir and the North East is facilitated by 
draconian laws (Human Rights Watch 1991). Further enabling 
deviance from due process and cloaking increased abuse by the 
security organs in their shadow (Mukherji 2012). 
Therefore, while the liberal critique casts terrorism first and foremost 
as a law and order problem, to be tackled by law and order means, it 
laments two developments. On the one hand, the draconian nature of 
the laws often led to stigmatisation of communities and organisations 
on a political whim. On the other hand, meddling with the procedural 
safeguards, included in regular criminal process to ensure the fairness 
of the trial for the accused, leads to increased abuse by the state 
(Mohapatra 2004). The perceived threat of terrorism to democracy is 
shorthand for a whole host of liberal values, which are supposedly 
threatened by the existence of terrorism. However the liberal critique 
                                                                                                         
range of focused critiques on their website. 
http://www.pucl.org/index.htm. 
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is also weary of specialised laws to counter this threat as they may 
give rise to a threat of their own. Degrading the trust in law and 
order, in the efficacy of human rights for protecting individuals from 
the state, and in the benevolent nature of the security organs can have 
severe and far-reaching consequences for the liberal project. 
3.2.2 The Role of the Law and Order Critique in the TCA 
The liberal critique is a component of the TCA. It interacts with the 
other components of the TCA, exerting and receiving tension. The 
tensions arising out of the liberal critique and its relations with the 
other components of the assemblage have an impact on the 
territorialisation of the assemblage. The critique brings to the fore a 
relationship between terrorism, liberal democracy and law. This 
creates linkages between what is going on in the specific courtroom 
and conjures far-reaching (virtual) repercussions. Consequently, these 
linkages increase the pressure and the tensions within the assemblage.  
These tensions bring into the assemblage thoughts and 
considerations that are linked expressively to claims of causality and 
ultimately have a bearing on the emergent properties of the TCA. 
The liberal critique and its three propositions have a territorialising 
effect within the TCA. The focus is on definitions and ways of 
understanding the relationship between terrorism, law and a wider 
political enterprise. 81  Its result is to make certain arrangements 
implicit and invisible even uncontested, reducing the transformative 
range of the TCA relations. However, in the TCA the affects of the 
liberal critique and those of the security critique also have 
deterritorialising properties. Casting the assemblage as one of terrorism 
- liberal democracy - law draws up a set of borders of what can be 
considered a part of the assemblage, which are not the same borders 
the security critique would draw. Solidifying the delineation of the 
aspects and components playing a role in the assemblage and 
attempting to change the hierarchy of the components breaks up the 
                                                
81 For example see various contributions in the edited 
volume (Slater and Stohl 1988). 
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territorialised and coded assemblage of the court in the pre-existing 
legal assemblage and is part and parcel of the TCA. 
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3.2.3 The Security Critique in the TCA 
3.2.3.1	Security	And	Laws	Against	Terrorism	
The critique of the current state of laws in India from a position of 
national security is more elusive in academic circles than the 
ubiquitous liberal critiques. Nevertheless, if the circle is expanded to 
include not only members of the academy, traditionally defined, but 
also those members of the Indian public who feel compelled and 
qualified to comment upon terrorism and its laws, then a different 
picture presents itself. These include think tanks, the media and 
perhaps most importantly those who do not only comment but 
practice security, draft and implement policy. A prime example of 
such a practitioner turned commentator is K.P.S. Gill. The former 
Director General of Police (DGP) is credited with having “rebuilt a 
shattered and infiltrated Punjab Police and […having] led that force 
to defeat terrorism in Punjab and thereby saved Punjab for the 
country” (Shourie 2001). In a number of speeches, presentations, 
books and journals Gill is not only a vehement proponent of 
encompassing and tough counter terrorism policies but also a ‘super 
cop’ for the most hawkish of security critics (Dawn News 2002). In 
contrast to the liberal critique, the security critique does not attempt 
to achieve a pure theoretical position before transferring it to 
practice, but rather argues from a practice and experience oriented 
point of ‘common sense’. Ultimately however, it mirrors the liberal 
critique in its two-stage structure. Counter-terrorism laws are 
critiqued both for their content and for the politics of their 
implementation or repeal (Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008, 47–54). As 
such proponents of the security critique decry the laws as political 
and unable to address terrorism as an international phenomenon. 
What is worse is that these laws are perceived to fetter counter-
terrorism and arguably even protect terrorists (Rabasa et al. 2009; 
Cherian Undated; Mathew 2009). 
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3.2.3.2	Laws	Are	a	Play	Thing	of	the	Political	
In his vehement defence of TADA, the draconian counter terrorism 
law in force in the eighties and early nineties, Shourie exhibits the 
security-oriented fervour that has gained momentum globally during 
the GWOT. His arguments, repeated in many forms by a host of 
other commentators pivots on portraying the fight against terrorism 
as a life and death struggle for the Indian state. In his opinion the 
lapsing of TADA resulted in “an instrument vital in the country’s life 
and death struggle against the terrorist invasion [to be] thrown aside” 
(Shourie 2001, 246). Not only does he go on extolling the virtue of an 
unbridled hand for security personnel engaging in the war against 
terrorism and its international backers. He further argues forcefully 
that terrorism is unlike crime and as such goes beyond the purview of 
the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian Penal Code, and even 
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. While TADA is extolled as “the 
one law that drove some fear into those who had been harbouring 
terrorists,” he bitterly criticises the government for allowing it to 
lapse for purely populist reasons (Shourie 2001, 240). In the context 
of TADA, Shourie’s account goes on to dismiss its misuse against 
Muslims, insinuating that TADA was kept on the books when it 
served the congress government of 1990-92 Gujarat to target 
members of the “Bhartya Kisan Union, the RSS-affiliated 
organisation of agriculturalists […during which] there was little 
protest against TADA” (Shourie 2001, 241). This critique aimed both 
at those repealing TADA, its implementation and subsequent laws 
contend that the provision of security should be above politics, and 
that any politicisation of the security apparatus, including its laws, (a 
phenomenon which is pervasive in India according to this account) is 
detrimental to security. The effect of the security critique on the TCA 
is a different territorialisation of the TCA than the law and order 
critique above. 
3.2.3.3	Counter-Terrorism	Is	Fettered	by	Laws	
Shourie insinuates that the public outrage at abuses of TADA was 
only due to “TADA [coming] to touch the networks of those who 
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wield the real influence in our country today, those who manipulate 
their puppets from Dubai and elsewhere” (Shourie 2001, 242). In this 
interpretation, claims about abuse against Muslims are a part of an 
organised subterfuge to allow (Muslim) terrorists to continue their 
campaign against the Indian state. The underlying message of the 
security critics is that the legal process in India is irreversibly mired in 
political battles and the back and forth of populist individuals. 
Therefore, matters of life and death are best left to professionals. 
Those professionals are according to this account found in the police 
and security services, and should in the best interest of the survival of 
the nation be allowed to do their work with all the political and legal 
backing possible. For the security critics, understanding terrorism as 
an international phenomenon puts it outside of the jurisdiction of 
domestic laws into the realm of the anarchy82 between states (Buros 
2011; Petallides 2012). Fettering counter terrorism policies with legal 
restraints not only puts counter terrorists at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
the terrorists but it also puts the state at a disadvantage in comparison 
to its un-scrupled international rivals, mainly Pakistan but to an 
extent also the gulf countries. Again TADA is upheld to provide an 
example of a law that did not hamper the security organs as severely 
as subsequent laws. The warlike portrayal of counter-terrorism, 
drawing on Kissingerian realism, props up the argument that counter-
terrorism efforts have to be undertaken unfettered by legal 
restrictions such as human rights, due process and civil liberties.83 In 
this way, the extreme brutality of the security organs is justified with 
the brutality of the terrorist violence and ultimately the sovereign 
interest of the state. The portrayal of the conflict as a matter of life 
and death makes the extrajudicial action of the police patriotic and 
any resistance on procedural grounds nothing less than treasonous. 
                                                
82 Discussions of anarchy between states are peripheral 
for this work, but see (Bull, Hurrell, and Hoffman 
2012) for a full discussion. 
83 This type of interpretation lies at the heart of the 
policies of the George W. Bush administration in the 
United States and gave rise to the Global War on 
Terror this interpretation is questioned and discussed 
in (Kowalski 2008). 
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Some may perceive Shourie’s account as hyperbolic or non-
representative. However the common theme cannot be ignored and 
is reflected in the work of many think tanks and commentators as 
well as echoed by the media.84 
One way of conceptualising terrorism/counter-terrorism is through 
the lens of a totalitarian conflict pitting ‘soldiers’ and ‘troops’ fighting 
for the good of the nation against opponents who 
“define their identity in terms of 
negating and destroying India, a 
country in which the most powerful 
organisations - ISI, fundamentalist 
groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba 
- exist only to destroy India, 
organisations for which the Jihad 
against India is the fount of power, 
of lucre” (Shourie 2001, 288). 
This critique’s powerful rhetoric and simplistic appeal to commonly 
held fears has made it very influential. This influences stretches back 
long before the American rhetoric of the GWOT lent it powerful 
backing and a transnational dimension.85 
One could be forgiven for thinking that the TCA is suspended 
between the polar opposites of the popular and powerful security 
critique and the liberal critique. However, after discussing some 
additional aspects of the security critique this chapter will return to 
demonstrating how these are only the most visible twin peaks of a 
much larger assemblage. 
                                                
84 For a good example of this echoing effect see the 
terrorism section of Fox News 
http://www.foxnews.com/category/world/terrorism.h
tml. 
85 For a great discussion of ISI and their role in the 
region see (Kiessling 2011). 
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II.3.d	Terrorists	Are	Protected	By	Laws	
Both the security critique and the law and order critique have a 
territorializing effect on the TCA. Critiquing the other side goes hand 
in hand with the process of securing for themselves the position to 
bring their expertise of choice to bear. From the vantage point of the 
security critique, the laws and the courts are inapt at providing 
security, because they lack the single-mindedness of purpose 
necessary for combating the scourge of terrorism. The courts are 
accused by the security minded observers of being “a judiciary that 
looks upon each issue by itself” (Shourie 2001, 246). The implicit 
accusation is that the strictly case-oriented application of the law 
leads to the upholding of procedural safeguards protecting the 
accused, even when the country is engaged in a life and death against 
the accused. It can be deduced that the authors of these arguments 
would prefer courts that would be swayed by the very precariousness 
of ‘survival’, to not mince words over the civil rights of accused. The 
situation is described as follows: 
“Those who carried out the blasts in 
Bombay are still on trial - nine years 
after those terrible explosions. Far 
from the cases reaching a 
conclusion in the trial court, all sorts 
of appeals on technical points have 
been entertained and now lie in the 
laps of higher courts. Is such a 
sequence not an invitation to 
terrorism?” (Shourie 2001, 291). 
This observation and particularly the conclusion hat this is an 
invitation to terrorism is a core argument for a tougher stance on 
terrorism be it as part of the law or outside of it. Wherever one 
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stands on the causality suggested by such an interpretation, it is clear 
that what is being called for is a more efficient judiciary, more 
professionalism, and ultimately a higher degree of sophistication of 
the entire machinery aimed at fighting terror. 
3.2.4 Both Critiques In The Assemblage 
Both the security and law and order critiques share the assumption 
that the resolution of this conflict, or perhaps victory in this conflict, 
will come about through increased sophistication of the deployed 
tools. On the one hand, these tools may be technological: improved 
surveillance equipment, better bulletproof vests, increased capacities 
at sifting the Internet’s meta-data. On the other hand, these tools may 
be legal: inclusion of new forensic methods into standards of 
evidence, a better definition of terrorism, a fast track for warrants and 
longer interrogation and pre-trial detention periods. Higher quality 
police work and increased judicial resources. Even when disagreeing 
about the exact content of these changes proponents of both 
critiques seem to agree that increased professionalization and 
expertise building in the process of counter-terrorism is required. 
They also share a drive towards a greater sophistication in 
professional capacities and the increased reliance on experts in 
relation to terrorism. This plays a key part in the delineation of 
terrorism/counterterrorism as a field of both practice and study. A 
field the content of which is embattled just as the contours are 
reinforced. In other words, this is a process of territorialisation at 
work. This territorialisation is evident in the law and order critique as 
well as in the security critique. 
However, understanding both critiques as expressive components 
and actants of the TCA shows how the tensions between them 
territorialize and delineate the acceptable boundaries of the TCA. 
These same tensions also create spaces in which de-territorializing 
components can take root. This simultaneous stabilization of 
terrorism/counter-terrorism as a delineated field, encompassing study 
and practice, and the destabilisation of the relations within these lines, 
results in unpredictability in the TCA. If we understand a court as a 
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highly territorialized and coded assemblage under normal definitional 
circumstances then the impact of terrorism on this defined, ordered 
and delineated assemblage is to rend it into an assemblage in flux. 
The law and order critique and the security critique give voice to 
where actants draw the boundaries of the assemblage and how they 
see their role in changing the circulations that make up the TCA. 
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3.3 Assemblages And Other Macro-Theories 
Within any assemblage an indeterminate number of theories play a 
role. Theories at various levels of abstraction qualify, participate and 
impact the assemblage. In the case of the TCA “Middle Range 
Theories”, such as the two approaches above, qualify tensions 
between components (Bryman 2012, 18). Their effect is to draw a 
territorializing line through the virtual capacities of interactions, and 
thus limiting the likelihood of actualization. At any given moment 
one interaction within the assemblage could be drawn in one or the 
other direction by the tensions exerted by those critiques. This 
section now turns to the role that “Grand Theories” play in the 
TCA. 86  The assemblage extends from the very concrete to the 
(absurdly) abstract. In addition to facilitating mind-games, the 
possibility of including multiple layers of abstraction within the 
assemblage is one of its advantages. In practical terms, this mixed 
blessing makes it possible to explore facets of the TCA as they are 
explained by other theories. While keeping in mind that all 
components of the TCA are rhizomatic and imminently in tension 
with each other, let us, for a moment, pretend that there are two 
spheres in the assemblage. The inner sphere consists of components 
that interact directly, whereas the outer sphere consists of 
components that exert influences onto the inner components by 
virtue of sense making and meaning-production. Grand theories are 
territorialisations in the outer sphere. Suspending the pretence of two 
separate spheres, it becomes clear that they too are intensively 
engaged in interactions with all other components of the TCA. 
Following Tania Murray Li’s methodology of allowing a number of 
theories to inspire the questions and the methodology, four theories 
stand out (T. M. Li 2007). The four areas that have inspired this 
work, through the questions they are asking, the mechanisms they are 
unearthing and the language they are using, are fully-fledged social 
                                                
86 The distinction between middle range theories and 
grand theories is drawn from (Bryman 2012) who in 
turn synthesizes a long tradition of debate on the role 
of theory in research. 
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theories in their own right, and as such, can only be engaged with as 
far as they are relevant to the assemblage. The unique advantage of 
assemblage thinking is to be able to incorporate these theories into its 
fold, with the ensuing limitations being due to the restricted scope of 
this work and its focus on the specific TCA. This section is 
structured in four sub-sections. In turn these subsections touch upon 
Systems Theory and its view of law, Critical Legal Thought and its 
impact on the idea of adjudication, concepts of Exception and 
Emergency, and finally conceptualizations of Governance and Power. 
Each of these theories raises and answers very important questions 
about the interactions of security laws with the legal system. This 
legal system is what I refer to as the pre-existing legal assemblage. 
Systems Theory is helpful in outlining the legal system as a defined, 
coded and delineated within the state. The pre-existing legal 
assemblage, has as its core the ability and perhaps the purpose to 
work as a force for oppressive control and the maintenance of power 
relations. Critical Legal thought allows us to identify some of the 
aspects of this mechanism and some of the mechanisms of control 
through the legal system. However, the legal assemblage is not 
homogenous enough to warrant a full condemnation of it as merely a 
tool of the ruling classes. It has to be understood in a wider context 
as something which develops a precarious dynamic through the 
continuous interactions between its components and serves as a 
disciplining element of governance on all who interact with it. Finally, 
in order to serve effectively the legal assemblage stands in tense 
relations with exercises of sovereignty which may disrupt its ability to 
function as a means of governance and social control, in order to 
maintain hegemony there needs to be a dividing line between the 
normal process and exceptions. This is where the theories of 
emergency and exception come in. It is between the norm and the 
exception that the governance function of the legal system is made 
possible. The contrast between the two, in its entire artifice, is what 
allows the law to play a part in governing and disciplining but also 
constituting functions that go far beyond that of the mere repression. 
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The sovereign power is dissimulated, diffused and made the 
exception in a system that is based on the non-existent norm. Each 
of the following subparts deals with their respective theory block in 
its own right, while at the same time attempting to limit the 
discussion to those areas of the theory which are relevant to the 
current project. 
The theories are employed here, not as theoretical edifices of their 
own, but rather as components of the TCA. As such of course justice 
cannot be done to the full theoretical discussion, and the theories 
become facets of a wider machine. While a great amount of effort is 
made to link section to section, a tension between these theories is 
going to remain due to their different backgrounds and purposes. 
Rather than to provide a final answer to any questions about the 
relationship between the legal assemblage and security assemblage, 
the purpose of this section is to unearth spaces and make visible 
productive tensions between the grand theories as they interact. 
Moreover, it is demonstrated how these spaces and tensions 
territorialize other components within the TCA. 
3.3.1 Social Systems Theory And The TCA 
According to the Social Systems Theory proposed by Niklas 
Luhmann, Law is one among many Social Systems (Luhmann 1995). 
Systems Theory has a high degree of theoretical sophistication and 
complexity. The key to understanding Law as a Social System is the 
concept of the autopoietic system, which is a system that “produces 
and reproduces its own elements by the interaction of its elements” 
(Teubner 2011, 3). Such a system is “characterized by a circular, 
recursive, self-referential mode of operation” (Luhmann 1988, 136). 
It is therefore through the circular construction of meaning within 
the system that the system is not only able to reproduce itself, but to 
also operate while at the same time being essentially closed, 
operationally, to the outside. Law as a social system “is a subsystem 
of society, and that there are other subsystems as well” (Luhmann 
1988, 136). In systems theory law is understood as a social system 
that is a part of a wider social system. “To conceive of society as itself 
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a differentiated social system presupposes a general theory of social 
systems that can deal not only with the comprehensive system of 
society as a whole but also with other social systems, such as face-to-
face interaction, or organizations” (Luhmann 1988, 136). 
An important caveat for Social Systems Theory is that we should 
avoid presupposing law as something existing outside of society. It 
follows that “[t]he legal system is a differentiated functional system 
within society. Thus in its own operations, the legal system is 
continually engaged in carrying out the self-reproduction 
(autopoiesis) of the overall social system as well as its own” 
(Luhmann 1988, 138). The suggestion that the reproduction of the 
legal system at the same time constitutes a part of the reproduction of 
the overall social system brings our attention to two important 
conclusions. On the one hand, that a threat to the social system also 
is a threat to the legal system. On the other hand, that the way in 
which meaning is constituted within the legal system has some 
bearing on the social system and vice versa. If a threat to the social 
system also constitutes a threat to the legal system, it should not be 
surprising for the legal system to react harshly when society as a 
whole is perceived to be at risk as explored in 3.2.1.1 In other words, 
all operations of the legal system have to be partially directed at the 
reproduction of the overall system itself. On goings that relate to the 
security of the social system as a whole, of which the legal system is a 
sub-system, then become markedly different from operations which 
are related to the management of routine events within the system. 
More explicitly, if crime is both an operational and constitutive 
category of the legal system, the existence of the category of crime is 
essential to the maintenance and reproduction of the system. Unlike 
crime, terrorism is not constitutive of the legal system, even if it 
might be operational. The category of terrorism cannot be reconciled 
with the legal system internally, rather it is a category that exists 
across a number of social systems. The latter point highlights that 
“the legal system fulfils a function 
for society - that it ‘serves’ society - 
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but also that the legal system 
participates in society’s construction 
of reality, so that in the law, as 
everywhere in society, the ordinary 
meanings of words (of names, 
numbers, designations for objects 
and actions, etc.) can, and must, be 
presupposed” (Luhmann 1988, 
138). 
The legal systems operations are therefore fundamentally linked to 
the constitution of meaning within society. This holds true not only 
in the legal context but also in setting the scope for the use of 
categories like terrorist. Consequently, the role of the system of law in 
determining categories of both a legal dimension and of a wider social 
import is paramount.  
“[Y]et, as a closed system, the law is 
completely autonomous at the level 
of its own operations. Only the law 
can say what is lawful and what is 
unlawful, and in deciding this 
question it must always refer to the 
results of its own operations and to 
the consequences for the system’s 
future operations. In each of its 
own operations it has to reproduce 
its own operational capacity. It 
achieves its structural stability 
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through this recursively and not, as 
one might suppose, through 
favourable input or worthy output” 
(Luhmann 1988, 139). 
Despite its strengths, there is a long line of very poignant criticisms 
of Luhmann’s theory; limitations that are avoided by positioning the 
legal system as part of the TCA Positing the system as reproducing 
communications is misleading as it is actants more broadly who enact 
the communications and thus reproduce them. This is an important 
difference and one that limits the ways in which systems theory can 
participate in assemblage theory. However positing the pre-existing 
legal assemblage as a closed, self-maintaining system adds to its 
territorialisation, identity and clear delineation. 
The second important aspect for the TCA is the claim made by 
system theorists that there is responsive simplification inside the legal 
system compared to the outside (Luhmann 1988, 8). This reduction 
of complexity has to do with a process of digestion, akin to 
translation, which takes place between the system and its outside. In 
other words, there is an element of interaction between the outside of 
the system and the inside of the system. This interaction is not 
transfer, but rather one of an impetus traveling from the outside and 
being translated within the categories of the system. This is relevant 
to the legal system because events/phenomena occur and are 
translated into the language/communications of the system before 
gaining effect. In addition to adding to the territorialisation of the 
pre-existing legal assemblage systems theory also offers an alternative 
perspective on translation. Understanding translation as digestion 
allows elements from the outside to be brought into the system 
without challenging its borders. This process of digestion reduces 
complexity, in the sense that it reconstitutes an infinite multitude of 
phenomena into clear-cut rubrics of the system. While this is only 
one facet of how translation works as part of assemblage it is 
nevertheless an important one. Systems theory highlights that there is 
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something special going on and that there are sets of translations 
taking place at the borders of a delineated legal assemblage that share 
commonalities. 
Yet, the consequences of such a translation remain questionable. 
Accepting that there are commonalities to the translations taking 
place along territorialized legal system borders, what are the 
consequences for the tensions that run across this border in the 
TCA? Even if Law as a Social System in Luhmann’s sense is 
equivalent to the pre-existing legal assemblage, the borders of that 
legal system are fluid, negotiated and precarious vis a vis other facets 
of the assemblage. For the TCA it is difficult to accept the binary 
Luhmann suggests between Legal and Illegal as the two operative 
criteria of the legal system as a totality (Luhmann 2004, 118). To do 
so would significantly constrain the qualities of tensions between 
components within the territory of the legal system and defeat parts 
of the purpose of working with assemblage. The assemblage allows 
us to remain attuned to the role of actors as components in the 
assemblage; components that are subject to tensions that only then 
produce legal or illegal categories. 
Despite these differences, Luhmann’s system theory contributes to 
this thesis. Firstly Systems Theory contributes to the understanding 
of territorialisations of the pre-existing legal assemblage in the TCA. 
Secondly understanding certain types of translations as digestion 
from outside to inside contributes to our understanding of the quality 
of the relations between actants embedded in different 
territorialisations. Finally the TCA resonates with the idea of the 
constitution of meaning within the self-referential, autopoietic legal 
system, which displays sets of hierarchical tensions, running along 
coded blueprints. In the next section I turn to Critical Legal Studies 
as deterritorialising the pre-existing legal assemblage by bringing 
politics into it.  
3.3.2 Critical Legal Studies And The TCA 
Critical legal theory takes its starting point in “represent[ing] 
adjudication and legislation as parts of political and cultural life” (D. 
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Kennedy 1997, 1). Despite being novel at conception, this view is not 
a very unsettling premise in today’s understandings of law. 
Nevertheless, it allows us to question “the role of political ideology 
[…] in the part of judicial activity that is best described as law 
making” (D. Kennedy 1997, 1). Law making includes both 
parliamentary activity and judicial interpretation.  
“[L]aw-making activity of judges 
takes place in the context of a 
structure of legal rules, in the face of 
particular gap, conflict, or ambiguity 
in the structure. Judges resolve 
interpretive questions through a 
form of work that consists in 
restating some part of this structure 
and then deploying a repertoire of 
legal arguments to justify their 
solutions. The most important 
mode of influence of ideology in 
adjudication comes form the 
interpenetration of this specific, 
technical rhetoric of legal 
justification and the general political 
rhetoric of the time” (D. Kennedy 
1997, 1). 
Beyond what is suggested above, we can point to the role of tensions 
between the technical discourse and the practices observed, between 
the rhetoric of the legal and the rhetoric of the social. We can take 
this mechanism, and see how it functions, not with one specific 
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ideology, but with ideologies in general to maintain two separate 
sense-making frameworks, one of law and one of the polity. Further, 
it is key to note the way in which these ideologies maintain these 
frameworks as separate through the device of the technical language 
of law. 
Hence, CLS becomes tremendously helpful in understanding the 
position and role of the judge, something we were not able to discern 
in Systems Theory, because of the absence of individual agency. 
Contrastingly, in CLS, as the agent of adjudication, the judge is at the 
heart of some amount of “anxiety” for observers of the legal system 
(D. Kennedy 1997, 30). Not only anxiety, but  
“[a]s soon as we shift from 
understanding adjudication as rule 
application to understanding it as 
interpretation, we threaten to 
destabilise the larger Liberal 
conceptual structure that 
distinguishes courts from 
legislatures, law from politics, 
technical from democratic decision 
making, and the rule of law from 
tyranny” (D. Kennedy 1997, 37). 
While this certainly is something to keep in mind the importance of 
Kennedy’s statement for our purposes is to question the apparent 
resilience of the distinction between rule of law and tyranny. In other 
words, this thesis identifies some of the mechanisms in the operation 
of Indian Counter Terrorism Laws, which insulate the rule of law 
from tyranny. These mechanisms have to be highly effective on a 
number of different levels and in a number of different dimensions, if 
they are to uphold this separation. The need for this effectiveness is 
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present even in light of the history of counter terrorism practices 
over past decades and recent years. (Carr 2008) In other words, in 
light of the legislative history, the implementation of laws, and the 
realities of the courtrooms, it contributes to the aim of this thesis to 
demonstrate some of the factors that allow people to continue to 
regard the law as the rule of law. 
Clearly there is a multitude of factors at work. But the focus in this 
section is on the ability of technical and procedural discourse to 
provide both the semblance of coherence and a-political-ness. In 
other words, this section highlights the role of technocratic 
discourses of procedure in managing tensions between due process 
statements and practical deviations. Of course this links the 
discussion here to the question regarding the uniformity of the legal 
system. In the terminology of this enquiry, it reinforces the position 
that understands the legal system as a stratified assemblage in which 
different territorialisations result in diverging sets of tensions. It is in 
this sense that we define the CLS position on the rule of law as 
requiring:  
 “That there be justiciable legal 
restraints on what one private party 
can do to  another, and on what 
executive officers can do to private 
parties; 
That judges understand themselves 
to be enjoined to enforce these 
restrains independently of the views 
of the executive and the legislature, 
and of political parties;  
That judges understand themselves 
to be bound by a norm of 
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interpretive fidelity to the body of 
legal materials that are relevant to 
whatever dispute is before them” 
(D. Kennedy 1997, 13). 
This conception of the rule of law shows the arbitrary separation of 
facets of our TCA. Nevertheless gaps remain regarding what happens 
in an area where the legal restraints are very limited. For example in 
procedure and in process, what happens when judges, independent as 
they may be, come to the same conclusion as the legislature, 
executive and political parties. Particularly when this is at the expense 
of a minority, and when the norm of interpretive fidelity becomes 
interpreted in an effects oriented way. It is in this context that 
Kennedy comes to the conclusion that the value of the rule of law  
“depends on a context of other 
modern Western Liberal 
institutions, so it doesn’t make sense 
to prescribe it for another kind of 
society without knowing a lot about 
it. It sometimes has to be 
compromised with ideas like 
emergency, national security, or just 
‘substantial justice’” (D. Kennedy 
1997, 14). 
Ultimately Kennedy identifies two phenomena that are key for our 
assemblage. On the one hand,  
“the degree to which the settled 
rules (whether contained in a Code 
or in common law) structure public 
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and private life so as to empower 
some groups at the expense of 
others, and in general function to 
reproduce the systems of hierarchy 
that characterize the society in 
question” (D. Kennedy 1997, 14). 
The connections Kennedy is drawing between the code at the heart 
of the pre-existing legal assemblage and wider social and political 
tensions have a deterritorialising effect. Rather than to adhere to a 
secluded domain of the legal system he shows tensions existing 
between these and other actants. Furthermore he goes on to show 
the role of individual actors in performing these hierarchies and 
delineations. 
“[T]he degree to which the system 
of legal rules contains gaps, 
conflicts, and ambiguities that get 
resolved by judges pursuing 
conscious, half-conscious, or 
unconscious ideological projects 
with respect to these issues of 
hierarchy” (D. Kennedy 1997, 14). 
For the current project we have to take these two points from the 
critique of adjudication provided by Kennedy. On the one hand, the 
relevance of individual actors in the process of making law and on 
the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, that these actors are 
under a number of known and unknown influences that lead them to 
come to certain conclusions when presented with certain 
circumstances. 
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However within assemblage thinking we cannot allow these 
influences to float around as invisible explanatory frameworks. What 
we can trace is that a large part of legal rhetoric is aimed at the 
neutrality, impartiality and independence from politics, territorializing 
the border between law and politics. What Kennedy has traced for us 
is that the act of adjudication is embedded in a context that makes it 
possible but also limits the scope of its directionality. The very nature 
of using discretion not only to apply but also to interpret a norm, 
requires a political mind and presupposes a certain contextualization 
of the current event into a wider political and social context. It is 
therefore a myth, albeit a useful one, that the legal system and 
adjudication are separated from politics, or any other part of the 
assemblage. Ultimately however, the distinction is highly important in 
order to maintain and keep in balance the great edifice of political 
liberalism, which requires the idea of separation of powers in order to 
clothe naked power. The caveat that we have seen above, regarding 
the potential necessity of curtailing this understanding of the rule of 
law for reasons of national security, is at the heart of the next 
theoretical point we will look into. The dangerous balance between 
the rule of law and tyranny lies at the heart of a long intellectual 
debate surrounding theories of emergency and exception with the 
potential to territorialize certain facets of the TCA.87 
3.3.3 Exception And Emergency In The TCA 
The most prominent theoreticians of the state of exception are 
probably Carl Schmitt and more recently Giorgio Agamben (Schmitt 
2010; Agamben 2005). Most aspects of the recent surge of interest in 
states of exceptions have been somehow linked and prompted by the 
Global War on Terror and its legal regime. Terrorism, or more 
broadly speaking security laws are inherently linked to questions of 
the relationship between sovereignty and the rule of law. The often 
cited maxim of necessitas legem non habet is at the heart of the tensions 
                                                
87  An example of a juxtaposition of terrorist 
movements and liberalism can be found in (Berman 
2004). 
 120 
surrounding terrorism in law and “its position at the limit between 
politics and law” (Agamben 2005, 1). Many attempts of legal 
scholarship to address some of the questions of exception are on the 
one hand marred by  
“the paradoxical position of 
[exceptional laws] being juridical 
measures that cannot be understood 
in legal terms, and the state of 
exception appears as the legal form 
of what cannot have legal form. On 
the other hand, if the law employs 
the exception - that is the 
suspension of law itself - as its 
original means of referring to and 
encompassing life, then a theory of 
the state of exception is the 
preliminary condition for any 
definition of the relation that binds 
and, at the same time, abandons the 
living being to law” (Agamben 
2005, 1). 
Agamben’s theory of emergency puts its finger on questions of 
territory in the TCA that are important for this thesis. These 
questions tie back to judicial independence in the sense of judges 
acting independently from executive influence as encountered in 
CLS. But they also very fundamentally call into question any notion 
regarding the rule of law as something that exists insulated from 
politics. If we have drawn insights about the pre-existing legal 
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assemblage from Luhmann and insights about adjudication from 
Kennedy, Agamben’s contributions are more directly relevant to the 
TCA. The continued importance of the pre-existing legal assemblage 
in the TCA links to the idea that the exercise of power through the 
legal system is somehow imbued with a greater degree of legitimacy 
than that of pure, raw, political force.88 This is due to the fact that, 
according to the classical model of liberal democracy, the source, the 
interpretation and the enforcement of the rule are all separated 
institutionally to generate this legitimacy. Agamben continually points 
to the high degree of tension between implicit norms and 
benchmarks of operation and the state of exception. In his words this 
is due to the 
“state of exception and […] its close 
relationship to civil war, 
insurrection, and resistance. Because 
civil war is the opposite of normal 
conditions, it lies in a zone of 
undecidability with respect to the 
state of exception, which is state 
power’s immediate response to the 
most extreme internal conflicts” 
(Agamben 2005, 2). 
These logics, can be, and are of course also applied to the question of 
terrorism. In this context, perhaps Agamben’s perspective is slightly 
different. Taking an international perspective he argues that  
“[f]aced with the unstoppable 
progression of what has been called 
a ‘global civil war,’ the state of 
                                                
88 For a critical appraisal of this position see (Schmitt 
2004). 
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exception tends increasingly to 
appear as the dominant paradigm of 
government in contemporary 
politics. This transformation of a 
provisional and exceptional measure 
into a technique of government 
threats radically to alter - in fact, has 
already palpably altered - the 
structure and meaning of the 
transitional distinction between 
constitutional forms. Indeed, from 
this perspective, the state of 
exception appears as a threshold of 
indeterminacy between democracy 
and absolutism” (Agamben 2005, 3). 
The important question for our work is about routine states of 
exception, the everyday bracketing of small segments of the legal 
system supported by the rationale of necessity. The operation of the 
TCA which diverges practically from the pre-existing legal 
assemblage to satisfy the necessities of the security assemblage. These 
everyday effects qualify tensions in the assemblage and interact with 
the other components in ways that have a de-territorializing/re-
territorialising effect. This tension plays out between legal and 
security facets of the TCA, the latter creating necessities and the 
former responding with exceptions. Many of the same rationales 
apply here, but this banality of exception is something, which in 
today’s world is far more dangerous and likely to affect whole 
populations than the apocalyptic cessation of the rule of law on a 
grand scale (Taylor 2009). 
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Necessitas legem non habet gains a new meaning in light of 3.3. We can 
apply it both to the macro scale of the whole legal system, and to the 
micro scale of the individual judge applying their mind to the 
discretion at their disposal, particularly in procedure. The judge then 
acts as the skilled navigator choreographing facets of the TCA 
between norm and exception. The traces of emergency and exception 
are then firstly, the role and scope of the individual judge; secondly, 
the role of the process and procedure in insulating the wider legal 
system from these processes; and thirdly, the role of other 
components, for example other legal actors, in facilitating or enabling 
this hybrid state of rule of law/exception rippling through the entire 
assemblage. 
The main question that Agamben is concerned with is that of the 
specific paradox of the state of exception. In the practices of the 
TCA there are tensions and contradictions but there is no 
insurmountable paradox. As actants continuously keep interacting 
and overcome or bypass contradictions. This coexistence of 
theoretical incoherence in the TCA is something that resonates with 
Agamben building on Benjamin and Schmitt, to reach the conclusion 
that the state of exception is situated at the threshold 
“where inside and outside do not 
exclude each other but rather blur 
with each other. The suspension of 
the norm does not mean its 
abolition, and the zone of anomie 
that it establishes is not (or at least 
claims not to be) unrelated to the 
juridical order” (Agamben 2005, 
23). 
This passage is key for the understanding of this section. On the one 
hand, we observe the norm of the legal order. On the other hand, 
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this norm is suspended in its application. The key is that the 
suspension of the said norm does not amount to its abolition. In 
other words, while in specific counter-terrorism trials various 
procedural norms are suspended at the discretion of actors and 
reflect specific alignments of tensions, these norms continue to exist 
as the visible benchmarks giving rise to and reflecting another set of 
tensions. This is the very essence of a Hegelian dialectic moment 
where the exception, necessity and emergency of these particular 
trials cause the negation of norms. In the Hegelian sense, negation 
stems from the German Aufhebung, which includes the idea of an 
uplifting of the norm, the idea of its conservation/preservation and 
the idea of its cancellation. Therefore, in practice the negation of the 
everyday norms of procedure causes them, not to cease to exist, but 
to take on the function of ‘the other’ for the process in which they 
are suspended. 
It is important at this step to return to the everyday character of these 
hybrid, banal and mundane states of exception we are concerned with 
here. The tensions between the ordinary and the extraordinary, or the 
routine versus the exception, creates productive tensions within the 
TCA. This negation of the norms of procedure, and the consequent 
tension between process and procedure, takes place on a micro level. 
It is in a case-by-case scenario rather than on some overarching 
planned level with sinister Machiavellian characters pulling the strings 
behind the scenes. It takes place in an uncoordinated and 
spontaneous fashion throughout the assemblage. Only as a result of 
the operations of the assemblage are these then tied into a wider idea 
of terrorism. Foucauldian ideas of governance and discipline are 
explored in more depth in the next sub-section. These ideas capture a 
part of the tension inherent between the components of the 
assemblage, while also turning our eye to the governance effects of 
specific territorialisations. Ultimately the link that has to be explored 
in the next section is one of power. It is in this context that Agamben 
still plays a role, particularly with respect to the theorization of 
sovereign power. The next section links theories of power to those of 
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governance, between the role of the emergency/exception and the 
every day of the legal system.  
3.3.4 Sovereignty, Power and Governance In The TCA 
3.3.4.1	Sovereignty	and	Governance	
The question of power over the body lies very close to the heart of a 
TCA; one can only point to the interrogation and detention practices 
used on suspected terrorists or the executions of those found guilty 
to grasp this connection. This power over the body can in some ways 
be understood as sovereign power.89 It boils down to two separate 
acts of power that have been understood as the essence of 
sovereignty by Slomp (Slomp 2009). The power to decide on the 
exception is what makes up the essence of sovereignty for Schmitt 
(Schmitt 2010). It is thus a sovereign act to decide which subject will 
be exposed to the unbridled power of the state, and which one will be 
granted all the protections that are considered inherently part of a 
modern (liberal) legal system. This act of sovereignty does not 
necessarily take place at the centre of the state; it may be very much a 
diffuse decision taken place at the level of the judge or the magistrate. 
It may not even be a decision in the classical sense of the word, but 
rather something that organically and necessarily grows out of the 
process that has been put in motion by a number of minor decisions 
(Tagma 2009). It may also be a central sovereign decision in the more 
classical sense, as in the case of designating an area as disturbed, 
lifting the rule of law, or refusing a mercy petition. These conditions 
of exception with regard to the body leave traces. Traces on the body 
and traces on objects are then often translated and we have access to 
reports on abuses in detention and the execution of terrorists. We 
sometimes even have pictures of their dead bodies (Ramakrishnan 
2013). These traces play a crucial role in researching and observing 
the different components of the TCA. Particularly as they stand in 
tension with the legal traces that leave a very different trail. 
                                                
89 For a discussion of this parallel see the excerpt from 
The History of Secuality in (Michel Foucault and 
Rabinow 1991, 258–78). 
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The second essential act of power associated with sovereignty is 
about the ultimate power to kill. The sovereign power to kill 
manifests itself in two forms. First the power to kill emerges out of 
the pre-existing legal assemblage in the form of a death sentence. The 
President of India has to sign off on any mercy petition/death 
warrant. In addition every death warrant has to be reviewed by the 
High Court hat has jurisdiction. The second form of the state’s power 
to kill is more diffuse and manifests itself without coded form 
through extrajudicial killings. These are also exercises of sovereign 
power, albeit on an almost individual level by small agents of the 
state. This diffuse as well as central manifestation is similar to the 
power to decide the exception. While Foucault was very clear on 
recognizing that power is something which comes into existence in a 
diffuse manner and not only at the centre of the state but rather as 
the domination over people which gives rise to the state (M. Foucault 
2007, 239). 
In contrast in the Schmittian view, it is the sovereign who decides on 
the imposition of the exception, and a diffusion of this deciding role 
would undermine sovereignty itself (Slomp 2009, 50). In other words, 
the ultimate act of sovereignty according to Schmitt is to rule out the 
rule of law. This is something we can see in the courts on an everyday 
basis. Where the individual judge, decides to overrule, drop under the 
table, or disregard certain legal norms sovereignty (in the smaller scale 
of the court) is being undermined in the name of exceptions. While 
this could be attributed to the discretion inherent in the application 
of mind as a key prerogative of the judge, it seems to be also 
indicative of a certain hybrid state of exception territorializing parts 
of the pre-existing legal assemblage. While the observations 
undertaken in this study follow actors and the traces they leave in 
specific contained cases, it is possible that these moments of 
exception are more widespread in the legal assemblage as a whole. In 
other words, while this study focuses on the TCA this is something 
that might not be unique to the TCA. However, the general rule of 
law is not collapsing; rather discourses of procedural norms allow this 
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multitude of banal exceptions to be negotiated and discussed without 
threatening the continued existence of the image of the norm that lies 
at their heart. 
Recognizing the abovementioned essential acts of power is crucial for 
understanding how the Indian legal system sustains its legitimacy and 
preserves (the semblance of) due process and norm adherence. The 
key here is to understand the role of moments of exception in 
governance. Arguably there are two aspects of governance here, 
namely a governance of the judicial and a governance of the 
exception. 
On the one hand there are governance effects at work onto the 
judicial agents - judges, magistrates, clerks, prosecutors, investigators. 
Shaping their view of the exceptionality of certain crimes, particularly 
those designated as terrorism, and at the same time contributing to a 
constitution of terrorism as a particular category of crime. This 
category shares meaning and includes certain manifestations of 
political violence while excluding others. This pervasive form of 
power is a form of governance and is deeply connected with ideas of 
identity, ideas of threat, fear and ultimately the shared conception of 
the state versus that which is designated as a Schmittian political 
enemy (Schmitt, Strong, and Strauss 2007). For Schmitt this enemy 
cannot be allowed to survive.  
On the other hand, stands a governance of the exception. In other 
words this is the management of these moments of exception into 
something coherent with the norms underlying the wider legal 
system. The threshold between the judicial order and the exception is 
also an area that must be managed, in order to keep one from 
impinging onto the other. Even more explicitly, the functioning of 
both the moments of exception and the normal rule of law - normal 
in the sense of norm adherent - must both be able to continue 
existing, even if they are seemingly mutually exclusionary.  
Narratives of procedures are key in the process of managing 
moments of exception. In the TCA the two territorialisations of the 
pre-existing legal assemblage and the pre-existing security assemblage 
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move in tension with each other. The pre-existing legal assemblage is 
heavily coded and carries with it governing norms and procedures for 
their application. Whereas the pre-existing security assemblage is 
geared towards exceptionalism. In the TCA it is then the 
choreography of the two, which in successful cases forms a tense 
balance whereas the TCA fails in unsuccessful cases. On a macro 
theoretical level, they are only a mechanism within a wider dynamic.  
3.3.4.2	Conceptualizations	of	Power	in	the	TCA	
On a micro level these mechanics revolve around stabilization and 
power. The TCA requires a nuanced perception of power as a diffuse 
circulation, however there are other perceptions of power, which may 
play a role. 
Firstly, the three dimensional understanding of power was coined by 
Steven Lukes. It aims to expand on a model of power, which includes 
only a one dimension of getting one’s way in decision-making and the 
second dimension of blocking decision-making. His contribution 
points us to the way in which preferences in decision making are 
formed, the lacunae between what seems to be an interest and a real 
interest and the power of agenda setting (Lukes 2005). The second 
relevant model of power is by Robert A. Dahl who argues that power 
exists on a continuum, from mild forms of influence to harsh forms 
of coercion (Dahl 1989). Finally, there is a third view of power, which 
we cannot bypass. Foucault sets out to explore “power in terms of 
the set of mechanism and procedures that have the role or function 
and theme, even when they are unsuccessful, of securing power” (M. 
Foucault 2007, 2). This understanding of power as a circulation 
through a set of mechanisms and procedures is what lies at the heart 
of the TCA. 
In Dahl and Lukes view power is something wieldier. While both 
theorists focused predominantly on the political process, there is a 
very interesting side line to be drawn from Lukes’ analysis for the 
legal process. In terms of agenda setting in politics, one party may be 
able to exercise power by shaping the debate. So, through setting the 
agenda one can influence what the starting positions of both sides are 
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and thus streamline and focus the own arguments and force the other 
side onto the defensive. While Lukes wrote this with political 
negotiations in mind, it is also a power that is clearly held by the 
prosecution in criminal trials. In most criminal cases there is a 
consensus that the case is not ‘framed’ in the sense of setting an 
agenda, but rather that the facts and the legal categories speak for 
themselves and thus necessitate one interpretation. While at the same 
time in the adversarial system the prosecution makes arguments 
whereas the defence predominantly takes position on those 
arguments without being proactive. Clearly in cases where there are a 
number of applicable laws, as in the case studies of this thesis, a 
discretionary decision is made. This is done by the investigating 
organs, together with the prosecution, and the signature of the 
magistrate. This seems to be a direct parallel to Lukes’ idea of agenda 
setting. The power to set a trial into motion following one particular 
route of legal debate fundamentally shapes the possible outcomes and 
the negotiating positions of all involved parties. Additionally, the 
framing of a certain debate, in this case a certain trial, also has an 
impact on the contextualization. In other words, there is a connection 
between the framing of an issue as terrorist, and the pathways open 
to subsequent development. On the one hand, this reaction may be 
influencing what the actors perceive as their predominant interest. 
For example, it could be proposed that if a judge normally has the 
interest of maintaining the legal system through upholding the rule of 
law, if an issue is presented as threatening the state, the interest of 
maintaining the legal system could become expressed in a different 
way, for example by granting an exception in order to achieve a 
conviction. This is an issue to which we will return in greater detail in 
the case studies. But suffice it to say here that the power of framing a 
charge is akin to what Lukes has described as the power of agenda 
setting and identified as one aspect of his three-dimensional model of 
power. 
Turning to the third view of power, governance and the power 
knowledge nexus. Foucault has posited this relationship as part of the 
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“power, right, truth” triangle (Michel Foucault 1975, 24). The triangle 
of mutual constitution for Foucault raises a question:  
“What are the rules of right that 
power implements to produce 
discourses of truth? Or: What type 
of power is it that is capable of 
producing discourses of power that 
have, in a society like ours, such 
powerful effects?” (Michel Foucault 
1975, 24). 
This leads us on to the partial and abstract answer he gives to this 
question:  
“Power constantly asks questions 
and questions us; it constantly 
investigates and records; it 
institutionalises the search for the 
truth, professionalizes it, and 
rewards it. We have to produce the 
truth in the same way, really, that we 
have to produce wealth, and we 
have to produce the truth in order 
to be able to produce wealth. In a 
different sense, we are also subject 
to the truth in the sense that truth 
lays down the law: it is the discourse 
of truth that decides, at least in part; 
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it conveys and propels truth-effects. 
After all, we are judged, 
condemned, forced to perform 
tasks, and destined to live and die in 
certain ways by discourses that are 
true, and which bring with them 
specific power-effects. So: rules of 
right, mechanisms or power, truth-
effects. Or: rules of power, and the 
power of true discourses” (Michel 
Foucault 1975, 25). 
The very linguistic register Foucault uses in this passage, already 
forces us to consider the legal system as one of the elements of his 
power discourse. He clearly identifies, both the professionalization, 
the desire to record and to institutionalize which we have 
encountered before. And further turns to the very act of adjudication, 
investigation and passing of sentence as having a truth-effect. In 
other words, the legal system and more precisely the judicial process 
are continuously engaged in truth production, as well as in power 
maintenance and the tying in of what is right. 
One of the key points raised by Foucault’s theory is the dis-apparition 
of the agent. It is “the discourse of truth that decides […] conveys 
and propels truth effects” (Michel Foucault 1975, 25). In other 
words, there is a certain deus ex machina in the discourse, which causes 
it to propagate and propel itself. This resonates with the actor 
network, which is both a network of distributed actors and a network 
that acts. So, there is no need for a Schmittian, centralised 
understanding of the sovereign power that decides on the exception. 
Rather the discourse of truth, in this case the narratives of law, the 
state, identity and terrorism, propel themselves and create a certain 
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dynamic, which leads to a multitude of moments of exception. The 
agents of the judicial system retain a certain amount of their agency, 
although of course their behaviour takes place within the truth-effect 
of the discourse. This means that while a certain amount of discretion 
is divulged all throughout the system, this discretion is exercised 
within the wider dynamic, causing it to be much more limited than it 
appears at face value. Finally, the sovereign moment, at which the 
individual judge, investigator or prosecutor exercises discretion, is 
shaped and tied in with the truth and power dynamics of the wider 
discourse. 
Each individual moment of exception, where one rule is broken in 
coherence with the wider discourse of truth, is tied together with all 
the other exceptions to form a hybrid state of emergency, where the 
exception coexists with the norm, while being insulated from it 
through the right discourse of technocratic, even scientific procedure. 
It is this demarcation, this existence of the emergency throughout a 
variety of discourses and narratives, but always at the threshold 
between process and procedure, between the political and the 
juridical, which gives rise to a need for management, governance or 
navigation. There is a necessity, to balance or choreograph the two 
narratives, in order to ensure that neither impinges on the other too 
much. 
The site of this struggle, in other disciplines is always that of history. 
Since the legal system is an autopoietic system, it produces its own 
history. Therefore, it makes sense to look at that in more detail in the 
case studies. Similar considerations apply to jurisprudence - meaning 
here, a collection of case law, or the internal history of the law - and 
many lawyers, and historians of law, see it as a rich source of 
anecdotal knowledge, with which to underpin the legal argument of 
the day. Foucault offers an alternative view  
“relations of force and the play of 
power are the very stuff of history. 
History exists, events occur, and 
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things that happen can and must be 
remembered, to the extent that 
relations of power, relations of 
force, and a certain play of power 
operate in relations among men. 
According to Boulainvilliers, 
historical narratives and political 
calculations have exactly the same 
object. Historical narratives and 
political calculations may not have 
the same goal, but there is a definite 
continuity in what they are talking 
about, and in what is at stake in 
both narrative and calculation” 
(Michel Foucault 1975, 168). 
In relation to the link between history and jurisprudence, we can 
begin to understand why there is a need in the judgments to be tied 
into the wider historical network of precedents. Stabilizations of 
relations of actants in the TCA are plugged into a wider historical 
narrative of both terrorism and precedent. Additionally such an 
understanding of diffuse power and governance adds to the 
justification of allowing other theories to play a role in the TCA. 
However, at the same time it is important to keep in mind that this 
macro-framework is one which is bespoke to the work here. So, 
rather than providing particular insights by itself, it unfolds its 
usefulness in respect of the findings from following the actors and 
their traces. The theoretical framework of this thesis is not meant to 
provide a full remodelling of the theories of exception and emergency 
for the world of today. Rather it is meant to provide a starting point 
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for the articulation of the seemingly confusing and often paradoxical 
findings from the research into terrorism cases in India. 
3.4 Chapter Conclusion: Theories In The TCA 
This chapter has illustrated the role that other theories play in the 
TCA. The collection of two middle range critiques and four broad 
meta theoretical influences in the TCA has covered a huge amount of 
theoretical ground traces of which can be found in the assemblage. 
While justice has not been done to any of the above critiques or meta 
theories on their own grounds, their role in the assemblage has been 
showcased.  Even when drawing on different conceptual, 
epistemological and even ontological bases serves the purpose to 
illustrate the breadth of actants in the TCA. The theories can become 
one or multiple components in the assemblage, which then exert their 
own pressures and tensions onto other components. Particularly their 
territorialising and codifying effects which qualify tensions between 
other components are interesting as they often remain unseen from 
within the perspective of the theoretical model. Having showcased 
how other theories have important contributions to make to, and can 
be accepted into, the assemblage, the next chapter turns to the role of 
assemblage thinking for method. 
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Chapter 4 - The Method Of The Assemblage 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is about my method, the method used to gather my 
findings and to build up my case studies. As such there is a focus on 
practical aspects of research method, however since the thesis takes 
place in a theoretical frame that is reflective and attuned towards the 
productivity of research, epistemology plays an underlying role. 
Throughout the chapter there are multiple points of contact with the 
assemblage, as theory and method are fundamentally intertwined in 
this approach. Assemblage also informs the limits of my own 
investigation. Overall the chapter aims to answer key guiding 
questions for qualitative research including: “How did you go about 
your research? What overall strategy did you adopt, and why? What 
design and techniques did you use? Why these and not others?” 
(Silverman 2009, 334). Drawing on these questions the chapter is 
structured in six sections. The first section focuses on the two 
fieldtrips to Delhi. The second section is on the case study approach 
and choices. The third turns to interviews, their uses and limitations. 
The fourth section focuses on participant observation. The fifth is 
about the role of texts and judicial documents in the TCA. And 
finally the sixth section questions the separation between method and 




The four circumstances under which fieldwork is the preferable 
choice of method can be paraphrased as 1) disadvantage of some 
actors severe enough to limit access to global media; 2) the scholar’s 
aim to disaggregate organisational actors into constituent factions; 3) 
the scholar’s aim to understand internal processes of a group; and 4) 
the presumption that some actors have an interest in obscuring their 
preferences and beliefs from public view90 (Boix and Stokes 2007). As 
part of the research for this inquiry I undertook two fieldwork visits 
to Delhi, India. In my initial thoughts on my inquiry about the 
relations between terrorism and law, made face-to-face interaction 
imperative. However, changes took place through iterative processes 
within and between fieldworks. As highlighted by Marshall and 
Rossman, “[i]n the early stages of qualitative inquiry, the emphasis is 
on discovery” (Marshall and Rossman 2014, 79). From the outset, 
fieldwork was going to play an essential part of my research. But 
following initial discoveries, the research’s focus shifted from the what 
of terrorism to the how in Indian Courts. The turn to ANT, 
assemblages and how the terrorist is produced and stabilised in 
Indian court emerged because the fieldwork kept turning up elements 
inexplicable with my initial framework. 
Obtaining a research visa to India proved more difficult than 
anticipated. This delayed the start of the research by almost six 
months from an initially stipulated start in 2012. The first research 
visit lasted two months, March and April 2013. The second visit of 
similar length took place in October and November of the same year. 
While researchers traveling to India routinely undertake their 
fieldwork on tourist visas, a practice that is commonly tolerated by 
the state, there are two specific reasons for undertaking this research 
entirely above board, and accepting the extensive delays. Firstly, the 
sensitive nature of planning and conducting interviews on terrorism 
meant that attention by the state could not be fully ruled out. 
                                                
90 The fourth point is potentially problematic for strict 
ANT interpretations but will be dealt with in more 
detail in the case studies. 
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Secondly, interviews with high-level government employees and 
members of the judiciary, as well as access to restricted areas such as 
the Supreme Court and Government Compounds, repeatedly 
required me to show my visa and having photocopies taken of the 
relevant pages of my passport. 
During both my stays in Delhi, I was affiliated with the Centre For 
Policy Research who graciously provided a space to do all the 
planning and calling of people necessary for day-to-day fieldwork. 
The decision to undertake two separate visits was necessitated by the 
closing of the Delhi Courts during the summer months. During this 
period it would have been nearly impossible to conduct effective 
research due to the monsoon weather, which not only makes travel 
through the city unpleasant and hazardous, but also leads to many 
senior officials leaving the city. In addition to being necessary, two 
periods of fieldwork also allowed for the digestion of the findings in 
between and thus served a practical purpose as well. During these 
two visits I undertook my inquiry using a variety of methods, 
including 43 semi-structured interviews and participant observation in 
courts and in a law firm. Both the participant observation and the 
interviews are discussed in their respective sections below. 
I approached the initial fieldwork with the intent of hearing from 
actors and learning from them. The methods seminars I had attended 
during the first year of my research had given me a number of 
avenues I wished to explore. I did have a number of theoretical 
frameworks in mind when approaching the fieldwork. The most 
important three, systems theory, emergency/exception and 
governmentality, are dealt with in section 3.3 on other theories in the 
TCA. It is perhaps important to note here that assemblages and the 
actor network theory were not part of those initial avenues. The 
separation between the first and the second fieldwork allowed me to 
re-assess what worked and what did not. Additionally, the gap 
allowed me to take advantage of opportunities and contacts made 
during the first visit to plan the second fieldwork visit in a more 
structured manner. 
 138 
By this time it had become clear that none of the initial explanatory 
frameworks were sufficient in making sense of my findings. At least 
this would not be possible without declaring some parts of the 
findings irrelevant or explaining them away. Therefore, I decided to 
maintain a broad outlook and kept collecting information on what 
actors are saying they are doing, how they see actants fit together and 
what relations and tensions I could observe. I was therefore able to 
collect traces and follow the flow of the TCA in stabilising terrorists 
even without being aware of the real value of what I collected. This 
also meant however that in approaching the interview partners I did 
not directly guide them towards terrorism but rather asked more 
generally about security laws.91 This fits well with an assemblage 
approach where the actors are required to make most of the sense 
making themselves. Out of the initial batch of interviews and 
contacts emerged the opportunity for participant observation in the 
chambers of Ms Nitya Ramakrishnan. Her focus during the time of 
my second fieldwork was the Special Leave Petition (to move the 
Supreme Court) in respect of the appeals of two cases, the 1998 
Mumbai Commuter Train Bombings and the 2002 Calcutta American 
Centre Shootings. The collection of information during the fieldwork 
was therefore done through two distinct, albeit overlapping, methods: 
the case study and interviews. 
4.3 Case Study 
A qualitative case study approach is often defined by “its reliance on 
evidence drawn from a single case and its attempt, at the same time, 
to illuminate features of a broader set of cases” (Gerring 2006, 29). 
For the TCA the cases Nasir and Aftab provide two such case 
studies. As the Nasir TCA (Chapter 6) and the Aftab TCA (Chapter 
                                                
91  There are a number of reasons why I am using 
interview partner instead of more common forms of 
interviewee or informant. In addition to expressing a 
higher degree of respect form them as actors (which 
they undoubtedly continue to be in their interaction 
with me) it also highlights the relational nature of the 
interview as something that goes both ways. See for 
example (Strathern 2006) on this. 
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7) they provide an easy reference term for the tensions and relations 
that coalesce around Nasir’s and Aftab’s becoming terrorists. As such 
the case studies accompany Nasir and Aftab along some of their 
journey to becoming terrorist. The focus is on stabilization of 
relations as discussed in chapter 2 and on legal narration as 
productive (Pottage 2002). The narrative of the judgments invents 
Nasir and Aftab as terrorist, but this invention is retroactive and 
creates the conditions of possibility for the discovery of the terrorist. 
The two case studies then follow the traces of the actants in the legal 
narrative of Nasir and Aftab, which lead to their stabilization as 
terrorist. 
Different actants in the Nasir-Terrorist assemblage and the Aftab-
Terrorist assemblage would draw the boundaries of relevance very 
differently. For example, what is relevant to the chemical expert 
preparing their expert opinion for the court on some “off white 
colour powder and one bottle containing yellowish colour liquid” 
recovered from Aftab’s house is very different to what is relevant to 
Ashphaque, Aftab’s brother.92 Drawing the boundaries of the case 
study poses a challenge since “the events themselves may be well 
bounded […] if one is studying terrorist attacks it may not be clear 
how the spatial unit of analysis should be understood” (Boix and 
Stokes 2007, 95). Drawing these boundaries in time is no easier, as 
many court proceedings in India, especially if they go up the ladder of 
appeals, take years, often the better part of a decade. And even once 
the entire legal process has unfolded it still includes the histories 
touched upon in the judgment and the repercussions of the 
judgments as precedents. 
In order to sidestep these difficulties, I use the fluid boundaries 
provided by the actors themselves. Different actors draw slightly 
different boundaries of relevance for the TCA. But nevertheless while 
these do not overlap fully there is a core and differently defined 
boundaries around that core. For example, many actors use a court 
                                                
92  For example paragraph 19 of the Sessions Court 
Judgment in Sessions Case No. 643/98 refers to the 
seizure and chemical analysis. 
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case as the scope of analysis without any difficulty, as it has the 
advantage of coming with its beginning (the terrorist incident) and 
end (the closure of the case). 
If we return to a different case, the example used in Chapter 2, a 
possible temporal bounding of the Kasab Case could be from the 
incidents (attacks on Mumbai) in 2008 to the execution of Kasab in 
2012. To the legal record this temporal bounding is coherent; there is 
a clear beginning and ending. But, at closer scrutiny even these 
common sense beginnings or endings do not remain so clear cut. 
Does the incident begin with its conception in the terrorists mind? 
The training of the attackers? Or perhaps the firing of the first shot? 
The recording of the First Information Report by the police? What if 
for each of these there are conflicting accounts? Where does it end? 
With the final Supreme Court Judgment? The prison doctor’s 
declaration of death? The reaction to the death in the Media? Its 
consequences for Indo-Pakistani relations? Understood in this way 
the list of possible beginnings or endings is endless, even without 
touching on the pre-existing legal or pre-existing security 
assemblages. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind the 
limitations of understanding the case studies as being circumscribable 
in either temporal linearity or Cartesian space outside of this text. 
These difficulties are largely absent in practice, where practitioners 
would easily refer to ‘the Kasab case’ depending on context and 
political orientation and they might disagree over what is relevant in 
that case. One actor might draw its beginning all the way to Mughal 
and Colonial times, another might cite partition, and a third Kasab 
dropping out of school in 2000.93 Nevertheless the overlap of what 
different actors refer to as ‘the Kasab case’ is sufficient to allow for 
easy reference between actors. Therefore, while we need to recognize 
that the borders of the case studies are nowhere near clear and 
settled, we are just going to follow the practitioners and investigate 
two cases without defining where they begin and end in a static 
manner. Suggesting that the case studies are fixed entities with a 
                                                
93Sessions Court judgment of the Kasab Judgment. 
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binary inside/outside is fallacious. The case studies as they are 
presented here are only brought under way by means of this writing 
in which they are clearly bounded in their respective chapters. 
However we can follow Deleuze’s and Guattari’s advice that “[e]ach 
time, mental correctives are necessary to undo the dualisms we had 
no wish to construct but through which we pass”. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 21) So while both the Nasir TCA and the Aftab TCA 
are presented in clearly bounded chapters in this work there is no 
such clear cut dualism between inside and outside, before and after as 
this would suggest and the necessary mental adjustments have to be 
made. 
In addition to the case of Kasab to which this text regularly returns as 
a source of illustrative examples, the two main case studies can also 
be further defined. The first is the assemblage in relation to the 
1997/1998 commuter train bombing in Mumbai. In this case we 
follow Aftab in his becoming terrorist and the assemblages that form 
around him. This is the Aftab TCA. The second case study is in 
relation to the 2002 American Centre Shooting in Calcutta, and it 
follows Nasir’s becoming terrorist. This text refers to it sometimes as 
the Nasir TCA. These designations originate from my participant 
observation at the law firm representing Aftab and Nasir during their 
Special Leave Petition at the Supreme Court. 
4.4 Interviews 
This inquiry combines interviews with participant observation 
throughout both fieldwork periods. The interviews were semi-
structured and undertaken with a range of predominantly Delhi-based 
actors involved with terrorism in India. All interviews were face-to-
face and ranged in time from 20 minutes to well over four hours. 
Despite the wide range between outliers the majority of interviews 
took around one hour. Although some of the interviews were 
undertaken with other persons in the room the majority of interviews 
were one-on-one. In the rare cases where assistants or family of the 
interviewees were present they were usually occupied with something 
else and only in four occasions did someone in addition to the main 
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interview partner participate in the interview itself. Only two 
interviews were recorded as, after initial attempts, it very quickly 
became clear that actively involved actors would not speak freely 
when recorded. I did ask for and received verbal consent to use the 
information gathered in the interviews in a non-identifiable manner 
for academic purposes in all but one case in which a few anecdotes 
were only shared under absolute confidentiality.94 
Interviews were undertaken with actors from different areas in the 
TCA. I have loosely grouped interview partners in three categories, 
those working on security and investigations, those working in the 
courts and those writing about or influencing the other two. Not all 
actors involved in the TCA were interviewed and not all interviews 
were with actors actively participating in either the Nasir Terrorist 
Assemblage or the Aftab Terrorist Assemblage. Due to the extreme 
risk, security environment and a large number of practical difficulties, 
only one interview with a person convicted under counter terrorism 
legislation was possible. The role of prisons and detention centres as 
well as interrogation areas in stabilizing terrorists goes beyond this 
inquiry.95 Chapter’s 6 and 7 are about the Nasir TCA and the Aftab 
TCA respectively. In contrast Chapter 5 is a collage of actors and 
relations from a number of TCAs. Driven by my interviews with a 
                                                
94  Initial attempts to get interview partners to sign 
consent forms were met with high degrees of 
skepticism and outright refusal. In my opinion, the 
relatively small community of actors involved, the 
quagmire of political shifts, personal relationships, 
contempt-of-court laws and reporting procedures for 
members of the security services as well as police 
abuse and prosecution for individuals suspected of 
supporting terrorist organizations made people 
extremely wary of having their name associated with 
even research on the topic. The one instance of refusal 
to allow the use of their interview to be used only 
covered a small part of the actual interview and could 
potentially have resulted in legal consequences for the 
individual interviewed. It relates to a personal role in 
elsewhere well-documented practices and therefore 
stil l  serves a corroborative function in the appraisal of 
other accounts. 
95  For an excellent discussion of detention practices 
and their role in the Indian TCA see (Ramakrishnan 
2013). 
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broad range of actors its aim is to illustrate a variety of relations and 
tensions from within a range of TCAs. The 5th chapter also touches 
upon both the pre-existing legal assemblage and the pre-existing 
security assemblage and makes room for the actors to speculate about 
why we encounter shortcuts when we expect detours. 
The three areas of courts, security and commentary encompass too 
many people to talk to every actor. Yet, their number is small enough 
that certain key individuals have connections to nearly all others. For 
sampling purposes, I focused on those key individuals using a 
snowballing method. The main thrust of the inquiry is to showcase 
how the terrorist is stabilized in two TCA’s. The interviews play a 
role in tracing some of the tensions that are highlighted or made 
invisible in these TCAs. Further the interviews serve to illustrate the 
interaction between the TCAs and the wider legal and security 
assemblages they are fusing. 
Preparing for the interviews was an integral part of the preparation 
for the overall fieldwork. An initial concern was to avoid leading the 
interview partners. As the issue of terrorism and counter terrorism is 
extremely sensitive, and the legal system is both a source of pride and 
a source of anguish for many educated Indians, the open, almost 
unstructured approach was aimed at allowing the interviewee to feel 
at ease and to identify by themselves the most interesting, 
problematic or otherwise relevant issue relating to the topic at hand. 
While this led to a wide array of answers, it also ensured that the 
factors influencing the reaction to the interview, and to the 
interviewer were reduced. Opening the interview with an expressed 
interest in security laws in India allowed the interview partners to 
make their own connections, which almost always turned to the topic 
of terrorism sooner or later. In preparation for the interviews, where 
possible, I studied some biographical data and other information 
about the interview partner, as well as their writing if applicable. In 
the final stage before the actual interview I usually had to have 
various interactions with employees or friends of the interview 
partner in the process of confirming the actual interview and finding 
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the exact location of it. Perhaps not surprisingly the reverse was also 
true as in a number of cases interview partners had undertaken some 
research on me before agreeing to meet. 
While the interviews were intended as relatively unstructured, in 
practice some structures repeated themselves. A standard interview in 
the first phase of fieldwork would consist of a few minutes of small 
talk in the beginning, usually about the UK or Germany. This small 
talk would usually be followed by a brief description of my work 
from my side, focusing on my interest in India. I strictly kept this 
description vague and open. In other words, the descriptions would 
be along the lines of:  
I am researching security laws in 
India, their procedures and because 
of your position as x, y, or z, I think 
that your views on the topic would 
be highly relevant to my 
understanding. Could you tell me a 
little bit about what the issues are 
for you and how things work in 
your everyday practice? 
Following this very brief introduction, I would get the practical 
questions out of the way. Including questions such as: whether the 
interview partner would mind if I took notes; what I intended to do 
with the transcripts; what role they play in my work. Furthermore, I 
would agree with them that they would not be quoted in an 
identifiable way without their explicit permission. I would let the 
interview partner speak for as long as possible without further 
prompting. When necessary I asked questions relating directly to 
what they had said before, asking for clarification of ambiguous 
points, or mirroring their words asking for approval in order to clarify 
their points. The purpose for this was to create “a situation in which 
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the theoretical postulates/conceptual structures under investigation 
are open for inspection in a way that allows the respondent to make 
an informed and critical account of them” (Pawson 1996, 313). In 
other words, my questions were aimed at allowing the actor to 
explore and explain their own conceptualizations and to draw their 
own boundaries. Once their time ran out or I was convinced that 
there would be no further information coming from them in that 
particular session, I would ask if I could be in touch with further 
questions, or for a further meeting. This would then be followed by 
either some more small talk or my departure. I had decided early on 
that hand written notes would be the best way of striking a balance 
between collecting information and allowing the interviewee to feel 
comfortable. All interview partners agreed to me taking notes and 
only on very rare occasions asked me not to note down something 
they had said, or not to quote them on it. I typed up my handwritten 
notes as soon as possible, preferably immediately after the interview. 
In this typed recording I included in an identifiable manner, all 
impression, recollections and other relevant miscellaneous 
information about the interview. This added layer of translation and 
interpretation increased the necessary caution in appraising the 
results. But it also recorded a multitude of small impressions and 
interpretations that were present and plausible at the time of the 
interview yet would not be so any longer at the time of writing. 
Often interview partners would suggest to me either some reading or 
some further people I should meet or both. This was very helpful in 
identifying more interview partners according to the snowball 
principle. During this fieldwork, I stressed quality over quantity, in 
conducting 43 interviews, out of which 31 generated relevant to the 
point information. The considerable variation in the length of the 
interviews obviously sets the scope for the amount of information 
which one interview partner would and could provide me with. 
Another factor is that some interview partners were limited to a 
specified scheduled time due to their other obligations. 
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This leads us to another point worth discussing here. As a clearly 
identifiable outsider, and a member of a respected, but very far away 
academic institution, I had both advantages and disadvantages that 
would affect the materials collected. The first effect was the 
occasional (and this might have something to do with my age as well) 
sense that they had to start at the beginning and not presume any 
knowledge on my behalf. This is a double-edged sword, on one hand 
this may limit the amount of sophistication the interview partner is 
able to engage in. On the other hand however, and I think this 
outweighs the disadvantage, this works really well with the 
assemblage method. Allowing interview partners to take the lead and 
guide me through their way of making sense of the relations between 
the direct question and terrorism minimizes my influence. That the 
vast majority of interview partners made the connection between 
procedures of security laws and terrorism very quickly is highly 
relevant. This bringing in of terrorism to explain and justify, or 
critique, various circulations shows that this inquiry is onto 
something. Even the basic views of the criminal justice system some 
interview partners presented were very interesting, both for what they 
highlighted and for what they silenced. As a novice to the intricacies 
of procedural laws at the time I was able to listen to the actors 
without immediately putting their words into my own legal frame of 
reference. This naivety with which I approached the study made 
some interview partners see me as a pawn in a wider game. Trying to 
use me to either annoy their rivals (by pointing me in their direction 
for interview – which incidentally worked out very well for me) or to 
air their wider concern about a number of issues. I therefore also 
enjoyed listening to a number of monologues about wildlife 
preservation, Bangladeshi immigrants and the impact of counterfeit 
rupees on the economy. Instead of understanding these as wasting 
my time and irrelevant to the wider study I think they illustrate a 
wider point about terrorism. While it would go too far to investigate 
this in depth in this work it seems that the invocation of terrorism is 
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also perceived by some actors as a license to bring out a number of 
issues they perceive to be ailing the world. 
Finally, there was a willingness to talk to me about issues because I 
was not a member of their community, and hence was not seen as a 
potential player in the domestic political game. Therefore, quite a few 
interview partners were much more frank with me than I had dared 
hope. 
4.5 Participant Observation 
The second pillar of the fieldwork consisted of participant 
observation. Participant observation can be defined as “the process 
of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day or 
routine activities of participants” (Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte 
1999, 91). In addition to the interviews, I undertook two separate but 
occasionally overlapping participant observations. In the first instance 
of participant observation taking place throughout both field visits I 
attended the on-going trial in respect of the 2008 Delhi Bombings. 
Taking place at Tis Hazari court but later moved to Patiala House, 
during the course of these four months I was able to observe a 
Sessions Court in action. This observation entailed “the systematic 
noting and recording of events, behaviours, interactions, and artefacts 
(objects) in the social setting” (Marshall and Rossman 2014, 79). 
Since the court was technically open to the public, it was not 
particularly difficult to gain access.96 Despite observation taking place 
“in plain sight in a public setting,” it was clear that it was not a case of 
me being a complete observer (Kawulich 2005, para. 6). Rather my 
research by default took the stance described by Kawulich as observer 
as participant (Kawulich 2005). It is clear that all attendees took note of 
my presence, and while I was not able to introduce myself to every 
individual in the courtroom I am confident that all could find out 
                                                
96 During the first fieldwork visit and the first half of 
the second visit the Trial was conducted at the Tis 
Hazari Court in Old Delhi. However it was then 
moved, at the behest of the prosecutor, to Patiala 
House, very near the Delhi High Court, Parliament 
and the Red Fort. At Patiala House the trial was 
conducted under the exclusion of the public. 
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why I was there. In fact the Judge sent his usher to ask who I was and 
why I was there the first few times of my attendance before 
recognising me. The prosecutor also made an effort to find out who I 
was. Since I interviewed a number of the lawyers present, and 
occasionally left with one of them for an interview afterwards, the 
defence was informed about me. It would have been impossible for 
me to talk to the accused directly as they were under heavy guard at 
all times. However, I did introduce myself to the father of one of the 
accused who used to wait outside the court to help the defence team 
carry their files and make photocopies. I am sure that he informed his 
son at the first opportunity. I was the only visitor at the trial. The 
courts at this level usually operate without any media or public 
scrutiny during the majority of their work. It is only in the sentencing 
stage of high profile cases that the occasional journalist might make 
their way into the courtroom. This means that the atmosphere is very 
closed and day-to-day work takes place with a routine manner that 
does not require awareness of constant observation. This stands in 
stark contrast to the Supreme Court where judges, lawyers and 
prosecutors are aware of constant scrutiny and therefore adapt their 
behaviour and speech. 
Throughout both the interviews and the participant observation(s) 
actors reacted to me and to various aspects of my visible identity 
(DeWalt and DeWalt 2002). Generally my gender, class and ethnicity 
facilitated the access granted to me, whereas my age sometimes 
worked against me. Clearly there was a trade off between being 
granted access and always sticking out and being visibly identifiable as 
different, an outsider. This out-of-place-ness was particularly 
pronounced at the lower courts, the canteens/tea stalls of courts and 
police stations. Undoubtedly there are aspects of the TCA taking 
place there that were more strongly affected by my presence than in 
other places. 
The second component of participant observation took place 
predominantly during the second field visit. Building on the contacts 
made during the first trip, I was able to participate in the drafting of 
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the Special Leave Petitions in respect of Nasir and Aftab at the 
chambers of Ms Nitya Ramakrishnan on 56 Todar Mal Road. During 
this period, which stretched over several weeks and included 
research, drafting and court visits where I was usually allowed to take 
part, I was able to observe the day-to-day processes taking place at 
her chambers. This involved not only observing the work, but also 
the interactions between her and her clients, the interactions between 
the members of her team and the way in which she prepared for 
court appearances and how they unfolded.97 The arrangements with 
the chambers were discussed with the main participants and it was 
clear to all colleagues during the participant observation that I was 
there primarily to observe and to understand how these cases 
worked. Nevertheless, it was my “ethical responsibility [to] preserve 
the anonymity of the participants in the final write-up” (Kawulich 
2005, para. 8.1). Therefore both the interviews and the participants 
(with the exception of Ms Nitya Ramakrishnan who is on public 
record as the attorney for Aftab and Nasir, and who agreed to 
identifiably take part in my research) are anonymous.98 
4.6 Legal Documents And Cases 
A crucial part of the inquiry consists of the analysis of judicial 
documents and their affects. Chiefly, the focus is on the documents 
relating to Nasir and Aftab but arrays of legal documents play a role. 
In this context there were some difficulties. Interview partners often 
                                                
97  My main research interest related to the cases of 
Nasir and Aftab, but of course she also engaged in a 
variety of other cases throughout my participant 
observation. To ensure absolute confidentiality to her 
clients those cases are not touched upon here. 
Interaction’s that took place because of those cases 
but were by no means particular to them will be used 
in an il lustrative way but without contextualization. 
(For example in relation to file keeping or preparing 
for cross-examination or general differences between 
civil and criminal cases etc.). 
98 For an in-depth discussion of the pros and cons of 
blanket anonymisation and a rationale for a more 
discretionary approach see (Bishop 2005; Clark 2006; 
Grinyer 2002; Homan 1991; Horner 1998; Parry and 
Mauthner 2004). 
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referred to statistical claims about a range of topics as well as to 
documents and other actants. Yet, obtaining and verifying the sources 
and claims proved impossible for me for three main reasons. Firstly, 
the area of this work was particularly sensitive, leading to many 
documents only being theoretically available through a Right to 
Information Suit (RTI). Secondly, court archives suffer from 
extremely restrained resources, even in Delhi. There is often no filing 
system, no centralized records bureau and no systematic collection of 
documents. The mixture of lacking resources and conflicting interests 
and priorities create an environment in which the rigorous keeping of 
records is sporadic. Thirdly, there was widespread lack of 
digitalization of records at the lower court level, and even when there 
was digitalization, records were often hidden through an inaccessible 
filing system.99 The system provided neither an incentive for the 
adequate keeping of records nor for the sharing of the existing 
records with researchers.100 All in all I encountered higher levels of 
good will than I had feared from the anecdotes of other researchers. 
Nevertheless incidents of actors referring to documents that were not 
locatable abounded. Often extensive online research to find lower 
court cases turned up empty, and I had to rely on photocopies taken 
in lawyers chambers and word-processed email attachments of 
evidence.101 
The reporting and archiving in respect of High Court and Supreme 
Court level is comparatively better, but nowhere near exhaustive. 
This led to the fourth obstacle for verification. The statistical claims 
                                                
99 Often the individual files are named at the discretion 
of the clerk and are impossible to find without the 
specific reference that depends on the clerks’ 
will ingness and ability to share. 
100 The archive assemblage in Indian Courts is certainly 
highly interesting, but is discussed in the case studies 
only to the extent as it is immediately relevant to the 
TCA. 
101  This potentially imposes a limitation on some 
avenues of analysis, but since these are the same 
routes through which actors get a hold of documents 
and often the very same documents that they interact 
with I will not exclude these files but use them in a 
cautious way. 
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were often based on numbers and reports provided by NGO’s, 
international organizations, human rights activists and other bodies, 
including the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). Numbers and 
statistics I encountered suffer from all the limitations of statistical 
findings and extrapolation. Additionally they are often based on each 
other or on more or less precise estimates. In the way that actors use 
these numbers for their purposes their abstract truth content does 
not matter so much here. However not being able to get hold of the 
original or to assess their production is somewhat limiting our ability 
to refer to them. Statistics, reports and other findings from 
institutional bodies often become actants in their own right, forming 
relations with other actants and leaving traces in judgments, 
arguments and stabilisations. 
The fifth difficulty was that the Right To Information is only 
available to Indian citizens, and even when successful, lists gathered 
under this right often prove to be inaccurate. For instance, during an 
informal discussion, a fellow researcher showed me lists of cases he 
had received under an RTI suit that were meant to list cases brought 
under anti-terrorism legislation for one district in a particular time 
period. When he did receive the list it contained cases from other 
districts, it lacked some cases that the researcher was aware of had 
taken place in this district. It also included some cases which were not 
terrorism, other that had been dismissed before proceeding to the 
trial stage or lay outside the time period stipulated. In other words, it 
seemed like the list had been compiled in an ad hoc manner without 
much thought given to accuracy. This is exemplary of a larger 
problem relating to interacting with records without being able to 
also dive into the process of their making. 
Archiving at all levels of courts is hampered by inadequate facilities, 
overworked staff, and a lack of incentive to actually keep accurate 
records let alone share them. It seemed that the only possibility to get 
hold of non-reported lower courts cases is to get the files from the 
lawyers as mentioned above. However, this led to the sixth problem 
that only well to do chambers had the resources to store files. 
 152 
Particularly in high profile anti-terrorism trials, the complete records 
can fill a number of storage cabinets. With many lawyers operating 
out of a single small room (if not their own bedroom/a table outside 
the court), it is standard practice to give the files to the involved party 
at the end of the suit. This made it impossible to track down the 
lawyer’s files for cases at the lower court level. 
Both high courts and the Supreme Court have similar problems. 
Although the limitations are getting much less severe as one moves 
up the ladder of appeal. At high court level the reporting of cases 
increases, however there is still the problem that some of the 
terrorism trials are conducted in camera, the files are often archived 
inadequately and often the lawyers remain the only source for them. 
The Supreme Court in theory has comprehensive reporting of its 
cases online. However with dozens of judgments handed down each 
day, and a somewhat arcane website, one still needs to be aware of 
the particular case in order to find it. Manupatra and Indian Kanoon, 
allow for some research to be done into issues rather than cases, but 
their search engines, are of a standard, which does not guarantee the 
exhaustiveness of a search.102 This means that one needs to combine 
methods to find cases. These methods need to balance a combination 
of, publications such as the All India Reporter, online search, word of 
mouth but often sill result in only a rough picture of how many cases 
there are, how they usually end etc. 
In short, it is impossible to say conclusively how many cases exist 
under a particular law in India, or to compare their outcomes in a 
meaningful way. The thrust of this research however does not require 
this. As mentioned above, difficulties arise when actors make 
reference to actants that are untraceable for the researcher. This 
problem is by no means limited to documents. It exists in relation to 
a number of actants, I deal with it by referring to these actants as they 
are referred to by the actor bringing them up. 
                                                
102 Both Manupatra (http://www.manupatra.com) and 
Indian Kanoon (https://indiankanoon.org) are 
websites that are used both by lawyers and researchers 
to quickly find Indian Cases. 
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4.7 Back To The Assemblage 
The role of this chapter has been to establish the method for this 
inquiry. As such, it has explored the practical aspects of the fieldwork 
undertaken. In this last section of the chapter I link the fieldwork to 
assemblage thinking and ANT. Traditionally understood, the 
methodology section of a (social-) scientific work plays a great role in 
allowing others to assess the validity of the findings and compare the 
set up to other similar studies.103 This chapter aims at providing a 
basis for others to assess the means by which I collected the 
information on which this work is based. At the same time it must be 
recognised that “method is productive of realities rather than merely 
reflecting them” (Law 2004, 70). The most straightforward 
interpretation of this is that the practical steps undertaken to collect 
information, decide which pieces of information are relevant and 
which ones should be dismissed has an effect on the findings. A 
deeper understanding suggests that a fluid and continuous tension is 
at work between the methods of inquiry and the production of 
findings and their representation104 (Mol and Law 1994). 
In the context of this thesis, method and methodology form a 
complex entity with affects.105 They are perhaps better understood as 
a method assemblage. This method assemblage consists of the 
“enactment of [a] hinterland of pre-existing social and material 
realities […] and its bundle of ramifying relations” (Law 2004, 13). To 
understand this I need to clarify a few concepts. Hinterlands are 
ubiquitous and they play a role that can be described as territorializing 
fluid space. In a fluid space “elements inform each other but in 
continuously changing ways”. Hinterlands are the baggage that comes 
                                                
103 That a study must be replicable is often taken as the 
ultimate test of reliability, but is ruled out by the 
contingent arrangement of the assemblage. 
104 While Annemarie Mol and John Law’s argument in 
this article is about the production of anemia in 
medical institutions in the Netherlands and in Africa 
many of the mechanisms they identify are transferrable 
to this investigation into the production of terrorism 
in legal institutions in India. 
105  For an in depth discussion of complexity in the 
social sciences see (Mol and Law 2002). 
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with the attempt of charting that space (Mol and Law 1994, 663). 
When a hinterland is enacted as part of a method assemblage it’s 
bundle of ramifying relations latch onto the indefinite tensions in the fluid 
space and order them. Thereby superimposing their order. 
Metaphorically this is the draining of the fertile swamp to replace it 
with productive fields and an efficient road system. The result of this 
is that “parts of the out-there are made visible while other parts, 
though necessary, are pushed into invisibility” (Law 2004, 70). The 
fluid swamp is replaced with bounded fields crossed by well-trodden 
roads. This argument is bound to play into its own enactment of pre-
existing social and material realities in one of the well-recognised 
weaknesses of assemblage thought and especially its ANT successor 
(Law and Hassard 1999). 
Assemblage thinking is often counterintuitive to traditional theory 
and especially social sciences’ claims at simplification and prediction. 
This tension and awkwardness extends to the relationship between 
traditional social science methodologies and the methods of the 
assemblage. This is not to say that assemblage thinking requires the 
rejection of methodologies such as the ones above, such as qualitative 
interviews, participant observation or case study approaches. Far 
from it! Yet, tension and awkwardness arise from the necessity to use 
those and other methods in a deliberate and conscious way, which 
neither naturalises their epistemologies nor reifies their way of gaining 
knowledge. As Law puts it: 
[M]ethods, their rules, and even 
more methods’ practices, not only 
describe but also help to produce the 
reality that they understand. […] if 
methods tend to produce the reality 
they describe, then this may be, but 
is not necessarily, obnoxious. […] 
But what is important now is to 
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note that if these two claims are 
right then they have profound 
implications for our understanding 
of the nature of research (Law 2004, 
5). 
Taking Law’s second point as encouragement, this thesis uses a case 
study approach with interviews and participant observation, and 
combines it with other methods such as the study of legal documents 
to weave a rich picture of material semiotic interactions (Law 2008). 
However, at the same time, the propensities of various methods for 
feeding the reality they seek to describe are acknowledged. Following 
the traces of actants from the heterogeneous practices of the TCA to 
the smooth narrative of the judgment interlaces theory and method. 
As this chapter is in a way about the nature of research rather than a 
straightforward methodology discussion, it makes sense to revisit one 
important point from the previous chapters. While writing this thesis 
three questions arose regularly: is/are assemblages a theory or a way of 
thinking? What is the difference? What are the implications for my 
work of seeing it either as a theory or as a way of thinking? Ultimately 
in this thesis I use assemblages in a way that suggests that it is a way 
of thinking rather than a theory in a more restrictive sense. This is on 
the one hand to avoid being drawn into predictions that go on to 
straightjacket, calcify and territorialise facets of the tensions that I 
seek to show at work. On the other hand, this is to avoid introducing 
a separation and hierarchy between theory and method. This is why 
these questions form a constant backdrop to not only this chapter 
but also the entire inquiry. Both implications lie just under the surface 
of many traditional social science understandings of theory. Which 
“passed down to us after a century of social science tend to work on 
the assumption that the world is properly to be understood as a set of 
fairly specific, determinate, and more or less identifiable processes” (Law 2004, 
5). To use assemblage thinking requires awareness of the implications 
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of the relationship between theoretical and methodological 
components, jointly forming a productive process by engaging with 
the narrative of the thesis. 
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Chapter 5 – Productive Mess 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I use my interviews and my observations during the 
participant ethnography to situate the emerging TCA. The particular 
focus is on allowing the actors to speculate on elements of the chain 
of reference that articulates terrorist facts. In exploring these tensions 
I follow the lead of my interview partners to focus on elements they 
find surprising, as well as their differing interpretations of detours 
and shortcuts in making the terrorist speak. This is important for two 
reasons. Firstly because we need to resist superimposing our own 
ordering strategies on the disparate traces that are uncovered. Each of 
my interviews produced a number of points and traces. But they do 
not easily map onto a smooth flat plane. For example the points 
made about the prosecution from a human rights activist or a security 
professional may seem mutually exclusionary. Each speculating that 
the prosecution is in the pocket of the other party. I am not 
suggesting that the truth lies in the middle, but rather that there are 
two traces that cannot be mapped onto the same smooth surface, two 
attempts to make sense of an apparent gap in the chain of reference 
at the heart of the terrorist fact. This means that while I loosely 
associate some points with the pre-existing legal assemblage and 
others with the pre-existing security assemblage this association is not 
stable or permanent. In the sense of territorialisation it means a 
circulating habit of association rather than fixed, solid reliability. 
Secondly this is important because it is this messy, productive swamp 
of fluid circulations and tense relations that so strongly contrasts with 
the smooth, stable self-speaking account of the terrorist emerging out 
of the TCA. This chapter therefore directly speaks to the following 
two case study chapters that show what mechanism are at work in the 
TCA to make the terrorist speak and to articulate terrorist facts. 
In addition to the two territorialising tendencies in the hinterlands of 
the TCA, legal/law and order and security, another reoccurring 
theme is a tension between process and procedure. We can 
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understand this tension as a battle over the vincula used to attach 
insignificant events to the corpus of texts. Each enrolment, each 
vinculum remains controversial and contested for some actors. Yet as 
the chain of reference builds the tensions between shortcuts and 
detours become increasingly suppressed. The tensions between 
security and law and order (see section 3.2) are reflected in the 
literature on terrorism in India.106 However, their role in the making 
of terrorists is more complex than a focus on corruption, 
incompetence or securitisation can account for. (Laqueur 2003) It is 
the tension between modalities of security and modalities of law, 
which play out in the TCA. This tension often shows stabilisations 
succeeding which are seriously criticised by some actors. Or on the 
flip side results in, solid links between actants suddenly being called 
into question and failing. The sentencing to death of the so called 
‘printer group’ by the Sessions Court in the Nasir TCA is one such 
example of a seemingly unlikely terrorist stabilisation succeeding.107 
At least for a time, before being overturned by the High Court. 
The Nasir TCA and the Aftab TCA came up occasionally during my 
interviews, as well as a host of other cases and anecdotes. The 
interviews explore how actors themselves make sense of the making 
of terrorists, the involved territorialisation and the role played by the 
courts. They are therefore a crucial step towards understanding the 
tensions that flow through any TCA, as actors express their 
endorsements, surprises and critiques of other actants. The tension 
between security and law and order is one of the strongest forces 
shaping how actors make sense of stabilisations. Many actors refer to 
a conflict in the TCA between individual rights and national security. 
Most of them position themselves on one or the other side of this 
divide with regard to the terrorist. This tension is also reflected in a 
slightly more abstract form in the tension between procedures 
prescribed by law and process. Processes are influenced by, but often 
                                                
106 See for example (A. Goswami 2002; Srivastav 2005; 
Raju 2004; J. Eckert 2012; J. M. Eckert 2003, 1999; J. 
Eckert et al. 2012). 
107 We will encounter the Nasir TCA and the printer 
group in Chapter 6. 
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divergent from coded procedures. One very important observation 
that comes out of these interviews is that many actors for whom 
security is more important than law and order, perceive rights and 
legal procedures as inherently favouring the terrorists.108 It is also 
clear from the interviews that for some actors the making of terrorists 
is a naturalised connection made in their minds between an incident 
and a shadowy enemy. Due to the ubiquitous reified connections 
terrorists are treated as discoverable, pre-existing essences. Ultimately 
these interviews provide an insight into the making of the links in the 
chain of reference that articulates the terrorist fact. These links are 
individual micro associations, including stabilisations, vincula, detours 
and shortcuts. Starting from the judgment we are digging back along 
the chain of reference which articulates the terrorist fact. At times 
some chain links cause our surprise because they look nothing like 
expected. Where we thought to find a slow, deliberate, hesitant 
detour we encounter a shortcut, a blank space or a gap in the solid 
chain. The interviews serve to identify these gaps as actors perceive 
them but also to begin filling them with some of the speculations of 
the actors. A large share of this speculations centres on tension 
between security and law and order. Despite this well known 
dichotomy the picture emerging from the interviews is one of 
contradictions and plural truths. In order to structure this chapter I 
zoom in on two main tensions we can also observe in the two case 
studies. These are the tension between security and law and 
order/rights and the tension between procedures of law and 
processes of the TCA. In the words of the TCA these are the 
moments where lacunae emerge in the chain of reference and they 
are filled with speculation that relates to shortcuts and detours or the 
embattled vinculum. Without a doubt many articulations of these 
tensions would be familiar to some scholars from their respective 
fields. Despite the risk of some repetition, the way actors themselves 
                                                
108  In line with the need for a blanket anonymity 
described in the Methodology Chapter, the interviews 
are numbered continuously between fieldworks I and 
II. This passage for example draws on Interview XXX 
from fieldwork I. 
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are making sense of the TCA is relevant. Some actors argue that it is 
these tensions that prevent them from protecting the state effectively 
by making it hard to go after terrorists. Others are infuriated that the 
tensions allow the rights of alleged terrorists to be trampled in court. 
What we are presented with is a fractal reality where opposing 
currents are at the same time influencing circulations. These currents 
can become a choreographed, balanced tension that is then inscribed 
in the judgment through the TCA, substituting a tense balance for 
univocal stability. Only through the choreographing efforts of the 
actors and the ordering momentum of the legal assemblage, does the 
judgment gain properties of stability, timelessness and permanence, 
once mature the terrorist facts can be left to speak for themselves. 
This permanence then also infuses the stabilised terrorist. Connecting 
her to all other terrorists, which increase the stability of that 
connection to the point where even subsequent judgments struggle to 
undo it. 
The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part (Section 5.2) 
focuses on the tension between security and law and order. The 
second part (Section 5.3) addresses the tension between process and 
procedure. Finally the third part (Section 5.4) goes back to 




5.2 The working Background of the TCA 
The TCA does not emerge out of thin air. Instead the TCA brings 
together actants from two pre-existing assemblages, namely legal and 
security. These actants are arranged in new constellations as part of 
the TCA. In what I loosely define as success or failure they are either 
enrolled in a successful, balanced choreography to make a terrorist 
speak, or failing to do so, in which case the TCA also falls apart and 
no terrorist facts emerge. The two case studies in chapters 6 and 7 
demonstrate how the TCA balances the modes of articulation of law 
and order with those of security. The smooth narrative and stable 
terrorist that emerge out of the TCA are surprising in light of the 
heterogeneity and ‘messiness’ that we encounter in this chapter. 
Actants from pre-existing assemblages are enrolled in the TCA but 
bring with them additional layers of tensions. These tensions reflect 
the territorialisation of the pre-existing assemblages along lines of 
security and of law and order.109 As such the successful TCA exposes 
itself to critiques from both sides of the divide, but not in a way that 
endangers its continued operation. Rather the suppressed links in the 
chains of reference that are being crafted cause for speculation 
among actors. Following a discussion of these two pre-existing 
assemblages and how they make themselves felt in the TCA the 
section turns to the temporal and spatial dimensions which add yet 
another layer of complication to the TCA’s hinterlands.110 Finally the 
section returns to the core role of the chapter that is to show the 
heterogeneity and messiness that forms the backdrop to the TCA’s 
stabilizations and reifications. 
5.2.1 Outlines of the Pre-existing Legal Assemblage and Pre-
existing Security Assemblage 
All actors I interviewed and the ones I observed have an individual 
perspective and a personal account of these tensions. These accounts, 
while occasionally overlapping, touch upon a wide variety of tensions. 
                                                
109 To which for facility’s sake I also refer to as ‘legal’ 
assemblage. 
110 Hinterlands are introduced in Section 4.7 
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Some of the tensions in the TCA that actors articulated for me during 
our interviews are between: process/procedure; the sense making of 
actors; proactive/reactive encounters with the terrorist; jurisdictions; 
terrorist/terrorism; regular law/special law; doing something/being 
seen as doing something; legal procedure/judicial discretion. Each of 
these tensions was brought out by at least one of the actors in my 
interviews as having a bearing through the TCA. It is traces of these 
tensions, and the way in which they influence the circulations and 
stabilizations, that make up the TCA. At the same time many of these 
tensions are coproduced with the understanding of terrorism as a law 
and order issue or as a security issue. By this I mean that they evolve 
simultaneously and inseparably from each other. The tension between 
the pre-existing security assemblage and the pre-existing legal 
assemblage run through many of the relations between actants. This 
tension is also expressed through the continuous dissonance between 
process and procedure. Where process is the unfolding of events and 
procedure is the normative description of process in law. 
5.2.1.1	Success	and	Failure	of	the	TCA	
Assemblage thinking informs us that these tensions, when 
understood as dualisms, are a product of the TCA. Since the making 
of the terrorist in the TCA is influenced by the territorializing 
tensions between security and law and order. The making of a 
terrorist in the TCA brings together actors who have very different 
notions on the role of the law and of effective counter terrorism and 
forces them to cooperate in a chain of reference leading to a stable 
terrorist fact. Making the terrorist speak requires a stable chain of 
reference, expecting a chain of reference as the one described as part 
of the passage of law by Latour leads to some surprising lacunae. The 
interviews offer a view of how actors in the TCA speculate on what 
fills these lacunae. Since the chain of reference operates to articulate 
the judgment and results in the terrorist speaking it cannot contain 
gaps, therefore the lacunae must be made of something we cannot 
see directly. The speculation of the actors allows us to trace these 
surprising shortcuts in the chain of reference. Often the focus of the 
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interview partners is on interactions between actors engaged in 
security assemblages and actors engaged in legal assemblages. 
However we also need to contemplate the possibility of the TCA 
failing. And by this I mean the entire TCA falling apart rather than 
the stabilization of the terrorist only. In other words, failure for the 
TCA is not to arrive at acquittal, but for its actors to cease interacting. 
This leads to pressure on some actors to participate in the TCA in 
such a way that it remains functional and keeps its actors locked in 
interactions. The alternative to sustained and balanced interaction is 
one where the actors operate fully outside of the TCA, on the one 
hand focusing entirely on a war-like mode of interaction with 
suspected terrorists, and on the other hand, fully embracing the legal 
assemblage. In cases where the interaction is not balanced, the 
security assemblage and the legal assemblage risk working 
antagonistically and divisively. The threat of avoidance to the TCA as 
part of the legal assemblage is forcefully illustrated by the encounter 
killings of suspected terrorists by the security forces. In my 
interviews, I recorded instances where members of the security 
organs have lamented that whenever they cooperated with the courts, 
terrorists risked being set free.111 During my participant observation 
at the Tis Hazari Court, a disgruntled Special Prosecutor Rajiv Mohan 
slowed the proceedings to a two-week standstill after the Judge 
refused him a request. The power of non-participation, extra-legal 
action and boycotting of the Court has the potential to put a lot of 
pressure onto the continuous churning required to keep the TCA 
alive and in some cases undoubtedly causes the TCA to fail.  
In many cases, including our two case studies, the TCA does not fail. 
Even staunch critics of the many abuses that are possible both 
outside of and under the special legal regimes maintain that justice is 
achieved through the TCA every now and again.112 Additionally, the 
cyclical nature of the special legislation leads people to always 
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112 A number of interview partners repeatedly referred 
to justice but without necessarily sharing an underlying 
notion of it’s meaning, except that it was a desired 
outcome of the judicial process. 
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remember both a time when things were worse and a time when 
things were better, leading to a certain belief in the Indian system as a 
whole.113 Justified as this belief may be, it seems clear that while 
things have a tendency to get better on paper, the changes in practice 
are minute. This leads to the relatively glum conclusion for one actor 
that, “the laws keep coming, every time we believe that a law has 
been gotten rid of it comes back in another form.”114 Despite these 
difficulties, many actors do not walk away and continue to engage 
with the TCA. While my case studies focus on successful TCAs, it is 
important for us to remember that the possibility of failure looms. 
For the TCA to successfully articulate terrorist facts two pre-existing 
assemblages have to be co-articulated and at times reconciled. 
5.2.1.2	The	Pre-Existing	Legal	Assemblage	and	Legitimacy	
The first pre-existing assemblage is the legal one. By pre-existing I 
mean that no TCA comes into being in a legal vacuum. Ideas of law, 
order and legality as well as an entire legal assemblage are already in 
place and constantly churning. Many actants that become enrolled in 
the successful TCA are also enrolled in the legal assemblage and 
bring with them territorializing tendencies and tensions. The pre-
existing legal assemblage also contributes to the legitimacy, and 
therefore the reach, of the TCA.115 Latour has discussed the workings 
of the pre-existing legal assemblage in depth but successful terrorist 
articulation goes beyond the passage of law. (Latour 2004) 
One of the most striking findings in my fieldwork was the overall 
faith of my interview partners in the legal system and in its 
legitimacy.116 Most interview partners, believed, explicitly or implicitly, 
in the rule of law and the legitimacy of the legal system as a remedy to 
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115 Some have also argued that the counter terrorism in 
itself also confers legitimacy (Kapur 2005, 176). 
116 I am using the phrase ‘legal system’ in this chapter 
to reflect the use of the phrase by the actors 
themselves. This largely overlaps with the pre-existing 
legal assemblage we encountered in section 3.2. 
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social injustice.117 Yet actors’ perception of the courts went beyond 
the potential for some forms of social justice. During the participant 
observation, the faith of the actors around me was even stronger and 
unwavering.118 While some actors express their concerns about the 
difficulties faced by minorities, particularly in security legislation as a 
partial critique of the legal system, many would still see the legal 
system as providing the potential for remedies as well. Li describes 
this particular distinction as a will to improve. 119  The desire to 
improve the status quo, by sticking to the system at hand is always 
both critical and supportive of the system. In other words, while a 
critique levelled at abuses within the legal system or at particular 
individuals can cast doubt on the effective functioning of particular 
components and processes, it at the same time reaffirms the whole 
and the universal validity of the system. 
Nevertheless some interview partners perceived the legal system, 
including the courts, in a very critical manner. One of the most 
fundamental critiques levelled at all courts including the Supreme 
Court is that they exist within the communal, casteist and patriarchal 
framework of bias, which imbues all of Indian society.120 This makes 
the courts problematic and deeply suspect for their complicity in 
maintaining these structures. 121  This is illustrated amongst other 
things through the upholding of police orders, even when those 
orders disagree with the overall conclusion of the case. In other 
words, the courts always make an effort to avoid slapping the police 
on the wrist for transgressions against both procedural and 
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substantive laws.122 This is something that I have also encountered in 
my observations. It is necessary for the courts to avoid antagonizing 
the police. If the police do not willingly cooperate with the courts, 
this will lead to a breakdown of the TCA. Therefore many judges take 
a long-term perspective and prioritize the expectations of some actors 
over others. In contrast the police may be more willing to engage in 
brinkmanship for individual short-term gains. Occasionally judges’ 
patience encounters its limits, and thus there is a certain degree of 
heterogeneity amongst judgments on security related matters, which 
is at the same time positive and negative. On the one hand, it is 
positive because it allows some people to get access to justice, while it 
also demonstrates that the whole is not centrally controlled. This 
illustrates the heterogeneous and in flux working of the assemblage. 
On the other hand, it is problematic because it does away with one of 
the other cornerstones of a legal system, namely predictability. If it 
comes down to, as one interview partner put, “a matter of luck, if 
your bench is good or not” this defies the principle that law ought to 
have an element of predictability in its application. 123  However, 
despite this conclusion, the assemblage keeps working and the actants 
remain engaged with it, even when they make sense of their 
interactions and engagements with reference to systemic failure and 
luck. 
A successful enrolment of actants from the pre-existing legal 
assemblage is necessary to keep the TCA from losing legitimacy. If 
the TCA becomes regarded as a kangaroo court it loses much of its 
reach. The mode of interactions is therefore often marked by the 
slow, hesitant and deliberate manner of described by Latour in his 
observation of the Conseil D’Etat. The meticulous crafting of chains 
of references, one vinculum at a time, to enrol current actors and pre-
existing legal actors in tandem, is the hallmark of this process. Yet at 
times we can observe the TCA moving rapidly, with speedy 
connections between actants and other actants that bear little 
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resemblance to the laborious detours and modes of agencement of 
law. The other pre-existing assemblage that plays a huge role in the 
TCA is that of security. 
5.2.1.3	The	Pre-Existing	Security	Assemblage	and	Effectiveness	
The second pre-existing assemblage that shapes the modes of 
associations of the TCA and is crucial for the successful articulation 
of the terrorist can be loosely termed a security assemblage. 
Constantly police officers are patrolling the streets, intelligence 
agencies are monitoring communications, commandoes and 
paramilitaries are training in counter-terrorism exercises. These actors 
and other actants are a fundamentally necessary part of a successful 
TCA. If their enrolment fails the TCA loses its ability to articulate the 
terrorist. If the security organs stop cooperating, the pre-existing legal 
assemblage becomes ineffective. But even before they cease to 
cooperate, the modes of association of the security assemblage are 
sine qua non of terrorist articulation. The enrolment of security 
actors into the TCA has two objectives. These actors are needed to 
provide the TCA with its input, so their enrolment can be 
investigative, forensic and contributory. The police, some parts of the 
intelligence community come to mind, but in areas where paramilitary 
organisations play a significant role in administering law and order 
they can also be enrolled in such a fashion. The security organs are 
also needed to carry out and adhere to the orders issued by the TCA. 
In this sense their enrolment is executive. The divide between the 
two is not usually clear cut, blurring particularly occurs when actors 
tasked with investigations, such as the police, engage in this task, but 
do not adhere to the guidelines set by the legal assemblage for its 
pursuit. Failure to successfully enrol actors from the security 
assemblage into the TCA results in failure or ineffectiveness. But a 
perhaps more significant contribution by the pre-existing security 
assemblage are its modes of association. Rather than to employ the 
slowly meandering, hesitant and deliberative mode of the passage of 
law, the passage of security is quick, reflexive, jumping to conclusions 
via the shortcuts of pre-established patterns. A chain of reference 
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crafted using both modes can only be unearthed with recourse to 
both modes. For terrorist facts the chain requires a choreography of 
both modes in order to make the terrorist speak. 
The security forces are a highly ambivalent actor on the Indian scene. 
On one hand the esteem for the military remains high amongst the 
population. On the other the proliferation of paramilitary security 
organizations leads to a blurring of lines and people wearing the 
uniform of the state commit many atrocities. The Salwa Judum is 
perhaps the most notorious example but even the more orthodox 
elements of the Indian security apparatus have been blamed for a 
large number of atrocities over the past decades. In case of atrocities 
being perpetrated either by the security organs of the state or even by 
the Hindu right wing, it does not matter what the text of the law says 
prosecution will not take place. 124  This absence of prosecution 
illustrates the difficulty, read impossibility, of engaging in 
investigation and prosecution without the cooperation of those very 
security organs. Furthermore, there is a sense that unjustified 
procedural acquittals partly explain the source of police frustrations, 
which then leads to extrajudicial killings. The mere fact that some 
people believe that the causality runs from difficult to implement 
procedural rules to the complete breakdown of procedure, is 
illustrative of some of the cohesion difficulties of the TCA. My 
interviews with security personnel support the existence of this view. 
Although all comments in this direction were given only under the 
strictest confidence, it seems that internally, amongst those tasked 
with protecting the state, there is a disdain for the law and a sense 
that in order to protect the state one has to move outside of legal 
confines.125 While the security organs of the state and the military way 
of addressing the terrorism issue are by and large outside of the ambit 
of the courts, there are some cases in which classified intelligence 
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reports have made their way into the hands of judges, in order to 
inform their decision, but this is all informal.126 
The pre-existent security assemblage is also far from homogenous. 
Tensions between actors are ubiquitous and influence their relations 
to the TCA. The military and the security organs of the state distrust 
the police. This causes a number of problems in co-operation, the 
Research and Analysis Wing, has no legal remit to operate on Indian 
soil, but a former director and my interview partner maintained that 
the information passed on to internal sources is lost in the mills of 
bureaucracy and institutional turf-wars.127 As such, the view of the 
police expressed by intelligence professionals is scathing. According 
to one interview, not only is the ratio of population to police in India 
one of the lowest in the world, but they are overworked, undertrained 
and not in the XXI century.128 While the police’s importance in 
counter terrorism cannot be overestimated, they are the cutting edge 
of bottom up intelligence as well as community presence, this is a 
fully unrealized potential.129 Thus the intelligence passed on, or held 
by the police, is poor not only due to their lack of training but also 
due to the lack of adequate databanks to store and access 
information, therefore when a bomb goes off somewhere, there is 
very little knowledge of how this could have happened which then 
leads to a problematic reflex reaction of rightly or wrongly arresting 
somebody, just to do something.130 This then leads to a cycle that has 
further alienation inbuilt into the often terrifying jail, court and police 
institutions. 131  This process is of course viewed as absolutely 
detrimental to an integrated counter terrorism strategy by some other 
actors. These cycles are then further fuelled by the many processes 
that take place outside of the law. According to this interview, it is 
important to give protection under the law to those actors you deploy 
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against terrorist, thus the Armed Forces Special Powers Act for 
example is not in itself a bad law, it is then being used in an abusive 
way, but if one is to use the army or other security forces 
domestically then it is important to give them legal protection.132 The 
core problem is that of extra-legality, when there is either no law, 
which protects or empowers the security forces being used, or there 
is a law but it is regularly flouted, this circumvention of the legal 
apparatus takes away one of the most precious assets a state has in 
fighting terrorism.  
Amongst the military arm of the security services many actors express 
a distrust of the courts.133 This extends to the entire criminal justice 
system in so far that, allegations are raised that due to corruption 
within the political elites, the police and the courts, predatory 
elements which have been caught at great risk to the security services 
are then released for politically opportunistic motives.134 This leads 
to a sense amongst some members of the security organs that turning 
over suspected terrorists to justice is a mistake, which will potentially 
set them loose again. From this point of view the human rights lobby 
is also threatening as it impedes the necessary every day work of 
those tasked to protect the country. The frustration is understandably 
great, when members of the security apparatus die on a regular basis 
in areas such as J&K and the North East, but the only response in 
Delhi seems to be one of bashing the security organs for the bad job 
they are doing.135 It is important therefore to note that the allegations 
of inadequacy of laws and the judicial system come from both sides 
as it were, the military/security apparatus feeling ill equipped with 
tools, sold out and abandoned in a tough area without freedom to 
defend themselves, and the minorities and activists on the other side 
who perceive that this opens rooms for abuse. The tension both 
within the security assemblage and between the security assemblage 
and the legal assemblage all too easily spill over into the TCA. If 
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suspected terrorists are never brought to the courts the TCA fails 
before it can even assemble. If institutional turf-wars hamper the 
collection of evidence, or poor training and incentives cause faulty 
procedures, the TCA either needs to shortcut past these elements of 
the passage of law or it fails in its stabilization and articulation of the 
terrorist. 
The mixed picture one observes, with judges sometimes rejecting 
cases and sometimes displaying the same communal bias and state 
preference as the police, is a function of the arrogance induced 
through the overall framework in the security organs. This arrogance 
according to some of my interviews is responsible for the 
investigating organs becoming complacent and thus producing cases 
that are so full of holes that the judge is compelled to dismiss 
them.136 From my own observation judges who are sincerely trying to 
do justice are still extremely reluctant to dismiss cases. 
Tensions in the pre-existing security assemblage notwithstanding its 
actors are an essential part for the TCA. Successful investigation, 
prosecution, stabilization depends on their successful enrolment. 
Failure to do so results in extrajudicial killings, tainted evidence and 
cases that are suspended in limbo because they seem neither 
dismissible nor prosecutable. To enrol these actants successfully 
however very often stands in tension with the enrolment of actants 
from the legal assemblage. To further complicate the picture both of 
these pre-existing assemblages are also uneven across time and space. 
In other words, how they present themselves and what influence they 
have in the TCA is contingent on location and historical background. 
5.2.2 Outlines of the Temporal and Spatial Scope of the 
Hinterlands 
In addition to TCAs not emerging out of no-where they also appear 
in a particular spatial and temporal context. In other words when and 
where a TCA assembles has an influence. On one hand the spatial 
dimension plays a role. Whether a TCA emerges in Delhi or in 
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Kashmir plays a role. This is an aspect that is looked at in more detail 
in sub-section 5.3.6 on spaces and locations. Suffice it to say here that 
the location of emergence influences more than the jurisdiction, but 
also a host of other factors such as the relationship between the two 
pre-existing assemblages. Both the location of the incident plays a 
role; a bomb blast outside of the Indian Parliament in Delhi has a 
different impact on the TCA than a blast in Srinagar, Jammu & 
Kashmir. On the other hand the temporal dimension determines the 
historical baggage a TCA has to contend with. From the point of 
view of articulating terrorist facts some required shortcuts and some 
detours are provided by the setting.  
An example that illustrates both the spatial and the temporal 
dimension of the hinterlands, and that was brought up repeatedly by 
interview partners was the insurgency in Punjab from the early 1980’s 
to the 1990’s. During the Punjab insurgency, courts often ceased to 
function properly because insurgents regularly intimidated the judges, 
the witnesses, the prosecutors etc.137 Courts were held inside prisons, 
with anonymous judges and witnesses, to guarantee their safety. 
Neither the judges nor the prisoners/accused were publicly 
questioned. Actors I spoke to often interpret this in various ways. 
The necessity of protecting all those involved in the context of a far-
flung insurgency is seen as an explanation. Others see it as an attempt 
by the state to avoid the oversight of the media, the public and 
ultimately even the courts. It is against this background that many 
interpret open courts as an achievement, one that is being resisted by 
some parts of the state machinery.138 Achieving open courts shows 
that legal assemblage also has an influence on the TCA. Therefore, 
the courts that are held with public admittance, with witnesses who 
show their face and judges who sign their name to the judgment are 
signs that the choreography ultimately includes a give and take 
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mentioned in the Introduction were ultimately ended 
by the High Court granting the prosecution’s request 
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between both security and legal assemblage. It is in this sense that 
some observers who have been following this for a long time disagree 
with the interpretation that everything has gotten worse. They rather 
argue that today the courts are much more careful and much more 
attuned to the dangers of blindly trusting the police than in the 
past.139 
The consciousness towards space and time displayed by many actors 
shows that these are dimensions requiring our attention throughout 
both this chapter and the case studies. However this also adds 
another layer of contingency to an already very complex background 
for the TCA. 
5.2.3 Heterogeneity and ‘Messiness’ 
The background, pre-existing legal assemblage, pre-existing security 
assemblage as well as temporal and spatial contingency, cannot 
exhaustively be mapped. Its elements are in flux and are influencing 
and informing each other continuously. This creates a heterogeneous 
picture that appears ‘messy’ to the uninitiated. However all actors 
skilfully navigate these changing currents and make sense of them for 
their purposes. My aim in this chapter is not to superimpose my 
order onto the different sense-making strategies. Rather my aim here 
is to illustrate how heterogeneous and messy the swirl of actants-in-
waiting is so as to fully appreciate the stabilising efforts of the 
working TCA in the case studies. In the previous sections we have 
encountered four aspects of the hinterlands of the TCA. But in line 
with assemblage thinking this inquiry needs to follow the actants 
themselves. In tracing associations through my interviews results in a 
picture which greatly increases the ‘messiness’ we have to contend 
with. Actors use a wide range of linguistic and conceptional registers 
to make sense of what they are doing. In contrast to the participant 
observation or my ethnographic recordings in court all tracing 
undertaken in the interviews is further mediated by the actors’ self-
translation. It constantly emerges that the deliberate and hesitant 
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passage of law is interrupted by shortcuts and jumps that are difficult 
to account for using the established logic of la fabrique du droit.  
5.3 Actors and Actants in the build-up to the TCA 
TCAs assemble out of a messy swirl of actants circulating in pre-
existing assemblages. Through my interviews I let these actors speak 
for themselves. This further accentuates these contradictory, 
heterogeneous and messy circulations. Mapping these traces is 
impossible onto a single smooth plane. Contradictions and tensions 
are rife, but in order to provide us with a road map of general areas to 
visit, the section is split up into seven subsections. Between these 
seven subsections there is some overlap and some contradiction and 
borders are not always clear-cut. But since it is this heterogeneity 
which gives rise to the smooth, stable terrorist in the successful TCA 
we can just take it all in before it falls into place in the next two 
chapters. 
5.3.1 Laws 
The first group of actants to encounter in my interviews are laws. 
They clearly leave traces in the TCA but their role is far from clear-
cut. Different actors have different takes on the role of laws and the 
types of laws necessary to fight terrorism. Laws play a role in fighting 
terrorism, but actors are far from agreed whether it is an enabling or a 
hindering role. Furthermore the types of laws involved in TCA’s can 
come from a range of legal instruments, including procedural law, 
special laws, general laws and even constitutional and international 
dimensions. One central element of making the terrorist speak is 
through the vincula we have encountered before. Each vinculum ties 
an otherwise insignificant event to a pre-existing piece of text, such as 
a law or the record of a precedent. Each little bond strengthens the 
coherence and stability of the TCA, but not all attempted micro-
stabilisations are successful. Above all it is important to notice that 
the bonds which are being formed as part of the TCA are at times the 
ones we are familiar with from Latour’s work on the passage of law 
and at times are marked by a different mode. Each of the case studies 
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shows how incidents are translated into laws therefore that is not at 
the heart of this section. The translation, and creation of vincula, 
requires work in practice and leaves traces. However in my interviews 
I found it very hard to pinpoint the time when the accused start to 
become terrorists. My interview partners told me that it is different 
from case to case, but that usually cases arrive before the court as 
already involving the concept of terrorism. Indeed my question 
puzzled both interview partners and colleagues during the participant 
observation, who asserted that it either is terrorism or it is not. This 
view contributes to the reification and naturalisation of the outcomes 
of the TCA. In most interviews terrorists were treated as inputs of 
both legal and security processes and considerations. It is only 
through the careful tracing in the case studies it becomes visible that 
they are outputs of these processes. This is a caveat that we need to 
keep at the back of our minds, while the language used in the next 
section draws on the interviews and therefore makes this step 
invisible.  Interview partners told me about laws as something which 
is sometimes a political play ball (intermediary) and sometimes a 
transformative structure or playbook (mediator). This understanding 
that law is both something which influences other relations and 
enters into its own relations is crucial to understanding the tensions 
between accounts of regular laws and general laws. 
5.3.1.1	Regular	Laws	
Vincula to regular laws form the backbone of the case studies in 
chapters six and seven. In my interviews however the actors 
positioned them as the backdrop to the special laws. This reflects the 
tension between laws that can act both as intermediaries in the tense 
relations between actants or as mediators changing those interactions. 
The specifics of the laws involved in the two case studies are 
discussed in the respective case studies. Here the focus is on how the 
actors that I interviewed reflected on their own and other actors’ 
interactions with laws. This means that while we encounter regular 
laws in their function as mediators in the case studies, here the focus 
is on their role as intermediaries between actors. As intermediaries 
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regular laws are a play ball in tangential arguments about other actor’s 
involvement in counter terrorism and the need for special laws. 
The police push for special legislation on terrorism. The assertion of 
the police is that terrorism cannot be dealt with under regular law.140 
As demonstrated in the case of the two TCA’s examined in chapters 
six and seven the Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code 
are sufficient to stabilize a terrorist. However the absence of explicit 
special legislation requires a more skilled choreography. Particularly 
compared to a more coded assemblage that explicitly inscribes some 
of the choreography between legal assemblage and security 
assemblage into special laws. This increased difficulty leads to the 
claim that the IPC, the CrPC and the Indian Evidence Act are not 
enough to deal with such offences.141 Calls for special legislation are 
persistent. Even though there is recognition amongst high ranking 
members of the police that special laws are often draconian. The 
special powers given to the police are an absolute necessity if the 
problem of terrorism is to be addressed.142 There is thus a group of 
actors constantly calling for more special laws. Hand in hand with 
this call for more special legislation goes a critique of the regular laws. 
Very often this critique leads with the argument that the IPC is 
flawed because it is based on English law.143 The problem with this is 
not merely one of origin, but of two presumptions enshrined in the 
law. Firstly, witnesses are principally presumed to be honest, and 
secondly, a crime is seen as locally contained. According to one 
argument I heard this is incorrect, because firstly, witnesses in India 
are under fear and compulsion, and secondly, terrorism networks 
encompass large areas.144 That these preconditions of regular laws are 
not met puts a lot of stress on the investigating organs and this 
pressure leads to problems. The police feel put between a rock and a 
hard place. On the one hand they are tasked with protecting the 
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country, and on the other hand, the very pieces of legislation under 
which they are given the powers to do so, are frayed with distrust 
towards them. This mistrust of the police enshrined for example in 
safeguards on the admissibility of statements made by police officers, 
plus the lack of actual police accountability, is also blamed by some 
on the British legacy in India.145  According to this account the 
structures of police corruption were set during the Raj in order to 
facilitate imperial domination and ensure pliability of one of the most 
useful organs of local control. This desire created a fissure in the 
relations between the courts, the magistrates, the prosecution and the 
police.146 There is a sense among high-ranking police officers that the 
magistrates are not aware of the difficulty of investigations, that they 
do not necessarily listen to the evidence brought to them, and that 
they look at possibilities rather than probabilities.147 According to 
this argument moving away from regular laws and towards special 
legislation is the remedy to this situation. 
Despite these critiques regular laws are always used as the benchmark 
to compare special legislation to. They are also used in many cases 
and have by far the larges network of precedent to build upon. In 
contrast stand the special laws that are more dedicated and have a 
smaller caseload to back them up. 
5.3.1.2	Special	Laws	
Like general laws, special laws are both intermediaries and mediators. 
The main special laws that I encountered in my interviews were the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, the Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 
They are routinely referred to by their acronyms: TADA, AFSPA and 
POTA. The Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) also plays a 
role but bridges the gap between a special law and a general law as it 
is neither specific to an area, like AFSPA, nor is it temporary, like 
TADA and POTA. Special laws play a role as intermediaries in the 
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tense relationships between actors, arguments about them are shot 
back and forth. They also play a role as mediators transforming the 
relations in the TCA both when they are explicitly invoked and as we 
will see in chapter seven when they are not invoked but still form a 
backdrop, in both cases the vinculum created articulates the event in 
a way that ties in with the special law. 
Special laws are divisive. Some consider them the only remedy to the 
heinous acts of terrorism and the weaknesses of the general laws 
identified above, whereas others consider them dangerous. The 
opponents of special laws argue that they are dangerous, because they 
make the judges feel special by virtue of sitting on a special court. 
Moreover, at the same time, they curtail the judges’ powers and 
freedom of discretion through both a legal framework and a narrative 
from which it is difficult to escape.148 The harshness of special laws 
often does not stem from their text, but rather from their application 
in an environment which makes it seem as if society as a whole were 
under threat.149 This results in commonality being drawn between 
cases and a sense that these are people who have struck out at society 
as a whole. The ensuing aura of the case leads to an increased 
likelihood of severe interpretation of statutes. Ordinarily the Special 
Court is not different from any other court in its composure. 
However, through the focus on these particular types of cases there is 
a toughening in attitude as a consequence of the surrounding 
narrative.150 As we will see in the case study, this impact brought up 
by my interview partners for cases of terrorism under special laws 
also plays a role when no special law is applicable but the case 
becomes understood as terrorism. 
The law may actually in theory work counter to this tendency, by 
including safeguards and limits on its own extraordinary nature. In 
the case of POTA for example, there are clear guidelines for the 
interception of electronic communications. This gives capable 
defence lawyers something to work with. The problem arises when 
                                                
148 Interview XXII, Fieldwork I. 
149 Interview XVII, Fieldwork I. 
150 Interview XVII, Fieldwork I. 
 179 
the judicial discretion, primed by the aura of national security, is 
applied in a fashion that is detrimental to the rights of the accused 
and sets adverse incentives for the resolving of the actual case. In the 
parliament attack case that we have encountered (Section 2.7) before, 
the defence of advocate Ms Ramakrishnan was in large part based on 
the inadmissibility of the intercepts, since the procedure laid out in 
POTA was not followed. However the judge dismissed this because 
POTA was not invoked on the day of the actual attack. Effectively, 
this led to a situation where the judge chose to apply certain tough 
parts of a special law, but refused to consider the safeguards 
applicable to the case at hand.151 While this is based on a lawyer’s 
account of the occurrences, the judge tells a different story.152 In the 
story of the judge, the routine length of these trials is the primary 
concern. Shortening it to achieve a verdict within weeks rather than 
years is a proud achievement. 153  Ever the skilled navigator and 
choreographer, the Judges’ first priority is to keep the show on the 
road. The subordination of procedural safeguards to judicial 
discretion is a part of an attempt to do justice both to the case at 
hand and to a wider perceived threat scenario. 
Therefore we encounter a situation where it is the process rather than 
the procedure that becomes punitive. This plays out for example in 
the extension of detention periods under special legislation. In 
POTA, the period of detention can be doubled with the permission 
of a magistrate who is satisfied themselves that the police require this 
time for their investigation. In practice, magistrates wave this through 
without looking at evidence. 154  This feeds into the perception 
amongst defending lawyers that the working relationship between the 
investigating organs results in the magistrates implicitly trusting the 
prosecutor’s office. This is as much a real tension as it is a 
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perceptional problem, because even if the allegations are untrue, the 
lack of transparency that allows them to fester and persist is 
perceived as damaging to the legal system and the rule of law. As one 
of my interview partners pointed out, “it is this process which chips 
at the law as a whole.”⁠155 This process can be destructive. Continuous 
applications of discretion that generally point in the same direction 
tend to dilute the entire procedural law over time, facilitating the 
introduction of shortcuts. This is amplified through the mechanism 
of precedent, if it happens at the High Courts as we will see in the 
case study of the Calcutta blasts. Drawing on various precedents 
from the Parliament attack case Supreme Court Judgment the High 
Court solidifies exceptions. This becomes even more pervasive 
through the sheer number of Sessions Court judgments that the 
higher courts ultimately become unable to overrule because of 
efficiency and non-interference reasons. And even if these cases are 
then overruled at higher levels much of the damage has been done. 
Under TADA approximately 77000 people were arrested as terrorists, 
of these only 725 or 0.81% were found guilty as charged. (Rahman 
Undated) Nevertheless, the other 99.19% underwent the harrowing 
process experienced by so many ‘undertrials’ in India. 156  They 
effectively undergo punishment. According to both literature and 
interview partners, part of the process aims at the punitive element of 
the undertrial experience.  
There is of course another side to this story. There is a risk to 
demanding absolute certainty in criminal proceedings. Taking this risk 
at the lower courts may be too high a standard from a public utility 
point of view, it is argued by other interview partners. It is clear that 
with the abysmal conditions and capabilities of the Indian Police 
Service, particularly in many of the populous northern states, the 
demand of answering all open questions before issuing a conviction 
would lead to even lower conviction rates, and the releasing of many 
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possibly guilty individuals. They would have to be released because of 
the gaps in the legal chain of reference produced by an ill-trained and 
ill-staffed police. Despite arguments that what truly produces a 
deterring effect are the integrity of the investigating process, and the 
infallibility of the legal system in bringing the guilty to account. This 
seems to be highly impracticable in the current situation due to the 
shortcomings of the police.157 However, heeding Kennedy’s warning, 
it is clear that the process of adjudication is not only limited by the 
quality of its inputs (D. Kennedy 1997). The role of the police in 
putting a stamp on these trials is at least twofold. On the one hand, 
there is the direct influence through the evidence they bring to the 
table, the framing of the issues as being of a particular nature, which 
is done in conjunction with the prosecutor. Creating at a first instance 
the vincula between insignificant incidents and the existing body of 
texts. On the other hand, and while more subtle perhaps even more 
far reaching, is the influence the police have by virtue of their own 
incapacities in forcing a constant relaxation of the rules of procedural 
justice for the sake of the process. The passage of law ceases to be 
deliberate, slow, hesitant and marked by detours but rather privileges 
passage over law. In other words, the rules of procedure have to be 
hollowed from the inside in order to maintain process. Shortcuts 
supplant laborious detours in order to arrive at the destination.  
Process is achieved at the expense of procedure. This is because the 
way in which the legal system is set up presupposes a modern, 
capable police force, which is capable of producing highly reliable 
forensic findings and operates within the mode of the passage of law. 
In the absence of police capabilities to produce evidence that is 
stabilizing by virtue of its quality and integrity, the rules of procedure 
have to be relaxed in order to arrive at stabilization. This results in 
the TCA encompassing a complex choreography, in which actors use 
discretion to fill gaps in the chain of reference in order to maintain 
the capacity of the assemblage to articulate. When the choreography 
fails and the territorialisations between legal assemblage and security 
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assemblage crystalize into a hard border, we can see traces of this 
failure. Encounters which are the extrajudicial killing, by the police 
and other security organs proliferate. This is an obvious sign of TCA 
failure as actors walk away, and the TCA is unable to make a terrorist 
speak. Yet failure is not inevitable even at this stage, we will see in the 
Nasir TCA (chapter 6) how evidence collected during an encounter 
can be seamlessly worked into the working assemblage even while the 
Judge sidesteps ruling on the legality of the shootings that led to the 
evidence. Passage is prioritised over law.  
These fundamental problems in the investigating organs lead to many 
flawed investigations. The result is dissonance between procedure 
and process. The blueprint of the law, coding the legal assemblage, 
and the operation of the police meant to provide actants and traces to 
be fed into the workings of that assemblage are at loggerheads. The 
imminent needs produced by the security assemblage put a huge 
strain on the coherence of the TCA. It is the record of the trial whose 
main function becomes to balance and integrate these actants to keep 
the TCA working more or less smoothly. This includes the formation 
of black boxes where the inner workings of some translations 
becomes suppressed so as to make a shortcut invisible behind a 
shortcut. 
The police together with the prosecution are required to produce a 
narrative in which the events can be plausibly linked to people in 
custody. This story needs to be plausible to all parties. Therefore, it 
has to fit into the pre-existing narrative(s).158 However there is an 
overwhelming sense that the police are not very good at forensic 
investigations. This in turn leads to a large number of unsolved cases, 
or cases in which a conviction is impossible due to the relatively weak 
evidence produced.159 This can be countered through improving the 
capacities of the police or through lowering the threshold for 
evidence, special laws allow to lower the bar in cases which are 
perceived as touching upon national security while maintaining the 
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aspiration of improvement in the police force. In such a scenario 
detours enshrined in law become replaced with equally inscribed 
shortcuts, but the chain of reference required to articulate the 
terrorist remains described in abstract by the body of laws. 
Some of these arguments transcend the separation between mediator 
and intermediary. Despite the absence of truly reliable statistics 
conviction rates under special laws such as TADA, POTA and 
UAPA are tremendously low.160 While this is not in itself a problem, 
it becomes one when the lack of successful prosecutions is paired 
with the impossibility of receiving bail under these laws. If we assume 
that accused who have been tried and found innocent are indeed 
innocent in the vast majority of cases. They would, despite their 
innocence, have spent on average the better part of a decade behind 
bars, simply because trials are so lengthy. This poses a severe problem 
for the legitimacy of the legal system as a discoverer of truth. 
However if we understand the TCA as an assemblage that has as its 
purpose the articulation of terrorist truths, their fabrication and 
stabilisation, then the punitive aspect of lengthy trials adds to the 
severity of the fact rather than to detract from the legitimacy of the 
process. 
5.3.2 Legislative and Politicians 
The Indian legislative is a part of the process that blurs the line 
between regular and special law, process and procedure, and actors as 
intermediaries and as mediators. Part of this contribution is the 
creating of an exceptional structure of overlapping laws. These laws 
then create a body of texts which through its internal plurality allows 
the a wider range of vincula to be possible. This increases the scope 
of the individual actor working on a particular micro stabilisation. It 
therefore both increases the complexity of the TCA and adds a layer 
of political legislative activity to the considerations the actors make 
when making sense of their perspective on the assemblage. Many 
come to the conclusion that fresh laws are made for old problems on 
a fairly regular basis, suggesting an introduction of new laws as 
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intermediaries. This has led some to argue that “laws are used as a 
sop thrown to the people to show parliamentary activity: Look here 
we have done something.”161 The flurry of new laws over recent 
decades, and particularly the repealing of POTA just to reintroduce it 
a few weeks later in the form of the amendment to UAPA, is a case 
in point. On the legislative level there is a sense that duplication is 
much easier than implementation.162Arguably making laws is one of 
the ways in which parliament can show that they are doing something 
and taking terrorism seriously. It is also something that is much more 
easily done than to address the fundamental problems at their root. 
It is often argued that Special Laws are really a legislative problem 
rather than a judicial one.163 In this sense, it would be parliament, and 
the ruling elites who are to blame for making a mess of the judicial 
system.⁠83  As such the creation of new laws is meant to provide cover 
for the legislation’s crossing of formerly held limits (Mate and 
Naseemullah 2010). In this sense the borders of what is legally 
permissible for the state are pushed out further and further with each 
new law.164 We can understand this as relative de-territorialisation of 
held legal norms and re-territorialisation of these actants within a 
security assemblage. The pressures on the legislative following attacks 
should not be underestimated (Kux 2009). In the aftermath of the 
2001 attack on the Indian parliament, an observer described the 
political climate as being so heated that any dissent and opposition 
against the introduction of POTA was depicted as almost 
treasonous.165 Nevertheless, a joint sitting of parliament was required 
in order to pass the bill into law.166 
However, there is a certain risk with this, as it draws parliament into 
an interaction with the terrorists. In other words the special status of 
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terrorism, inscribed in law, works as a double edged sword, as 
according to one interview there is at least some risk that this special 
status attracts new terrorists by setting them apart from ordinary 
criminals.167 Clearly, while this is a risk, it is one that should not be 
overestimated in the legislative dimension. In other words, the hype 
that makes terrorist strategies viable from the terrorist perspective is 
predominantly one in civil society, pushed by the media and 
subscribed to by the middle classes rather than spurred by 
parliamentary activity. While it is likely that parliament feels 
compelled to jump on the bandwagon of outrage, by drafting a new 
law in response to an incident, it is unlikely that this new law is 
spearheading popular attention to the crime. 
Internal political trends are also reflected in the various pushes for 
new legislation, or to repeal existing ones. When TADA was allowed 
to lapse in the 1990s, the home ministry was ready with a new draft, 
and according to my sources, was pushing for it all throughout the 
decade.168 Only in 2001 the cataclysmic events taking place gave the 
impetus for new legislation to be passed. While POTA has been 
repealed since, over the past decade the legislature has allowed all 
kinds of amendments to existing laws at the behest of the state and 
the security organs. This has caused the existing law, UAPA, to be 
very harsh. For example since its 2012 amendment a person is 
defined both naturally and inclusively of judicial persons. Drastically 
expanding the scope of entities capable of committing terrorism. 
Additionally the period for which an organization can be banned 
before review has been extended to up to five years. On top of this, 
and most worryingly, the legislature repeatedly puts the onus of 
safeguarding and checking measures under the act on the same 
institution that is the most active user of its provisions, the home 
ministry. And despite all of India’s variety in its political spectrum, it 
is important to keep in mind the great continuity displayed in security 
laws (Fischer 2004). 
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There is a destabilization and deterritorialisation, melting together 
legislative and policy-making activity in the passing of special 
legislations. On the one hand, the laws are considered to be part of 
the criminal justice system. On the other hand, their role is much 
more complex as it becomes part of a signalling endeavour of the 
policy making process. The new law acts as an intermediary to convey 
the message to the public that parliament takes an issue seriously and 
is acting against it. This duality of function is at the heart of the 
misnomer that is in the title of these laws. Laws of the criminal justice 
system are very rarely aimed at preventing something, but rather to 
punish some entity after the act.169 In other words, the role of the 
criminal justice system is reactive.170 According to one interview, the 
titles of the acts, which usually stress prevention, are confusing, as the 
law is not at the heart of prevention of terrorism. After all, terrorism 
is not a law and order issue in the first instance.171 Rather, according 
to many, prevention of terrorism needs to be dealt with from a 
position of integrated policy, including a legal dimension, a 
developmental dimension, an economic dimension, education and 
democratization, as well as ultimately a security driven approach (Giri 
2009). 
5.3.3 The Prosecution 
The prosecution is an ambiguous actor. They have a dual role within 
the TCA. On the one hand, their role is the representation of the 
state’s and victim’s interest in court. On the other hand, in practice, 
they often seem to play an advisory role to the police. It is particularly 
this latter role that is often problematic. In this function, at face value 
legal advice on how to frame a charge sheet and how to handle 
evidence could be very beneficial. This is essentially expertise on how 
to create vincula and how to contribute to the crafting of a stable 
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chain of reference. However, if some interview partners speculate 
that this advice extends to comments on the usefulness of additional 
evidence and how the law could be skirted to achieve a conviction. It 
seems clear from my interviews and the observations I made in court, 
that in many ways the police and the prosecution are almost 
synonymous in relation to their interests when the matter at stake is a 
high profile case. Both the police and the prosecution desire to 
achieve a conviction as well as recognition for their role in the case.  
In India there is an on going debate surrounding prosecutorial 
autonomy.172 Some argue that the police are really in charge as all 
prosecutors are politically appointed.173 Yet autonomy seems to be a 
desirable outcome as since 1973 efforts have been made for the 
prosecution to become established as autonomous from the 
government. But this has not happened and prosecutors continue to 
change with the tenure of government. This causes an additional 
problem. If the prosecution is an agent of the state, it is there to 
ensure a conviction, rather than to, as most idealistic accounts of 
prosecutorial authorities suggest, to ensure a fair trial and to work 
towards giving the judge full knowledge of the facts.174 This inbuilt 
ambivalence of one of the key actors increases the likelihood of a 
tipping of the TCA, to become territorialised more along the lines of 
security than law and order. 
5.3.4 The Police 
The police are one of the most important actors of the TCA. The 
police structure is somewhat opaque to the outside. However, my 
interviews enabled me to piece together at least a sense for the route 
that an event takes place as it becomes registered and taken up by the 
police. Most importantly for the initial translations of the TCA, each 
First Information Report (FIR) has to be checked by a senior officer 
before going to court, where the magistrate checks it again.175 Within 
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24 hours of investigation, a senior officer has to decide if the 
ingredients of the crime are present, at which time a case file is 
opened or the FIR is tabled. The police are organized in circles. Each 
circle has at least one senior police officer. Two to three circles are 
then grouped together into one subdivision, which is headed by an 
assistant superintendent of police. Subdivisions are grouped together 
to form one district, which is headed by a superintendent of police. 
While theoretically FIRs need to make their way up this hierarchy 
immediately this is a slow process in practice.176 For most serious 
crimes, there is also an inspector who is in charge of the 
investigation, and thus by extension responsible for monitoring the 
adding or removing of charges. The review of the process of 
investigation at the district level takes place in a weekly review. For 
grave crimes, it is usual that the Assistant Superintendent of Police 
(the head of the subdivision) is personally responsible to investigate 
immediately, this ASP would also be in charge of guiding the 
investigation and making and keeping the first case diary. The 
combination of cellular divisions between circles and a strict 
hierarchy that is not routinely observed in practice introduces added 
tensions into the TCA. These tensions however are nearly invisible at 
the court stage on which we will focus in the case studies. By the time 
the TCA produces a judgment the various tensions within the police 
and the investigation have been completely edited out of the account. 
So while the focus of this inquiry is on the making of terrorists in 
courts, legitimate questions arise to the role of the investigation in 
already engaging in stabilization. Additional pressures to the already 
highlighted tensions in the police apparatus exacerbate the 
heterogeneity of the investigative process. 
Some of my interview partners pointed to the vicious circle of police 
corruption, which ensures that officers cannot reach a high position 
without making a substantial bribe to the ones appointing them, and 
therefore are forced from an economic point of view to recover that 
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money during their time in the post. The second problem with the 
police is that they are undertrained, understaffed and under equipped 
to deal with something like terrorism. According to my interview 
partners from the elite side of the security forces, the police are 
scared of terrorism because they do not know what to do with it.177 
Not only are the police scared of terrorism and terrorists, but also, 
according to this interview, there is no money to be made with 
terrorism. In other words, while the police can extort bribes and 
make money during criminal investigations, terrorism requires 
genuine work and because of the severity of the issue does not offer 
itself to making money.178 Without an economic motive, there is 
nothing or very little to extort. 
This is contradicted by another interview in which my interview 
partner asserted that the police are able to use draconian special laws 
to extort money from people. Some go even so far as to claim a 
nexus between police, crime and politicians. This takes shape when 
the police have to bribe a politician to get the appointment, thus 
needing to make good on their investment while on the job.179 While 
of course these are only allegations, they are sufficiently widespread 
to require at least a mention. Whether or not it is true that some 
elements of the police are out there to make money, the general 
population perceives it as true.180 The sense that terrorism laws are 
being used by ruthless police officers to extort maximum kickbacks is 
a widespread point of view. Additionally, one that would be 
supported by the findings of previously mentioned studies on 
TADA.181 
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Police harassment is made possible by tough counter terror laws.182 
There are occasional references in my interviews to police informers, 
who would not be called to court as witnesses in order to protect 
their identity, but whose testimony to the officers plays a large part in 
shaping the narrative proposed by the police and in guiding their 
investigation.183 It would seem that this is a widespread practice of all 
investigating agencies around the world184, and thus not necessary to 
note upon more here, except perhaps that in light of the frequent 
inadequacies, implausibility and other irregularities in the 
investigations, the role of these informers has to be called into 
question. Especially the acceptance in court of the account which the 
officer develops on the basis of anonymous informants should be 
considered carefully. 
A further issue with the police is that, according to insider sources, 
there are strong attempts within the police to avoid complicated cases 
in their jurisdiction. Some have allegedly gone so far as to physically 
move bodies across the border of their jurisdiction into the next 
precinct. This ties into the tensions between regional politics and law 
and order policy. Regional disparities, state differences and a lack of 
uniformity in laws and procedures lead to a strongly heterogeneous 
picture of the police.185  Additionally, this creates problems for issues 
that require trans-border co-operation. The difficulties witnessed first 
hand during the ethnographic observations of the court in the 2008 
Delhi Blast case are apparently not isolated incidents, but rather a 
regular phenomenon when states with different governments are 
required to work together on a case.186 This is the same in cases of 
attempted centralisation, such as the National Counter Terrorism 
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Centre, where because of states’ opposition to having this power at 
the centre, nothing is happening.187 
Finally, while in many of the cases we have looked at the police 
seems to be this ominous organisation in the background, they are far 
from uniform. This is an important and often overlooked aspect in 
understanding the police in India.188 Between individual officers and 
between precincts/states, the police are afflicted with competition, 
rivalries, promotions, popularity, professionalism and all kinds of 
other areas of conflict, which is barely contained beneath the 
surface.189 Further exacerbating this pressure the security organs of 
the state often suffer heavy casualties from engagements with the 
more organised insurgent groups that are generally also grouped into 
the terrorism bracket. While there is a certain recognition in the 
police force, including special units, that operational failure leads to 
these casualties, a part of the blame is also put on the public and the 
media for being sensation hungry and unwilling to support decisive 
action against people seen by the police as obvious culprits.190 This 
leads to half hearted rescue missions as the disastrous initial attempt 
during the 2011 Mumbai Hostage Crisis. Allegations of planting of 
weapons on innocents after killing them, the frequency with which 
already extremely rare forensic reports turn up police ammunition 
used to kill civilians, are all dismissed as part of a sensation hungry 
media. According to high-ranking police officers, Maoists obviously 
use the same weapons as the police, because they either steal them or 
buy them on the black market.191 
In addition to these reapportioning of responsibility the interest in 
playing the procedure by the police is defended as something 
necessary in anticipating the court, as otherwise the Indian Evidence 
Act is so complicated that it would become impossible to prove a 
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case.192 In addition, there is the practical difficulty that the courts are 
overworked. But it would be mistaken to allow the thousands of 
cases pending to evoke a sense of homogenous slowness. Rather the 
courts can be very fast in some cases while others languish on 
adjournments in the hope that the judge changes.193 In addition the 
police raises the legitimate issue of security in the courtroom. While 
there have been no noteworthy incidents since the 1980’s, the threat 
to judges sitting on terror cases is real, and shapes procedure.194 This 
links back to the temporal and spatial scope of the invoked 
hinterlands of any specific case. 
However there is also a different way of making sense of these 
irregularities. In interviews with police officers, some raised a number 
of anecdotes of cases in which terrorism was suspected at first. In 
these anecdotes, the charges that were on a false basis were simply 
amended and replaced by the more appropriate charges. The use of 
special laws, in order to gain a momentary tactical advantage, such as 
increased custody, decreased likelihood of bail, or simply a show of 
force, are understood to be part of the tricks of the trade, something 
every police officer is aware of and creative use of these techniques is 
applauded.195 Whether the incident in question is an attack on a 
police station, or the assassination of an MP, there is a recognition 
that the temptation is there to use these laws in an abusive fashion.196 
Additionally, there is a potential for police to hurry their 
investigations, because they know that if they file the charge sheet 
within 90 days, then bail will not be granted. 
In many ways it is the role of the police and investigating organs to 
stabilise a series of events into something significant. Therefore, while 
much of the focus is on the courts, the police play an equally 
important role in the TCA’s articulation of the terrorist as their 
labours are essential to the chain of reference. However as the case 
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percolates up the courts the police’s role becomes increasingly 
suppressed. The dividing line between evidence and irrelevancies 
serves to make the police work involved in crafting the facts of the 
case invisible. Failed stabilisations fall by the wayside as irrelevancies 
whereas those where the vincula hold fast become evidence are 
treated as interpretable legal facts. The police therefore plays a crucial 
role in the early stabilisations of the terrorist through determining the 
scope of the terrorist facts that are then made to speak for themselves 
in the course of the TCA, but a role that in the same course is made 
increasingly invisible. 
5.3.5 Judges and Magistrates 
It is perhaps no wonder that judicial discretion operates differently 
from one court to the next.  Yet, interview partners identified a 
tendency for the lower courts to exercise their discretion in ways that 
favour the police.197 As we have seen above this could be a side 
product of the visibility of the police at lower courts and their 
increasingly diminishing presence as their work cumulates in the 
established and accepted body of evidence. Pro-police commentators 
are however often vocal in their warnings against the tendency to 
make the police the scapegoat for any public failings including those 
in regard to terrorism (Balachandran Undated). Officers who are 
highly decorated for their successes in tackling terrorism in public 
have a reputation voiced behind raised hands, of being torturers and 
killers. 198  In the courts this open secret is usually dealt with 
discretion, bordering on deliberate silence (Ramakrishnan 2013). But 
while the courts almost never explicitly address the issues of police 
corruption and police violence, there are clear signs every now and 
then that the court is aware and attempts to move procedure around 
the pitfalls of relying on clearly tainted evidence. For instance, 
according to one reading of the parliament attack case, the Supreme 
Court’s reluctance to rely on the confession by Afsal Guru was 
partially due to the open secret of the main investigator’s reputation 
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for being highly unorthodox in his methods of investigation.199 While 
the Court did not openly rely on the confessions, which were marred 
by the usual procedural lacunae,200 it nevertheless took cognizance of 
the confession and relied on the recoveries that were allegedly made 
as a direct result of the confession. These recoveries included 
explosives and weapons as well as computers and phones. 
Additionally Afsal Guru was allegedly able to identify the deceased 
attackers at the morgue. All these were things that the court relied 
upon, despite what many commentators see as clear signs of police 
tutelage of witnesses and even Afsal Guru himself.201 Arguably the 
decision to uphold the judgment despite these irregularities and 
unanswered questions is also a political decision. This is because, 
according to many, it was a necessary symbol of deterrence to have 
somebody sentenced to death over the parliament attack case (Roy 
2006). 
The courts have powers at all stages of the investigation. This 
includes the power to ask for progress reports or even to direct the 
investigation.202 Like we have seen for the police above the courts are 
also organised in sets of relations which have a bearing on their ability 
to articulate freely. From the side of the courts each district is headed 
by an executive head of the district, who is of the rank of a 
magistrate, but predominantly has administrative functions and 
technically also heads the police. This is not always the case in 
practice.203 Additionally, each district has a chief judicial magistrate, 
who, on paper, is entirely independent and reports directly to a 
designated High Court Judge.204 However, in practice, high-ranking 
members of the police are aware of the importance of keeping a good 
personal relationship with the chief judicial magistrate, and the deep 
interdependence between the police and the magistrate. In the words 
                                                
199 Interview IV, Fieldwork I. 
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201 Interview IV, Fieldwork I. 
202 Interview XIX, Fieldwork I. 
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of a high ranking police official: “if the police is on good terms with 
the sessions judge, the court might be persuaded to be pro police, if 
not, not.” ⁠ 205 This relationship is particularly important in instances 
involving discretion, for example the decision to grant or deny bail. 
From the perspective of the police many courts are overly distrustful 
of the police. This may be due to people being coached by the police 
and then on the stand realizing that they cannot go through with it. 
This may also be a matter of bribes or threats.206 As pointed out to 
me by a police officer, a witness making a written statement and then 
deviating from it in court commits perjury in his opinion. In the face 
of witnesses turning hostile all the time and statements being 
admitted entirely at the discretion of judges, meaning they can be 
rejected or accepted at what to police looks like a whim, the job of 
the police is rendered increasingly difficult. This is in addition to the 
above-discussed difficulties of resources, training and political 
pressures. Whether the discretion of the judges and magistrates plays 
out in practice as something which favours the security assemblage or 
the legal assemblage is unpredictable (Shankar 2009, 13). 
5.3.6 Spaces and Locations 
There is a spatial dimension to the tensions between the actants 
above. These differences are tied in with the locations of both the 
incident and the courts. The TCA brings together actants that are far 
flung but there is always an inscription and/or a translation involved 
in making an actant travel. So the role of distance should not be 
underestimated in the background of the TCA. This distance 
expresses itself particularly between the metropolitan centres such as 
Delhi and the periphery. The travels required for actants from one 
court to the next, but also for many of the actants in the TCA to the 
court in the first instance create a new dimension for tensions and 
translations. Another example of such travels is that of laws, which 
are applicable in one part of India and are then transported either to 
the whole union or to another state. 
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One example of a law that was brought from the periphery to the 
centre is TADA. First designed to tackle the Punjab insurgency in the 
1980’s it was later brought to bear on all of India. 207  Another 
example where this is being attempted is the case of the Maharashtra 
Control of Organised Crime Act; a stringent law that according to 
many has been useful in tackling both terrorism and organised crime 
in Maharashtra. This law is the object of envy for legislators in 
Gujarat who want to have their own version of it (K. Gupta 2006; 
Nanjappa 2015). Yet, for various reasons the central government has 
prevented this from happening for a while now. This draws our 
attention to yet another complicating factor, the role that rivalries 
between institutions or in this case states play in shaping some of 
these tensions (Boland-Crewe and Lea 2004). One of the concerns I 
encountered in my interviews was that laws that begin as peripheral 
phenomena, i.e. something to be used in far away disturbed areas, 
begin being applied closer and closer to the centre, until eventually 
the fear is that they strike at the heart of the vocal communities in the 
metropolis as well. 208 
Another difference between the periphery and the centre is the 
audience of a trial and its effect on the judge. According to some of 
my interviews, judges, prosecutors but especially defence counsel may 
not be as aware of the law in the provinces as in the central 
metropolises. 209  The most important difference is that in an 
adversarial legal culture the quality of the defence, at the sessions 
court stage already sets the scope for the remainder of the trial, and 
failure to challenge something there may pose a problem later. This is 
not true as much in respect of challenging material facts or legal 
reasoning, but evidence which is not challenged immediately upon its 
entry into the system, will be very difficult to be disregarded later, and 
although there are notable exceptions, it is not the rule that such a 
challenge will be successful later on. Further, because of a negotiated 
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character of the court record, it is possible that failure of the defence 
attorney to supervise very closely what is being recorded and 
potentially to amend it right on the spot, will lead to artefacts in the 
records, which either fail to show some particular incident, or include 
certain words in a witness testimony which were not there.210 It has 
been my observation during fieldwork, that the most competent 
lawyers paid close attention to the work of the typist and included 
regular amends to their work, whenever uncertainties were there for 
reasons of understanding, language or carelessness. Finally it was an 
integral part of an astute and diligent lawyer’s routine, particularly in 
contentious cases, to leave one person behind to check that the 
record was not tampered with at the end of proceedings, before being 
taken into the court archive till trial resumed. The quality and 
truthfulness of the records is something that has to be treated with a 
certain amount of scepticism. The fact that the record does not 
reflect everything spoken in the courtroom during the day, as a 
record would for example in a UK court, reinforces it as a translation. 
It has been my observation during participant observation, that 
between the courts, and depending on the seniority, competence and 
skilfulness of the defending advocates the record would more or less 
accurately reflect what happened on the day. That these records then 
travel without the context of their inscription causes space to play a 
significant role in editing out specificities and instabilities. 
Then there is the difficulty of law and order being a state subject. The 
balance of power between the centre and the periphery is distorted 
with coalition governments.211 When there is a coalition government 
at the centre, but perhaps several strong state governments who also 
have the backing of a strong minority at the centre, this makes things 
much more difficult. At the end of the day, the states, as the 
implementing organs of central directives also always have the ability 
to drag their feet as a measure of last resort. These complexities and 
complications are partially responsible for the intensely mixed picture 
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that counter terrorism in India always portrays. There have been 
some attempts at solving some of these tensions through the 
implementation of the National Investigations Agency Act which is 
meant to concentrate the power of counter terrorism investigations 
which this new agency under the control of the centre, however this 
has yet to show substantial results as six years after its enactment 
there still are no finished cases to show for the agency’s work. 
After having encountered the tensions in play between centre and 
periphery in courts and in governments it should come as no surprise 
that there also are tensions involving the police. During my 
interviews I have come across high praises for the investigative 
capabilities of the CBI. While there are some allegations of being 
directed by the government, people generally concur that the CBI is 
doing a relatively good job in the investigations that they are 
undertaking. It is said that the CBI has more focus, as it can focus 
solely on investigations, and does not have the requirements of every 
day policing to contend with. On the other hand there are also 
allegations that CBI only picks cases they know they will win, this in 
combination with CBI being located at the centre, and potentially 
overtaking the jurisdiction of state police forces, just to leave those 
with the cases which are deemed unsolvable does create friction.212 
Nevertheless from the legal angle, it is quite interesting to see how 
CBI operates in contrast to the state police forces, as they have legal 
advisors integrated at all levels of the investigation. This dispersion of 
legal expertise to the lower echelons of investigations, is partially 
responsible for a much more effective operation style, with 
investigations which yield a high chance of successful prosecution 
due to the following of procedural safeguards. It is however 
important to note, and quite interesting, that despite this close 
working relationship between the forensic investigators and the legal 
advisors at the CBI, there are regularly problems of admissibility with 
CBI procured evidence as well. Suggesting that on one hand it is 
impossible to ensure absolute admissibility while working in the field, 
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and on the other that the investigating organs know that they will be 
given some slack in respect of procedure, when in court.  
It is no surprise that the situation in the periphery is much worse than 
at the centre, although we have to understand the two as slightly 
different phenomena. While what is generally considered terrorism 
takes place both at the centre and in the periphery, it makes more 
sense to understand what is happening in the periphery through the 
lens of an insurgency in many parts of the country. It is clear that the 
reaction of the security organs and of the state is much more severe 
in the periphery.213 The frequency of encounter killings, including of 
women and children who are then designated as militants is shocking 
and the role of the security organs is generally predatory. In addition, 
the access to justice in more remote areas is very limited, with judges 
and magistrates who frequently are unwilling to stand up to the 
security organs, or even share their views on the adivasi 
population.214 While there are some moves from NGO’s to counter 
this situation, the access is very limited and people are struggling to 
get their voices heard. 
Part of the functioning of the TCA is to mediate local, regional and 
global dimensions that come together in making the terrorist speak. 
In other words the articulated terrorist is stabilised locally through a 
chain of reference that draws on local, regional and global actants. 
The terrorist facts which are made to speak for themselves through 
the TCA are then again carry the local, regional and global 
dimensions. While we can pinpoint locations within the TCA the 
spaces that play a role are complex and do not map easily onto the 
locations where the terrorist facts are crafted. 
5.3.7 Messiness and the Anomaly of Smoothness  
The above accounts have only covered what came out in my 
interviews and the picture is rich and confusing. The contradictions, 
tensions and many angles that we encountered stand in stark contrast 
to the smooth narrative that stabilizes the terrorist in the TCA and 
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makes the terrorist facts speak. Yet the specific court is the location 
where these stabilizations are crafted and the TCA brings together 
aspects of all the above encountered actants. Even the most vigorous 
critics of the special counter terrorism laws do not question the 
legitimacy of the rule of law and the legal system as a whole. The 
three main critiques I encountered in my interviews do not call for a 
dismantling of the whole legal system. Many actors criticize incidents 
of incompetence or corruption of individual actors (Ahuja and 
Ganguly 2007). Others criticize the special laws (UAPA, POTA, 
TADA, AFSPA etc.) as not being in line with ideals of the rule of 
law. And thirdly there is a critique of the practices in the courts, 
which does not necessarily relate to incompetence or corruption, but 
rather to a systemic dependence of judges. In this context the 
ambivalent role played by problematic institutions, like the 
prosecution, the investigating organs and the political executive, 
moves to the foreground. In combination these three critiques could 
be highly destabilizing, but they are rarely levelled in unison. Rather 
many actors focused on one of them, while suggesting reforms, 
changes and other improvements to the legal system in order to 
address them. This transforms the critiques into productive tensions 
within a wider legal assemblage. The TCA then consists of tensions, 
such as these critiques, circulating along conflict points and 
delineating the field itself. Therefore, while these critiques play an 
important role in articulating some of the tensions found in the TCA, 
they are also part of the choreographed circulations, which give rise 
to a notion of legal field as picked up by the actors. Since in this 
section my focus is on the tense relationship, as described by the 
actors themselves, between the specific TCA and the wider legal 
assemblage and security assemblage. Part of the stability of the 
terrorist emerging out of the TCA is the choreography that 
encompasses actors who would see themselves as part of the law and 
order approaches to terrorism and actors who recognize themselves 
as security oriented. Influenced by the judge the choreography, the 
coming together of these actors, leads to high degrees of tension 
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within and surrounding the TCA putting strain on the chain of 
reference and individual vincula, but at the same time allows the 
terrorist to emerge relatively stably out of the TCA. Yet it is 
important to differentiate between the product of the TCA and its 
outcome as something ‘discoverable’. To use the words of one of my 
interview partners: “This [the messy picture] is all only the tip of the 
iceberg. There are doxa around the law, of context, outrage, 
escapism, inherent communities, distrust, partial well meaning human 
rights, courts overstepping, and the resilience of the system. But be 
careful of absolute innocence or guilt, the question of actual guilt is 
usually beyond us.”215 This comment illustrates the role of trust and 
faith in procedure. The courts and the rule of law rely on this faith to 
continue the establishment of legal facts. This is tied in not only with 
the procedural guidelines but also with the underlying necessity of 
faith in a system, which has as its declared purpose the 
discovery/production of social facts. 
5.4 From the Hinterlands to the TCA – Section Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented articulations of the perspectives my 
interview partners took on the TCA. While no one actor has 
complete overview of the assemblage within which they operate the 
plurality of viewpoints and heterogeneity of speculations as to the 
modalities of associations observed contributes to our appreciation of 
the complexity of the successful TCA. Making the terrorist speak, the 
articulation of terrorist facts, is the core function of the TCA, but 
understanding the above perspectives allows us to better understand 
how the choreography between shortcuts and detours plays out. 
Throughout my interview partners have maintained the court as a 
place of central importance for the playing out of tensions between 
actants. It is through the court that pre-existing security assemblage 
and pre-existing legal assemblage encounter and interact. It is in the 
courts that process and procedure are being balanced. Even the 
encounter killings of suspected terrorists are understood as extra-
judicial, and in reference to the procedure of the courts. The 
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choreography of the TCA and the terrorist stabilisation include 
modalities of associations that draw on both the slow, deliberate and 
hesitant passage of law and a swift, risk management oriented, short 
cut prone logic of security. In the two case studies in the next 
chapters we can see how vincula are crafted in practice and the gaps 
in the chain of reference edited out as the judgment percolates up the 
courts. Ultimately the terrorist facts speak for themselves, making the 
bulk of their production and articulation through the TCA inaudible. 
In order to reach this point we encountered both the well known 
passage of law and gaps in the chain of reference which actors have 
speculated about from their respective perspectives.  
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Chapter 6 – Case Study I / Nasir and the 
Choreography of Terror 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
There is nothing essential about terrorists, but neither is it correct to 
say that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. In fact 
most terrorists are terrorists for most of the people most of the time. 
But they are so, not out of some essential terrorist characteristic, 
rather as a product of a terrorist stabilising machine. In this case we 
are going to look at one aspect of this machine, the terror court 
assemblage. More specifically, the TCA under examination here is 
that in relation to which Nasir becomes terrorist. Nasir becomes 
terrorist, but this is neither an act of mere labelling nor is it the 
discovery of some hidden attribute that makes him, and has always 
made him, terrorist. A lot of work goes into stabilising the category 
of terrorism around a particular person and this is by no means an 
inevitable process. The careful crafting of vincula builds into the 
chain of reference which permits the TCA to articulate terrorist facts. 
As such, the work of the TCA remains contingent and precarious. 
But tying it to pre-existing hinterlands, such as the pre-existing legal 
assemblage and the pre-existing security assemblage significantly 
increases the likelihood of lasting stabilisation. At the same time this 
stabilisation requires a number of translation processes. These 
translations articulate terrorism and narrow the plausible range of 
relations between the actants of the assemblage by crafting (legal) 
vincula into the chain of reference. Without ever opening their 
mouth Nasir and his co-accused are made to speak, they are 
articulated as terrorist, through the chain of reference crafted into the 
heart of the judgment. These terrorist facts pass through trials of the 
familiar passage of laws, laborious and detourned, but they also 
follow the shortcuts and prehensions of the modality of security 
assemblage. Following Bruno Latour’s advice to ANT, I want to 
avoid taking as my job “to stabilize the social on behalf of the people 
it studies; such a duty is to be left entirely to the ‘actors themselves’” 
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(Latour 2007, 30). In this chapter I will follow the traces of actants in 
the Nasir TCA, to highlight how the chain of reference is stabilised 
and the terrorist fact made to speak for itself. This enterprise raises 
one unavoidable double question. What are the actants and who are 
the actors?216 It would be tempting to deal with this as a preliminary 
question, one where a set of actants are predetermined and then 
followed through the study. However, this would pose the risk of 
missing out on some interesting actants that only emerge as the 
inquiry progresses. The TCA comes into existence in non-
chronological and incoherent patches. These patches of relations 
become increasingly choreographed and their actants increasingly 
enrolled in the choreography of the TCA. But it is only in the 
completion of the judgment that a smooth, coherent and 
chronological narrative emerges in which all actors are firmly 
enrolled. Throughout the chapter I use the judgment as a starting 
point. However since I then follow actants that weave in and out of 
the judgment, each patch of stabilisation is in fluid interaction with all 
the others. From the starting point of the judgment I then need to 
work backwards through the details of traces. This shows the 
processes of enrolment, stabilisation and sanitisation through which 
the chain of reference is stabilised and the terrorist is articulated. 
What is commonly treated as inputs: evidence, the terrorist, laws, are 
actually products of the specific TCA that flow into the chain of 
reference and are tied together by vincula. The judgment works as an 
inscription of this chain of reference but also as a transportable 
mediator between the specific TCA and other assemblages. 
This chapter then shows the actants that are drawn together in the 
tension surrounding definitions of terrorism and group delineation. 
This tension is evident in this case study; at the Sessions Court, High 
Court and Supreme Court different actants come together and cast 
the delineation in an increasingly restrictive sense. The initial 
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translations that actants undergo as part of the incident becoming a 
TCA are crucial. As the TCA churns on these tense, initial 
translations are increasingly supplanted by the inscribed judgment. 
This then acts as a mediator between Courts. Now let us turn our 
attention first to these initial translations and how they create 
circulations amongst actants. 
6.2 The Divide and How to Clear up a Mess 
The first case study illustrates how Nasir the terrorist is stabilised and 
articulated in court through the crafting of a chain of reference. For 
our inquiry the case of Nasir is particularly interesting because he, 
and the six others, are accused not of terrorism but of a conspiracy to 
wage war against the state and of killing with a prohibited weapon.217 
Despite the law in application not being explicitly anti terrorism 
legislation, the case has terrorism written all over it.218 The lawyers I 
interviewed refer to it as a terrorism case. The judges at all levels 
occasionally refer to the accused as terrorist. The media certainly 
picked up on the case as one of terrorism (Bhattacharya 2002). This 
case shows that rather than to obsess with the definition of terrorism, 
we can understand it as a way of choreographing actants so that the 
terrorist emerges. The TCA enacts this choreography and importantly 
does not rely on terrorism to be defined in the law books. The 
terrorist is made to speak its own terrorist facts, articulated through 
the chain of reference which is carefully crafted and stabilised in the 
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TCA. To show how this terrorist is assembled I follow three 
components that make far-reaching connections and the judgment. 
Each of these components is made up of one or more actants in the 
assemblage. The first section looks at the actant AK47, the second at 
two motor vehicles and their garage, the third follows a few emails 
and a letter, the fourth section follows the path of the judgment. 
These four components are in tension with a number of other actants 
in the TCA, for example the most evident tension is between the 
components and the laws applied. These tensions are choreographed 
so that Nasir the terrorist emerges. Terrorism thus emerges out of 
this TCA despite no law or definition of terrorism being explicitly 
involved. The terrorist is being performed, made to act, made to 
speak and articulated in a legal setting without the legal blueprint so 
many people argue is required. 
The case of Nasir shows that in some cases actants from a law 
assemblage (procedural law, lawyers, judges, courts, substantive law, 
etc.) enter into tensions with a pre-existing security assemblage and 
fall into a choreography of terror. The resulting assemblage performs 
terrorism and stabilises some of its actants in relations of terrorism. 
This gives rise to three insights: firstly, the quest for a definition of 
terrorism is a project with a distinct political agenda; secondly, the 
debate between security and law in respect of counter-terrorism 
misses the point about terrorist becoming; Thirdly, terrorism is 
enacted and (re-)performed through assembled chains of references 
for example through a TCA. Terrorism comes with and emerges out 
of its own choreography the strong tensions of which ripple through 
the entire assemblage. The invocation of terrorism results in a partial 
crystallisation of erstwhile fluid relations. This crystallisation is also 
contingent and precarious but gains increasing stability through the 
crafting of a chain of reference and its inscription. Nonetheless by 
drawing on the pre-existing security assemblage, it comes with its 
own force that curtails the realm of plausible interactions between 
actants in the TCA. As part of the inscription actants are enrolled in a 
story that is itself precarious but becomes more and more stable as 
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the TCA operates. In starting with the judgment we encounter this 
story at its strongest, after it has been inscribed already, I will start 
with an overview of the case before going about destabilising it 
through showing the contradictions and processes of stabilisation 
that go into it. This allows us to zoom in on the crafting of the chain 
of reference that makes the terrorist speak. 
6.2.1 The Story of the Case 
The Nasir Case is first and foremost a working arrangement that 
articulates Nasir as Terrorist. As such it does things rather than is 
things however we need to know a little bit more of what it is all 
about. The telling of this story of the case relies on what the actors I 
spoke to consider as the story of the case. This is not to say that 
numerous instances are not problematic to some of the actors for a 
variety of reasons. This story is at the very heart of what is embattled 
between the prosecution and the defence. It is also the only 
sequential, coherent narrative of the events surrounding the 22nd of 
January 2002 that emerges out of the TCA, it is the finished chain of 
reference which makes possible the articulation of terrorist facts. It is 
the story after it has been stabilised and in it the terrorist facts are 
made to speak for themselves. This narrative is an actant in its own 
right. It is so for two reasons. First it interacts with other actants. The 
affects of the narrative latch onto other actants in the Nasir TCA. 
The underlying chain of reference has a co-constitutive tension with 
the judgment. The judgment makes sense because of the chain of 
reference but the terrorist fact is ultimately stabilised by the 
judgment. It is the fabric of the chain that makes the incident a 
terrorist conspiracy. At the same time it is the judgment that 
sanctions the fact and imbues the chain of reference with official 
legitimacy. I will return to the relationship between the chain of 
reference and the judgment in the section on the judgment below. 
For now one simple caveat will suffice. The working relations in the 
assemblage are fluid. Part of what this chapter aims to illustrate is 
how some conceptual actants, such as terrorism, exert tensions which 
ripple through the entire assemblage territorialising, stabilising and 
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ultimately crystallising parts of the assemblage. By looking at the 
finished chain of reference we start from the product and work our 
way backwards. Additionally this reflects how the actors I worked 
with introduced me to the Nasir Assemblage during my participant 
observations. 
The story of the Nasir TCA starts in the early morning on 22nd 
January 2002 in Calcutta. From there the Nasir TCA radiates 
backwards and forwards in time connecting people, objects, histories, 
laws, countries, God, Courts through a myriad vincula in a 
choreographed assemblage that puts Nasir at its heart and makes him 
the terrorist; an assemblage that is sustained not least through the 
countless hours of work that have gone into performing it, including 
the time it takes me to write this and you to read it. All these work 
hours help to make, define, stabilise and articulate the assemblage. It 
is only in the process of relations between actants that the Nasir TCA 
emerges. Yet none of it would have happened without the events of 
the early morning hours on Tuesday the 22nd of January 2002. 
Sticking with the metaphor of the chain of reference, we need a first 
segment. It all starts with two persons operating three machines. 
6.2.2 The Nasir TCA Becoming 
So far the Nasir TCA is still non-existent, although it will reach back 
to this moment in the future and translate it (e.g. one of the two 
people on the motorbike is translated/reconstituted as Nasir the 
terrorist). But for now there are only two people operating three 
machines. This is important because even the latent TCA has the 
capability to naturalise its own processes. In other words, it is all too 
easy to, as most standard accounts do, slip into essentialist accounts 
in which the persons operating the machines are terrorist. In such an 
essentialist account the products of the TCA become its inputs and 
the work that goes into stabilising them becomes invisible. The 
carefully crafted chain of reference becomes a seemingly autonomous 
fact that speaks for itself. However, this inquiry is about how terrorist 
facts are made; how the latent TCA operates to become a Nasir TCA 
and produces stable terrorists whose stories speak for themselves. 
 209 
The two men riding that motorcycle and shooting those guns are not 
at that time essentially stable terrorists and this is by no means a 
moral argument in their defence. As stabilised products of the TCA 
the terrorist cannot be terrorist before the TCA has become active. 
This is therefore solely about the sequence with which terrorism 
emerges as a result of the working of a TCA. An example to illustrate 
this point comes from Bruno Latour who drew much puzzlement 
and criticism for claiming that Ramses II had not in fact died of 
tuberculosis (Daston 2000). The crux of this claim is not to dispute 
that scientists working on the mummy of Ramses II may not have 
discovered tuberculosis. Rather that since the medical assemblage 
necessary to speak of tuberculosis only came into existence 3000 
years after the incident we would succumb to a fallacy in claiming 
that he died of it. This may seem like hair-splitting, but in the case of 
terrorism it is indeed highly relevant hair-splitting as other incidents 
may not emerge out of the assemblage as terrorist. Returning to the 
story of the Nasir TCA, and the events that lie at its heart. 
6.2.3 The Incident 
At around 06:15 A.M. two people on a motorcycle drive up to the 
American Centre in Calcutta and open fire on the group of police 
officers gathered there for shift change. The driver uses a pistol 
whereas the pillion rider is operating an AK 47 (Kalashnikov) 
machine gun. The shooters open fire killing five and injuring fifteen, 
and then drive off southwards. At 06:36 the Calcutta Police Control 
Room at Lal Bazar receives information pertaining to a shooting 
outside of the American Centre and immediately dispatches 
personnel from the Shakespeare Sarani Police Station to the 
American Centre. Upon their arrival the 20 shot individuals (2 
civilians and 18 police officers) are taken to S.S.K.M Hospital, where 
five succumbed to their injuries, the two civilians and 12 police 
officers were treated and discharged while one was retained for more 
treatment. 
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6.2.4 The Investigation 
The investigation starts and simultaneously translations are taking 
place. Someone at the Shakespeare Sarani Police Station records the 
First Information Report (FIR) No. 19 and makes an entry into the 
General Diary (entry No. 1889) in response to a complainant named 
as Shri Barun Kumar Saha. The FIR and the General Diary entry are 
timed and dated, both indicating that they were written at 06:36 A.M. 
on the 22nd of January 2002 and pertaining to an incident that took 
place at 06:30 A.M. on the same day. The fuzzy time window of the 
incident is translated into a precise time for the purposes of the 
rapidly forming TCA. Latent structures of the legal assemblage are 
creating the first vincula between insignificant events and a body of 
texts. 
Another step in the direction of assembling the TCA is the 
translation of the incident above into legal categories. This crafting of 
an initial set of vincula remains extraordinarily powerful throughout 
the TCA and in many ways crafts a scaffolding for the chain of 
reference on which the terrorist articulation hangs. The FIR is for 
offences under Sections 121, 121A, 122, 120B, 302, 333, 427 and 21 
of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) 1860 as well as Sections 25(1B)(a) 
and 27 of the Arms Act 1959. I will return to these laws in greater 
detail in Sub-Section 6.2.5. The incident is broken down and 
translated into the coded relations of the pre-existing legal 
assemblage. Returning to the investigation, which is placed under the 
leadership of Mr Anil Kar. Mr Kar also plays a role later on to testify 
as prosecution witness (P.W.) no. 123. Him and his assistant, Mr Sujit 
Mitra (P.W. 122) interrogated the injured police officers, collected 
cartridges from the scene and spoke to the back up forces from the 
Shakespeare Sarani Police Station. Beginning the amassment of a 
store of materials, which become tied into the chain of reference as 
significant through the crafting of a vinculum or can be returned to 
the realm of insignificant artefacts later on. From there the 
investigation stalled for five to six days. The TCA however is 
beginning to assemble around a series of translations. 
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6.2.5 Initial Translations – Laws and Legal Categories 
6.2.5.1	Making	two	things	that	are	not	the	same	equivalent	
Recalling from Chapter 2, “translation is the process or the work of 
making two things that are not the same, equivalent” (John Law and 
Hassard 1999, 8). In the subsection above we observed a crucial, 
initial translation. Through the framing of charges the incident was 
translated into the pre-existing legal assemblage, little bonds between 
insignificant events and a body of texts were created. There are three 
questions we need to address in this regard: Firstly, what is the 
product of translation? Secondly, what takes place during the process 
of translation? Thirdly where does terrorism come in? 
Making the incident outside the American Centre and FIR No. 19 
equivalent is a translation, it creates a vinculum between the event 
and a text. This translation breaks down the overlapping but multiple 
realities of the incident219 into relatively smooth, transportable legal 
categories, i.e. specific texts describing crimes under specific laws. All 
across India Section 27 of the Arms Act covers prohibited weapons. 
It is understandable to a lawyer, it can be transported but only if a 
vinculum can be crafted to tie the text to the event.  For us it is 
necessary to go through these categories one by one. The primary 
reason for this is that once the vincula hold fast the legal categories 
become used as shorthand for their content in both the judgment and 
the interviews. The translation therefore creates a new set of actants 
that stand in tension with the incident, tandems of events and texts 
tied together with a vinculum, a third set of actants that articulate the 
incident. The tension arising between the incident and the legal event 
introduces a looping effect between the incident and the pre-existing 
categories that it is translated into. These looping effects are 
amplified as the translations take place from court to court. No new 
                                                
219 After all the reality of one of the shooters is l ikely 
to be somewhat different from that of one of the 
people shot, which again would be different from that 
of Mr. Kar the lead investigator. Even among the 
Police Officers being shot at there are quite 
substantial differences in the accounts of events. 
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vincula are introduced, but the tandems which are part of the chain 
of reference become refined and retranslated. The following three 
subsections outline three blocks of vincula that play an important 
part in the chain of reference. Largely presented in the form of 
traditional legal analysis these sections set the scene for the 
articulation of the terrorist providing the frame of reference within 
which the terrorist fact can be made to speak for itself. 
6.2.5.2	Waging	War,	 Conspiracy,	Murder	 and	 the	 Indian	 Penal	
Code	
Following the order listed in the framing of charges the first section 
we encounter is 121 Indian Penal Code220 (IPC). This section goes to 
the heart of the TCA. 121 reads:  
Waging, or attempting to wage war, 
or abetting waging of war, against 
the Government of India. – 
Whoever, wages war against the 
Government of India, or attempts 
to wage such war, or abets the 
waging of such war, shall be 
punished with death, or 
imprisonment for life and shall also 
be liable to fine. 
The provision of 121 IPC above has been amended three times. The 
first time by Act 16 of 1921 which substituted “fine” for “and shall 
forfeit all his property”. The second time by A.O. 1950 which 
substituted “Government of India” for “Queen” and the last time by 
Act 26 of 1955 which substituted “imprisonment for life” for 
“transportation for life” (Universal’s Criminal Manual 2013, 440). All 
                                                
220 45 of 1860. 
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of the IPC has a long history but shows interaction between the 
hinterlands of pre-existing security and legal assemblages. 221  The 
translation that makes the incident at the American Centre equivalent 
with 121 IPC, also ties it into an assemblage that has been in tension 
since before 1860. The hinterland of this assemblage today is vast and 
beyond the scope of this inquiry. However, this hinterland is also 
directly relevant to the unfolding of the Nasir TCA. This translation 
ties the working of the assemblage to a network of other Court 
assemblages; a point that holds true for all aspects of the TCA. Each 
of the sections below has been interpreted and reinforced through 
court assemblages and their judgments. Judgments that continue to 
play a role as precedent. But in order to tie in with specific precedents 
the translation of incident into coded categories must be complete. 
121A IPC is closely related to 121 and reads 
121A. Conspiracy to commit 
offences punishable by section 121. 
– Whoever within or without India 
conspires to commit any of the 
offences punishable by section 121, 
or conspires to overawe, by means 
of criminal force or the show of 
criminal force, the Central 
Government or any State 
Government, shall be punished with 
imprisonment for life, or with 
imprisonment of either description 
                                                
221 For an excellent discussion of the use of terrorist 
fictions in British India see Morton in (Boehmer and 
Morton 2009). 
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which may extend to ten years, and 
shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation. – To constitute a 
conspiracy under this section, it is 
not necessary that any act or illegal 
omission shall take place in 
pursuance thereof. 
The section has undergone very similar sets of amendments as 121 
IPC, largely aimed at making it work for the newly independent 
Indian state. For the TCA this section and the section below on the 
punishment for conspiracy are of great importance. The legal 
mechanism of conspiracy facilitates a specific type of connections 
between various actants. Through the legal machine of conspiracy 
actors can be tied together making a subsequent stabilisation easier 
since evidence against one can be used against all. 
122 IPC still relates to the waging of war and reads 
122. Collecting arms, etc., with 
intention of waging war against the 
Government of India. – Whoever 
collects men, arms or ammunition 
or otherwise prepares to wage war 
with the intention of either waging 
or being prepared to wage war 
against the Government of India, 
shall be punished with 
imprisonment for life or 
imprisonment of either description 
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for a term not exceeding ten years, 
and shall also be liable to fine. 
120B IPC is of pivotal value for the sentencing of the case. It relates 
to the punishment of conspiracy and is read both in conjunction with 
the sections from the IPC and those from the Arms Act we will 
encounter below. It reads 
120B. Punishment of criminal 
conspiracy.- (1) Whoever is a party 
to a criminal conspiracy to commit 
an offence punishable with death, 
imprisonment for life or rigorous 
imprisonment for a term of two 
years or upwards, shall, where no 
express provision is made in this 
Code for the punishment of such a 
conspiracy, be punished in the same 
manner as if he had abetted such 
offence.  
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal 
conspiracy other than a criminal 
conspiracy to commit an offence 
punishable as aforesaid shall be 
punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term not 
exceeding six months, or with fine 
or with both. 
 216 
Conspiracy is further clarified in the case law, tying it even more 
firmly into a pre-existing assemblage. These clarifications are both 
general and specific to the Nasir TCA. Previous judgments specifying 
elements of conspiracy are found in the judgment, which we will turn 
to below. The general ones relate to the definition of Common 
Intention. One case is referenced where the Supreme Court held that 
the one condition for the application of conspiracy was the 
establishment that the acts be committed “in furtherance of common 
intention.”222 120B is further qualified by the necessity to establish an 
agreement between the parties to commit an offence. This means that 
mere association or relation is not enough to establish the 
intention.223 The case law further recognises that while it is necessary 
to establish the agreement, this is difficult and therefore gives a nod 
towards the use of indirect evidence.224 
We can make most sense of this network of tensions by linking it to 
the assemblage as a working arrangement described by Ian Buchanan 
(Buchanan 2015). The interplay between various loosely scripted 
ways of interacting and networks of association between actants is 
what turns it into a desiring machine or a working arrangement. The 
desiring machine is a machine that interacts with actants it comes in 
contact with. But it is neither individual agency nor structural forces 
that have primacy. This latter point is particularly important as many 
accounts of terrorism in court fail to take it into account. In other 
words, the functioning of the law in stabilising Nasir as terrorist is by 
no means a rigid path dependent on following of a prescripted 
structure. Neither is the judge a free agent, able to categorise in an 
unfettered manner as she pleases. Rather what we observe is a 
complex enactment, or choreography, of the tensions between 
heterogeneous actants, contextualised by the momentum of a number 
of hinterlands. Hinterlands are in this case territorialised most 
                                                
222 Chandra Kant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1999 
SC 1557. 
223 Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 
1999 SC 782: 1999 (1) JT 716. 
224 Vijayan v. State of Kerala, 1999 (3) SCC 54: AIR 
1999 SC 1086. 
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strongly by the pre-existing security assemblage and the pre-existing 
legal assemblage. The enactment takes the form of a relatively 
familiar scene such as the courtroom, the discussion of evidence 
and/or the deployment of stylised arguments in the form of 
precedent. The tensions between actants become visible in the way in 
which actants are unpredictably integrated into the assemblage. Yet, 
the hinterlands make themselves felt in the way in which patterns of 
associations are more likely than others. The pre-existing legal 
assemblage and the pre-existing security assemblage influence what 
associations of actants are plausible in the TCA. 
In this case one of the hinterlands we could unearth is the way in 
which the IPC was conceived by the British as part of Crown Rule in 
British India. The way in which the sections under discussion here 
were particularly used to quell dissent and the independence struggle 
has been sanitized by the amendments following the one in 1950. 
The laws we are discussing here are an important part of the 
assemblage precisely because their blueprint is loose. If their 
codifying effect were too strong the assemblage would turn into what 
DeLanda calls a Strata, a strictly hierarchical and almost calcified 
assemblage (DeLanda 2006). But since even the law recognises room 
for the application of mind, other influences and tensions also arise in 
the assemblage. We will return to this discussion in the concluding 
section. For now it is enough to recognise that the loose blueprint 
provided by the sections, stands in tension with the hinterlands of 
precedent and that the initial translation of the incident which we are 
examining here, puts these actants into relations. 
Another element of the assemblage is section 302 IPC relating to 
murder. Not surprisingly it is a very short provision with a long 
history. It reads 
302. Punishment for murder. – 
Whoever commits murder shall be 
punished with death, or 
 218 
imprisonment for life, and shall also 
be liable to fine. 
We can focus on two aspects that make murder interesting in relation 
to terrorist stabilisation. Firstly, the case law provided in the criminal 
manual for elucidation of murder includes a hierarchy between truth 
claims. Secondly, it also has a provision for extreme cases. The court 
is the final authority on truth, for example in relation to medical 
evidence:  
“Mere variance of prosecution story 
with the medical evidence, in all 
cases, should not lead to conclusion 
inevitably to reject the prosecution 
story. Court to make out efforts 
within judicial sphere to know 
truth” 225  (Universal’s Criminal 
Manual 2013, 514). 
The court is the authority of truth within the judicial sphere. 
Therefore it can decide between the expert evidence and the 
prosecution story. To reformulate this for the purposes of our 
investigation, the tension between two actants, the medical report and 
the prosecution story, can be choreographed for the purposes of 
judgment and ‘truth’ by the court. 
Extreme cases are considered the ‘rarest of rare cases’. In Indian law 
the death penalty should only be implemented when the case qualifies 
as rarest of rare. We are therefore looking at those murder cases that 
fit the description rarest of rare in the explanation of when the death 
penalty should be imposed. The comment first recognises that all 
                                                
225 Mohan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1999 
SC 883: 1999 (2) SCC 428. 
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murder cases involve brutality.226 But that that brutality in itself is not 
sufficient to make them stand out as the rarest of rare. The death 
penalty should not be imposed in every murder case. Then the 
comment turns to two cases to illustrate incidents of the rarest of rare 
cases. Both cases it turns to are cases that are also spoken about as 
incidents of terrorism. The first is the assassination of Indira Gandhi 
by her bodyguards. 227  The second illustration is that of the 
assassination of her son Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE.228 In addition to 
brutality there is something worse about these cases, which makes 
them even more heinous than murder alone. That the rarest of rare 
formulation is a constellation which is already coded for in murder 
makes the choreographing of the terrorist more easily accessible even 
through the murder route. 
Just as the rarest of rare case above section 333 IPC relates to 
attacking civil servants and makes the initial crime more severe. It 
reads 
333. Voluntarily causing grievous 
hurt to deter public servant from his 
duty. – Whoever voluntarily causes 
grievous hurt to any person being a 
public servant in the discharge of 
his duty as such public servant, or 
with intent to prevent or deter that 
person or any other public servant 
from discharging his duty as such 
public servant, or in consequence of 
                                                
226  Subhash Ramkumar Bina @ Vakil v. State of 
Maharashtra, AIR 2003 SC 269. 
227 Kehar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1988 SC 
1883. 
228  State of Tamil Nadu through Superintendent of 
Police CBI/SIT v. Nalani, AIR 1999 (5) SC 2640. 
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anything done or attempted to shall 
be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which 
may extend to ten years, and shall 
also be liable to fine. 
The sections related to attacking the state violently are completed 
with Section 333. The translations between the incident and the pre-
coded legal categories (vincula) have begun the choreography of the 
terrorist. However they have also opened connective spaces to tie in 
another set of actors. These actors are stabilised as terrorist at the 
Sessions Court, even if the High Court picks apart this stabilisation, it 
has been stable for a period.  
6.2.5.3	The	Printer	Group	
The legal sections found in the footnote relate to the so called 
‘printer group’ which produced fake documents. According to the 
main narrative the printer group supported the core group by 
providing them with fake documents. There are no attempts to 
stabilise them as involved in violent crime, but through the legal 
machine of conspiracy we have encountered above they are initially 
stabilised as terrorist.229The printer group is loosely associated with 
                                                
229 As such these sections relating to them read 
467. Forgery of valuable security, will , etc. – whoever 
forges a document which purports to be a valuable 
security or a will , or an authority to adopt a son, or 
which purports to give authority to any person to 
make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive 
the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to 
receive or deliver any money, movable property, or 
valuable security, or any document purporting to be an 
acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of 
money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of 
any movable property or valuable security, shall be 
punished with imprisonment for life, or with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which 
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to 
fine. 
468 IPC reads 
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the main conspiracy in the narrative provided by the prosecution. 
The Sessions Court also sentences them to death. The interplay 
between the different sections makes the conspiracy extend to all 
involved and thus requires all involved to be punished with the same 
severity. 
6.2.5.4	The	Arms	Act	
 The legal mechanism the Sessions Court uses to dispense death 
sentences to all accused, and that in conjunction with the conspiracy 
is aimed at stabilising all accused as terrorists comes from the Arms 
Act.  
25(1B)(a) Arms Act 
25. Punishment for certain offences 
– Whoever – […] (1B) (a) acquires, 
has in his possession or, carries any, 
firearm or ammunition in 
contravention of section 3; […] 
shall be punishable with 
imprisonment for a team which 
shall not be less than one year but 
which may extend to three years and 
shall also be liable to fine. 
                                                                                                         
468. Forgery for purpose of cheating. – whoever 
commits forgery, intending that the document or 
electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose 
of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to 
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
471 IPC finally reads 
471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic 
record. – Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as 
genuine any document or electronic record which he 
knows or has reason to believe to be a forged 
document or electronic record, shall be punished in 
the same manner as if he had forged such document or 
electronic record. 
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This relatively mild provision contrast starkly with 27(3) Arms Act. 
27. Punishment for using arms, etc. 
– […] (3) Whoever uses any 
prohibited arms or prohibited 
ammunition or does any act in 
contravention of section 7 and such 
use or act results in the death of any 
other person, shall be punishable 
with death. 
For the purposes of the arms act a prohibited weapon is defined as 
2. Definitions and interpretations – 
In this Act, unless the context 
otherwise requires, - […] (f) 
“prohibited arms” means –  
(i) firearms so designed or adapted 
that, if pressure is applied to the 
trigger missiles continue to be 
discharged until pressure is removed 
from the trigger or the magazine 
containing the missiles is empty. 
During the first translation, the weapon used during the incident, 
AK47, is translated as a prohibited weapon. Since there is an entire 
section on the AK47 below, we need not go into too much detail 
here. Suffice it to say that a key provision for both the sessions and 
the high court is the mandatory death sentence resulting out of 27(3). 
What happens during the process of translation? We have seen above 
how the incident is translated into a smooth account that interacts 
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with the legal assemblage. Translated into legal categories the incident 
becomes entangled with a much wider network of actants; procedural 
law, case law, and an entire legal assemblage. As this translation takes 
place the assemblage becomes increasingly coded. As demonstrated 
in sub-section 2.4.2 coding “performed by genes or words supplies a 
second articulation, consolidating the effects of the first 
[territorialisation] and further stabilising the identity of assemblages” 
(DeLanda 2006, 15). Therefore, the translation of the incident into 
legal categories not only makes links to a legal assemblage, it also 
begins to territorialise the TCA and consolidate it. Such a secondary 
articulation of the incident permits three things. Namely creating a 
feedback loop between the category and the accused, making the 
incident transportable and making it relatable to a network of other 
incidents. 
 Firstly, it ensures the use of the legal categories as a looping effect 
occurs between the secondary articulation and the investigation into 
the incident. Ian Hacking initially explored his looping effect in 
relation to categorised people and their interaction with the category 
of their description (Sperber, Premack, and Premack 1996). He found 
a feedback loop where people would increasingly conform to their 
categorisation in a complex interactive social inscription of expected 
roles. We can however also extend this logic to the way in which 
actants in the TCA enter into tensions during the investigation stage. 
Aspects of these tensions that correspond to legal actants are 
privileged and thus the process of translation transforms actants. The 
primary articulation ‘AK47 machine’, which releases missiles when 
the trigger is pressed, is relayed into the secondary articulation ‘legal 
machine of the prohibited weapon under 27(3) of the Arms Act’, 
which releases death sentences when proved beyond reasonable 
doubt. To use Donna Haraway’s term, there is a ‘partial connection’ 
between the AK47 and 27(3) but one that requires the translation to 
be maintained (Haraway 1988). This translation takes place during the 
investigation stage and is self-reinforcing. The investigators are 
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looking for partial connections and select actants for their suitability 
to be partially connected. 
Secondly, this translation makes the incident transportable. The legal 
sections allow the incident to be transported from one lawyer to the 
next and from court to the next but also across time. Thirdly, it ties 
the incident in, makes it comparable and connects it to the assembled 
secondary articulations – it becomes comparable to similar cases. As 
the case proceeds through the courts and becomes increasingly 
stabilised as terrorism, the secondary articulations increasingly move 
to suppress the primary incident. In the investigation stage, all 
manner of materials are sifted through and the prosecution creates a 
mix and match case out of them. This case supports their narrative 
and latches onto particular actants, such as the AK 47, the car and the 
correspondence, to tie together a particular story of the incident. 
Other elements, such as the CCTV coverage from the American 
Centre is expressed as a lack. It is mentioned, it is referred to, but no 
one I spoke to had seen it, the prosecution never physically made it 
part of the trial assemblage. The CCTV coverage is mentioned to 
support the prosecution narrative but the tapes are not available for 
viewing in court (The Hindu 2002). The presence of these CCTV 
tapes is interesting because they are at the fringes of the assemblage 
and the other parts of the assemblage are unable to interact with 
them in the way that one traditionally interacts with CCTV tapes – by 
watching the footage. They are unwatchable, their content is virtual, 
but the fact of their existence is actual in the TCA. By their existence 
they contribute to the stabilisation even though their content remains 
speculative. 
From the investigation stage to the Sessions Court a translation takes 
place. This translation has various aspects, the ‘officer in-charge’ of 
the investigation, Kausalya Nand Chowdhury, becomes prosecution 
witness 113. In his place the prosecutor becomes the chief 
choreographer up to the judgment stage when the Judge takes over. 
These translations show not only the transitions between phases, or 
modes, of the TCA but also the interchangeability of roles and actors. 
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6.3 The Breakthrough – The Travels of an AK 47 a Dying 
Declaration 
After having stalled for a few days a breakthrough happens in the 
investigation. The very concept of the breakthrough is of course 
problematic for our ANT account. It is therefore important to keep 
in mind that the breakthrough becomes narrated and stabilised as a 
breakthrough in a post hoc fashion. This is important because it 
illustrates that the investigation is not a smooth coherent and 
gradually cumulating process, only once it’s story becomes told does 
it transform into a goal bound trajectory. It is only through the TCA 
that both the incident and the investigation are tied together as the 
smooth halves of one whole that speaks for itself. Whereas tracing 
actants carefully uncovers that the investigation and the incident 
become together in fits and jerks. We can understand this 
breakthrough by following two actants, an AK47 assault rifle and an 
encounter. Before exploring these two actants in detail, it is important 
to be clear on one preliminary point. While the details of the 
breakthrough are very murky, its function in the wider case is pivotal. 
We will return to this murky but functional episode in section 6.3.5 
when we look at how the judgments are translated from one court to 
the next and how some aspects are increasingly suppressed. But for 
now let us follow the AK 47. 
6.3.1 The Kalashnikov 
According to many estimates the AK 47 (Kalashnikov) is the most 
widely available firearm in the world (PYADUSHKIN, HAUG, 
AND MATVEEVA 2003). The old soviet assault rifle is certainly 
widely and easily recognised even among laypersons. Due to its wide 
dissemination in conflicts around the world, but notably not among 
NATO member countries and their clients, according to Kabbani it is 
also in popular culture often associated with crime, subversion, 
terrorism, insurgency and more generally third world conflicts 
(Kabbani 2013). In our case, the AK47 is the weapon on which the 
entire case rests. This makes it a crucial actant. These symbolic 
considerations aside, the underlined fact is that the use of AK47s for 
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violent purposes remains a daily event around the world and its 
specific significance needs to be articulated for this case. 
As a mass produced commodity one AK 47 is nearly 
indistinguishable from any other. The only straightforward 
exceptions are that each AK47 comes with a serial number and 
factory stamp (Hogg 2000). While those theoretically make each 
weapon uniquely identifiable, they suffer from three limitations. 
Firstly and most obviously, one needs to hold the weapon to find the 
serial number and stamp. Being shot at with one AK47 without then 
taking possession of that weapon immediately rules out this 
identification process. Secondly, even if the officers had gained 
possession of the gun, the serial number can be filed or etched off. 
Sophisticated forensic laboratories can often reconstitute numbers 
that have been tampered with. However that takes time and requires 
a lab with specific capacities. The third problem is that AK47s come 
in a wide range of qualities. Cheaper models are usually repaired by 
simple mixing and matching of parts. This means that some parts, if 
they are well made, can in their working life be part of a number of 
guns. Not only does that make identification difficult, but we also 
have to introduce a secondary industry, as AK47s are some of the 
most often copied and counterfeited firearms on the planet 
(Isachenkov 2009). Therefore, the serial number is a very unreliable 
source for identifying a particular AK47. This leaves only the 
significantly more complicated option, of identification through 
ballistic analysis. As we saw in section 7.1, bullets and cartridges were 
found on the scene of the incident. The striations created in a bullet 
from its high-speed passage through the barrel of a gun allow for the 
relatively precise determination if a bullet has been fired from a 
specific gun or not. In order to make this determination, the analyst 
requires a sufficiently large bullet fragment as well as the firearm in 
question. If the striations match, it is likely that the bullet was fired 
from this particular gun. If they do not then it is unlikely. With 
sufficiently advanced forensic equipment the accuracy is comparable 
to fingerprint analysis (Castaneda and Snyder 2012). The process is 
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slightly easier when using casings (Cox 2015). In our case both bullets 
and bullet casings were recovered from the scene. In combination 
with the technological assemblage that makes forensic ballistics 
possible, the preconditions for the identification of the weapon are 
there. In other words, the AK47 bullets and casings found on the 
scene could be used to produce the link between the weapon used on 
the 22nd of January 2002, a person who was found in possession of 
the gun and Section 27 of the Arms Act as discussed above. That this 
is possible creates the expectation that in the way that in the course 
of the passage of law we will embark on a detour to establish one 
element of the chain of reference as establishing a connection 
between machine and incident via a series of trials and textual links. 
What is most interesting about the link provided by the AK47 is that 
at first sight there is nothing spectacular about it. For one familiar 
with the passage of law there is nothing surprising about the causal 
connection articulated in the assemblage: 1) the weapon used at the 
incident was a AK47, 2) Bullets and casings were recovered at the 
scene, 3) The AK47 recovered in Hazaribag is the one used in the 
shootings, 4) The dying declaration, that is discussed below, connects 
the accused to the shooting, 5) Therefore both circumstantial 
evidence and direct evidence of their involvement and shooting is 
available. These are the connections between actants, which the 
prosecution successfully attempts to stabilise. These relations 
between actants form a smooth story. We expect the detour via the 
ballistic expert and the stabilisation of the two AK47s as the same 
gun and therefore a stable link in the chain of reference leading to the 
terrorist fact. The surprise comes in when this stabilisation remains 
successful despite the ballistic expert opinion indicating that the 
AK47 recovered in Hazaribag and the bullets and casings found on 
the scene in Calcutta are not a match. The slow, diligent, hesitant 
passage of law which detours via a whole body of forensic practices is 
short circuited in this particular case to arrive at the result the two 
guns are the same as soon as the detour leads nowhere. By relying on 
the dying declaration over the expert opinion the court is asserting its 
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discretion and choreographing contradictory elements, establishing a 
short cut, which bypasses the (now vexatious) detour we expected as 
part of the passage of law. The shortcut and choreography that 
enables it makes the story smooth again, by suppressing contrary 
pulls. Therefore before we return to our discussion of the AK47, or 
rather the two AK47s and their role, let us have a look at the dying 
declaration and the encounter that led to it. This is necessary because 
the shortcut which permits the AK47 is based on the dying 
declaration. 
6.3.2 The Encounter and the Dying Declaration 
On the 29th of January 2002 the Hindu ran a front-page story that on 
the 28th of January two Pakistanis involved in the Calcutta attack had 
been killed (The Hindu 2002). The two men are named as 
Mohammed Zahid, alias Mohammed Idris and Salim.230 Zahid and 
Salim died after being shot by police. One report suggests that one of 
them died on his way to the hospital and the other one at hospital. 
Whereas a conflicting version indicates they both died on the scene. 
However both reports suggest that one of the two (Salim or Zahid) 
made a statement to the effect that he had been involved in the 
Calcutta Shooting. According to Union Home Secretary Kamal 
Pande they also admitted to being from the Khanewala District in 
Multan Pakistan (The Hindu 2002). The links in the chain of 
reference that articulates terrorist facts tie in the encounter in which 
both men died with the Calcutta attack and throws in a connection to 
a district in Pakistan which amongst security personnel has a 
reputation for being the birthplace of many terrorists. Despite, or 
perhaps because of, the convenient smoothness of this story 
scepticism abounds. The details of the shooting that took place in 
Hazaribagh are already murky. Accounts of the sequence of events 
differ. Not everyone is convinced that the dying declaration was 
                                                
230 Names for suspected militants are always interesting 
in the media as both a wealth of aliases or the using of 
one single name result in a degree of indetermination. 
In this case the journalist uses many aliases for Zahid 
and only the one name for Salim. 
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genuine or even that it was necessary for police to swiftly shoot the 
suspected terrorists (The Economic Times 2002). The account 
provided by the prosecution and accepted by the Court is as follows: 
A.7. Hazaribag 
[…] 
c) Kausalya Nand Chowdhury (P.W. 
113) was the Officer in-charge, 
Sadar Police Station at Hazaribag. 
On January 27, 2002 he received an 
information from S.P., Hazaribag 
that one police team was coming to 
Hazaribag from Delhi being led by 
Mr Rabi Sankar, S.E.P., Delhi 
Police. They came on a tip off that 
two terrorists had taken shelter at 
Hazaribag. On investigation it 
revealed that the terrorists were 
staying at the residence of Abdul 
Mazid Khan at Khirgaon as also at 
the residence of one Monti at 
Hasmian Colony. Monty was 
connected with the terrorists. Two 
raid parties proceeded, one for 
Khirgaon and another for Hasmian 
Colony. On January 27/28 at about 
2:40 a.m. they cordoned the house 
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of Mazid Khan. At 6:45 a.m. S.P. 
Hazaribag requested the inmates of 
the house to come out and asked 
them to surrender before the police. 
After about half an hour two 
persons escaped from the side gate 
and began to fire indiscriminately at 
the police party. There had been an 
encounter and ultimately both the 
miscreants died. One of them 
(Salim) died on the spot and the 
other one (Zahid) subsequently died 
at the hospital. While the injured 
man was being carried to the 
hospital he disclosed that he was a 
member of Lasker-E-Taiba and a 
resident of Pakistan. He participated 
in the shootout incident at 
American Centre along with one 
Sadakat. One AK-47 rifle was seized 
from the said injured person who 
subsequently died at the hospital 
(sic.)231 
It is unclear from the above account what happens at Hasmian 
Colony except that it implicates Monti, which is relevant for the 
                                                
231 Nasir High Court Judgment, Paragraph 7. 
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printer group. During the main shootout in Khirgaon two persons 
were shot and according to the police at least one of them (Zahid) 
survived for some time. According to the police the wounded 
individual, later named as Zahid, made a statement to the effect that 
he had been one of the shooters in the Calcutta incident. 
Additionally, A.K. Singh, the North Chotanagpur Range DIG, 
claimed that Zahid was in possession of the AK47 used in the 
Calcutta incident (The Hindu 2002). The statement made by Zahid 
states that he was “a member of Lashkar-E-Taiba and a resident of 
Pakistan. [And that] He participated in the shootout incident at 
American Centre along with one Sadakat”(sic) (High Court 
Judgment, A7 (c)).232 However, this statement is not brought to court 
as hearsay, being overheard by the police and subsequently recorded 
in writing. Rather it is translated into a dying declaration. A dying 
declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 has 
evidentiary value.233 In the case at hand the court is satisfied that the 
                                                
232 Sadakat is a new name, appearing more or less out 
of no-where and disappears into no-where again. 
233 The section reads: 
32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person 
who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant. – 
Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made 
by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or 
who has become incapable of giving evidence, or 
whose attendance cannot be procured without an 
amount of delay or expense which, under the 
circumstances of the case appears to the Court to be 
unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the 
following cases: –  
(1) when it relates to cause of death. – When the 
statement is made by a person as to the cause of his 
death, or as to any of the circumstances of the 
transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in 
which the cause of that persons’s death comes into 
question. Such statements are relevant whether the 
person who made them was or was not, at the time 
when they were made, under expectation of death, and 
whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which 
the cause of his death comes into question. 
[…] 
(3) or against interest of maker. – when the statement 
is against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the 
persons making it, or when, if true, it would expose 
him or would have exposed him to a criminal 
prosecution or to a suit for damages. 
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statement made by Zahid is a dying declaration and therefore 
admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. Recorded by 
Shri Sujit Mitra on the 28th of January 2002, the statement contained 
information pertaining to the shooting. During the incident at 
Hazaribag the police also seized the one AK47. Initially thought to be 
the weapon used in Calcutta, this is then disproved by the expert 
report, however the court continues to use it as a material link 
between the two shootings. The dying declaration ties Zahid to 
Pakistan and to Lashkar-e-Taiba. The seized AK47 was transported 
to Calcutta by the police team for further examination. The chain of 
reference, which articulates the terrorist facts and makes Nasir be 
terrorist is marked by these aborted detours and suppressed 
shortcuts.  
We can see how the network of actants surrounding the Nasir TCA 
thickens. The investigation is no longer reported as stalled and 
vincula have been made. These links connect geographical locations, 
Hazaribagh and Calcutta. They also connect one of the ephemeral 
shooters of the Calcutta incident with the dead body named as Zahid. 
The other with the name Sadakat, who according to the dying 
declaration is the second shooter in Calcutta. The two AK47’s, one 
recovered at the raid and other one that provided the casings found 
on the scene in Calcutta, have been linked by their common 
appearance and by the ambiguity whether or not they are the same 
one. The inexplicable brutality of the incident in Calcutta has begun 
to make sense by being linked to LeT and Pakistan and thus to the 
hinterland of state sponsored terrorism (The Hindu 2002). Slowly the 
assailants are taking shape. Even though we do not know very much 
about the second shooter, except his alleged name Sadakat, linking 
him to Lashkar-e-Taiba begins to stabilise the narrative with a 
hinterland from the pre-existing security assemblage. This 
stabilisation seems peripheral in the judgment but is an essential part 
of the narrative about the incident. It is the slow crafting of the chain 
of reference which will ultimately articulate Nasir as terrorist and 
make the terrorist facts speak for themselves. 
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The investigation continues to unfold, using the landlord Abdul 
Mazid Khan mentioned in the excerpt from the judgment above as 
the link that ties Salim and Zahid in with the Nasir TCA. It also ties 
another set of persons to the incident at the Calcutta American 
Centre. There is a twofold connection between Monti and the Nasir 
TCA. On the one hand, Monti was included in the tip off that Delhi 
police received about the terrorist cell in Hazaribag. On the other 
hand, Abdul Mazid Khan is also Monti’s landlord. Abdul Mazid 
makes a deposition but does not come to court himself. His 
deposition is the link between the actants in the next two sections. 
According to the deposition, Abdul Mazid lets one flat to Nasir. To 
that flat the deposition ties a Maruti Zen car and a motorbike, as well 
as a chocolate coloured jacket that the police seize from the said flat. 
Finally Abdul Mazid’s deposition also talks about a specific email 
address. 
Starting from the two shootings, one in Calcutta and one in 
Hazaribag, we have seen how the network of actants has rapidly 
expanded. We have encountered actants ranging from the AK47 to 
the words of Zahid and the processes of translation that render one 
as a prohibited weapon and the other as a dying declaration. Through 
the interplay of translations, hinterlands and actants, the Nasir TCA 
emerges and categories of terrorist are stabilised. Even though we 
have only scratched the surface of the working arrangement that is 
the Nasir TCA, the amount of work gone into stabilising the terrorist 
becomes evident. Every link of the chain of reference needs to be 
crafted carefully to allow the judgment to make the facts speak for 
themselves and to articulate the terrorist. While each link may include 
seeming lacunae, shortcuts and detours the chain itself needs to stay 
strong. 
Furthermore, while we need to have one eye out for visible actants, it 
is important not to allow those we cannot see to drop out of our 
minds. The tip off Delhi police received to make them look in 
Hazaribag and cordon off these specific houses is not discussed 
anywhere in the Nasir TCA. This hints at the existence of a security 
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assemblage, which has points of connection with the TCA but 
remains largely invisible. The shortcut which led the chain of 
reference to jump from Calcutta to Hazaribagh is not one of the slow 
and deliberate passage of law. In the final judgment the chain link 
AK47, dying declaration and the Hazaribagh encounter dissimulate 
their own becoming in order to bridge the unexpected shortcuts we 
encountered in each one of them. What remains visible are actants 
such as car, the motorbike and the jacket, they leave traces we can 
follow. 
6.3.3 The Connection - A Car, A Motorbike and a Garage 
Following the shooting in Hazaribag the investigation is said to 
accelerate and even take off. A number of arrests are made within a 
few days and material objects play a crucial part in linking these 
individuals, vincula proliferate. Most prominent amongst them are a 
car and a motorbike as well as the flat/garage where they are kept. 
The arrests begin with that of Nasir on January 29th 2002. Nasir’s 
arrest is followed by that of Adil and Monti on February 6th, Boby 
and Hasrat on March 6th, Aftab on March 22nd and Rohit on April 6th. 
These dates are taken from the judgment, but some open questions 
remain. For example, an article by the MRT (an American 
newspaper) cites Indian officials as having arrested and charged three 
Bangladeshis and three Indians on the 23rd of January 2002 (Banerjee 
2002). This illustrates that Indian officials are convinced that there is 
a foreign element in the attacks, even if it remains unclear whether it 
originates form Bangladesh or Pakistan. 
The uncertainties and contradictions only arise out of comparing 
sources that are not linked to the main productive processes. Within 
the judgment as the trace left from the main thrust of the TCA these 
contradictions have largely been ironed out, edited out or suppressed. 
One smooth and strong chain of reference serves to make the 
terrorist speak. It is not possible at this stage to determine whether 
the reporter just got it wrong or misunderstood something. Any 
number of other reasons could have contributed to these 
contradictions. The most interesting aspect of this is that when only 
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reading the judgment and the court record incongruences regarding 
the dates of arrest or provenance of the accused do not appear. 
Looking only at the official court records it appears that the arrests 
took place on the above-mentioned dates and that the flat/garage, the 
Maruti car and the motorbike were the links used to make the 
connections. There were two flats that played a role in connecting 
people, the first one is the one raided in Hazaribag and the other in 
Tilzala234. The first one was owned by Abdul Mazid, and was rented 
to Nasir since some time in either November or December 2001. It 
was at this flat that Abdul Mazid once encountered Monti, Zahid and 
Salim. Abdul Mazid, who was not called to the stand but recorded a 
deposition with the police, identified the latter two post-mortem. He 
further said that Monti had told him that Adil would also come to 
stay and that Zahid and Salim were employees of Nasir. Abdul Mazid 
further mentioned a Maruti Zen car, motorcycle and the email 
address to which we will return below. Finally when presented with 
the Chocolate coloured jacket the police seized from the flat he 
recognises it. At the flat in Hazaribag a tenancy agreement for the 
second flat in Tilzala is recovered. When that flat is searched fake tax 
tokens and registration certificates for the car are recovered. It is later 
suggested that the car was stolen from Delhi and that a complaint 
had been lodged with Manas Saravar Police station. A motorbike was 
also seized from the flat in Tilzala. Most incriminatingly, a sketch 
map of the American Centre was also seized from the flat. 
What happens in the Nasir TCA now is the core of the connection 
between the people accused and the foundation on which the session 
court dishes out death sentences to all accused. Group formation is 
taking place, the group’s members are terrorist, and encompass all the 
accused at the session court stage. The key instrument for forming 
this group is the interplay between the two flats, the car and the 
motorbike on the one hand, and with section 120B of the IPC on the 
other. Creating vincula between the body of text relating to 
                                                
234  Tilzala refers to a road, a lane and an area in 
Calcutta. Alternative spelling: Tiljala. 
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conspiracy and the insignificant events makes the law speak for itself. 
The IPC definition of conspiracy permits the prosecution to draw the 
line so that it encompasses all the accused. This delineation is at least 
initially successful and the session’s court uses this to sentence all 
accused to death. The interaction between the persons, the objects 
and the conspiracy charge are such that all seven accused are included 
in the terrorist group by the Sessions Court. While the delineation 
undertaken at the Sessions Court level is modified at the appeals 
stage, excluding the printer group from the main conspiracy, the core 
conspiracy is maintained. Ultimately conspiracy, as we encountered 
above, hinges on the prosecution showing shared motive. Since 
motive plays a significant role in setting apart terrorism from other 
violent acts, making the terrorist speak their motive is a fundamental 
link in their articulation. Making the terrorist speak is achieved 
through the use of yet another body of texts.  
6.3.4 The Motive – A few Emails and a Letter 
What sets terrorism apart from murder, and waging war against the 
state from other violent acts, crucially involves the core of its 
intention. Intention is sometimes declared but in this case, and many 
other cases of terrorism, artifice has to be employed to make the 
terrorist speak their intention. In the Nasir TCA the prosecution 
story establishes this intentionality by translating intermediaries into 
mediators.235 The pieces of written and electronic communication, 
notebook, letter and emails are initially mainly intermediaries to 
transfer information from one person to the other, or in the case of 
the notebook to preserve detailed information accurately. They are 
intermediaries because in the primary purpose what goes in is also 
predictably what comes out. The prosecution however introduces 
them as circumstantial evidence in court and thus translates them into 
                                                
235 Intermediaries and mediators have been discussed in 
the theory chapter, but as a quick refresher: 
Intermediaries transport relations predictably from 
one setting to the next. Mediators on the other hand 
have an impact on relations that play out differently 
depending on a large set of factors, thus effectively 
influencing the relations that they impact upon. 
 237 
mediators. What comes out has a very indirect relationship with what 
went in. Making the detour from the person, to older texts, to 
intention, back to the person requires a slow and deliberate, step by 
step, following of the enrolments marking the chain of reference. 
The first is a letter sent from Aftab to the widow of one Asif. 
According to the prosecution Nasir and Amir were school friends 
and Asif was Amir’s brother. Asif and Aftab came into contact at 
Tihar Jail in Delhi where they were both imprisoned. This is brought 
to the attention of the court by Nadir Ahmed Khan. (P.W. 46) When 
Asif is killed in an encounter by security forces in Gujarat, Aftab 
wrote a letter expressing his condolences to the widow. According to 
exhibit No. 45/1, he not only expresses his condolences but also 
promises to take revenge. Exhibit No. 45/1 is exemplary of a 
phenomenon that has come up time and again in this inquiry. At the 
heart of exhibit No. 45/1 lies the original letter written by Nasir, or at 
least that is taken as an assumption by the actors in the TCA at the 
High Court and Supreme Court stage. But in practice exhibit No. 
45/1 becomes its own actant which moves through the assemblage, is 
referred to by prosecutors, lawyers and judges, while the actual letter, 
presumably, remains locked in the evidence locker in Calcutta.236 
Nevertheless, the two, original letter and exhibit No. 45/1 are in a 
relationship that in turn implies the relationship between Aftab and 
Asif’s widow. Without the letter there would be no exhibit No. 45/1 
in the Nasir TCA and without exhibit No. 45/1 the prosecution 
narrative of the revenge motive would be significantly weakened. 
Nasir is made to speak through the vincula which tie the letter into 
the TCA and create the links between a piece of paper and a past 
event. 
The relations within which Aftab and Nasir are terrorist are partially 
predicated on the existence of material evidence. Not only of their 
involvement at the scene in one form or another, but also and this is 
                                                
236 I haven’t seen the letter and I haven’t spoken with 
anybody who has seen the original letter. It is ‘exhibit 
45/1’ that travels through the courts – since the 
Sessions Court accepted it as saying the content 
ascribed to it the original letter is not revisited. 
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the crux of terrorism, on the existence of a particular motive (A. 
Goswami 2002, 33). The Nasir TCA illustrates how one possible 
stabilisation of terrorism ties itself to the two components of the 
definition, the act and the intention behind the act. The gas engineer 
who negligently blows up a school full of children is not a terrorist. 
Neither is the comedian who takes on the state by virtue of her wit. 
Even as the original letter becomes sidelined by exhibit 45/1, its 
capacity to tie together Aftab, the killing of Asif and the incident in 
Calcutta (through the arguments of the prosecution), provides the 
glue for the TCA. The motive required in terrorism, also works as an 
explanation of the seemingly inexplicable brutality witnessed in the 
incident. 
Nonetheless, “to explain is not a mysterious cognitive feat, but a very 
practical world-building enterprise that consists in connecting entities 
with other entities, that is, in tracing a network” (Latour 2007, 103). 
The courts are engaged in tracing networks and building worlds. This 
is essentially an effort at translation. The TCA therefore is both an 
assemblage in its own right and a choreography of actors tracing an 
assemblage. The actors who trace the terrorist assemblage (accused, 
acts, evidence) for the purpose of the Court, create a parallel second 
assemblage which mirrors the first. However, this second assemblage 
takes over more and more from the first as the case moves up the 
courts for appeal. The dynamics and interactive potential of that 
second assemblage is slightly different from the first as it becomes 
firmly tied in with the pre-existing legal assemblage. It’s result is a 
carefully crafted chain of reference which articulates the terrorist fact 
making it speak for itself. This process of translations, enrolments 
and vincula crafting culminates in the judgment of the Court of 
Sessions. Which in turn translates knowledge and other actants for 
the High Court and ultimately the Supreme Court. 
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6.3.5 The Judgments as Mediators  
The judgments are first and foremost mediators.237 In other words 
they provide a link between the proceedings at the Court of Sessions 
and the High Court and from there to the Supreme Court. But each 
judgment also translates between the judiciary and the prison or jail 
facility that has custody of the accused. It is not an intermediary as 
judgments often interact in unpredictable ways with new actants they 
encounter. Additionally, the judgment is a mediator between two 
assemblages. The court assemblage which includes all the obvious 
pre-existing actants, (judges, lawyers, prosecutors, court rooms, laws, 
procedures, investigators) and the not yet existent terrorist 
assemblage which includes an as of yet undefined mass of 
heterogeneous actants. As the court assemblage becomes a TCA, it 
first creates and then assimilates the terrorist assemblage. This 
process of creation and assimilation can be followed in the 
assemblage. In this process of translations, vincula are crafted which 
transform the machine operator and their machine, becomes a 
terrorist with a prohibited weapon, becomes an inmate and an inert 
plastic box in an evidence locker. A person becomes, first a person of 
interest, then a suspect, then an accused, then an appellant, then a 
petitioner, then an inmate unless they are returned to being just a 
person again. These processes of translation are made transportable 
via the judgment, which serves as a mediator between parts. 
Furthermore each translation in its final stage renders its own 
production invisible creating a stable sequence of facts. To cite 
Latour  
“Facts were facts – meaning exact – 
because they were fabricated – 
meaning that they emerged out of 
                                                
237 I am referring here to the three judgments in the 
Nasir case, Sessions Court, High Court and Supreme 
Court. 
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artificial situations” (Latour 2007, 
90). 
The TCA is an artificial situation out of which the fact of the terrorist 
emerges. The artful tracing and assembling of a Terror Court 
Assemblage creates and stabilises facts. It is again, very important to 
keep in mind that the aim of this critique is not to question the 
outcome – that there are terrorists. Rather my intervention aims to 
show that terrorists are a product of this artificial process rather than 
a naturally occurring input of it. The assertion that the fact of 
terrorism is artificial does not detract from its reality, but rather 
points towards its assembled and stabilised becoming. The terrorist 
fact is made to speak for itself, articulated by the chain of reference. 
“When we say that a fact is constructed, we simply mean that we 
account for the solid objective reality by mobilizing various entities 
whose assemblage could fail” (Latour 2007, 91). The role played by 
the successful TCA in assembling the solid reality of the terrorist is 
objective in the sense that its outcome is independent of any single 
individual’s opinion of it. However it should not be confused with a 
process of discovering a previously existing fact, the fact of terrorism 
only comes into existence by the successful mobilisation of the 
entities contributing to the TCA. If this mobilisation is unsuccessful 
failure is the result and there is no terrorist. We can see such failures 
in the becoming terrorist of Monti and Adil at the High Court and 
Boby, Hasrat and Rohit at the Supreme Court. 
The stabilisation of Nasir and Aftab is successful and their 
categorisation as terrorist becomes fact. This does not mean however 
that everybody has to agree with this fact, but most people most of 
the time would accept as fact that Nasir and Aftab are terrorist. As a 
result of the entire TCA Nasir and Aftab are stabilised and articulated 
as terrorist. Their actions become terrorism rather than revenge, 
resistance, murder or an almost infinite range of other 
categorisations. This terrorism requires an enactment, a performance 
and a choreography which come together in a solid chain of reference 
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as otherwise it remains unstable. The terror element as well as the 
intentionality element both so crucial to our understanding of 
terrorism are not obvious to the naked eye. They require the 
interaction and the performance of certain relations between actants 
for their stabilisation. It is this choreography that is played out at 
length in the TCA. 
The above is an interesting choreography partially because it works 
even when the pre-existing legal assemblage does not have the 
category of terrorist pre-coded or programmed into it. The terrorist 
can be stabilised without specific counter-terrorism legislation. None 
of the laws, which ordinarily would seem like the blueprint for the 
assemblage, are pre-coded for terrorism in this particular case. 
Despite this, the legal assemblage is translated into a TCA, and it is 
widely accepted, by the judge, the media and the public that Nasir 
and Aftab are terrorists and their actions terrorism. This goes on to 
show how objects, in this case laws, behave as either mediators or 
intermediaries depending on context. “Objects, by the very nature of 
their connections with humans, quickly shift from being mediators to 
being intermediaries, counting for one or nothing, no matter how 
internally complicated they might be. This is why specific tricks have 
to be invented to make them talk, that is, to offer descriptions of 
themselves, to produce scripts of what they are making others – 
humans or non-humans – do” (Latour 2007, 79). These specific tricks 
are of course very visible in court where scripted formulations are 
routinely used. However this also applies to human actors and the 
careful choreography needed to enrol them in the TCA. “[H]umans, 
too, have to be made to talk; and this is why elaborate and, often, 
artificial situations have to be devised to reveal their actions and 
performations” (Latour 2007, 79). The court is the means by which 
the laws are made to speak. And it is because they are connected to 
humans that they shift from being intermediaries to becoming 
mediators. These mediators then interact unpredictably with in the 
TCA. The legal categories are used to transport meaning from the 
legislature to the judiciary, from the general to the specific and to tie 
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it in with a pre-existing legal assemblage. The trick invented to make 
them talk is both enabling and disabling, the law as mediator is not 
rigidly pre-programmed in its working application, but neither is it 
open to interaction from any actant. For example following the 
attacks, Harkat Jihad-i-Islami claimed responsibility (Bedi 2002). The 
judgment refers to the various terror groups, but does not make that 
a part of its own workings. The references to terror groups are not 
translated into legal actants. The claims of responsibility are not taken 
into account in the actual judgment, because the source of truth is the 
Court and not the narrative that is spun outside of it. The chain of 
reference builds up to articulate the individual, Nasir and the other 
accused, it stays detached from the claims of responsibility of non-
articulated organisations. That the court reaches a parallel conclusion 
is almost coincidental. 
6.4 Soldering the Two Assemblages – Nasir Traveling up 
the Courts and Embedding in a Network of Precedent 
We encountered the processes of translation above. The actors of the 
legal assemblage engage in crafting a chain of reference which 
assembles a terrorist. In this process elements of the pre-existing legal 
assemblage and the pre-existing security assemblage come together in 
the chain of reference. Through this the chain of reference combines 
the familiar hesitant process of the passage of law but also includes 
some shortcuts which make sense as modalities of the security 
assemblage. The chain of reference, once assembled, reaffirms the 
passage of law by making the shortcuts invisible and making the facts 
speak for themselves. The legal identity of the TCA is maintained 
through embedding it, via a proliferation of vincula, in a network of 
precedent, while translations are taking place all the time. It would be 
tempting to see the Court of Sessions, the High Court and the 
Supreme Court as more or less differently qualified and powerful 
institutions. After all, more or less the same rules of procedure apply, 
the same laws interact with them all and the judges often moved up 
through the ranks, and perceive the courts as reflections of a 
successful career. But from a TCA point of view there is a clear 
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distinction between the Court of Sessions, and the two higher Courts. 
There is significant difference in the working and operation of the 
court of first instance and those of appeal. It is in the Court of 
Sessions that the chain of reference becomes initially inscribed, this 
initial translation is intended to make intermediaries out of mediators. 
It also articulates terrorist facts to make them speak for themselves. 
The Court of Sessions makes texts with objects (including texts) and 
people, whereas the other two courts make texts with texts. As such 
the exposure to the pre-existing security assemblage becomes less and 
less visible as the TCA moves up the ladder of appeal. The artificial 
nature of the stabilisations undertaken in the first instance also 
become buried deeper and deeper under layers of connections with 
the pre-existing legal assemblage naturalising the TCA’s own 
processes. Following Nasir and Aftab in their becoming terrorist we 
encountered a number of other actants that have played a role in 
stabilising this translation. But the initial dynamic is set at the 
Sessions Court where a series of insignificant events become crafted 
into a stable chain of reference capable of articulating terrorist facts. 
The later translations are always influenced by the scope set in the 
beginning. For example a continuous source of frustration during my 
participant observation was that stabilisations of evidence undertaken 
at the Sessions Court are extremely difficult to break up at the higher 
courts. However since defence lawyers at the Sessions Court are 
usually amongst the worst paid and most junior very often the 
prosecution managed to get things on the record that according to 
the more senior lawyers at the higher courts should not have been 
there. The chain of reference becomes increasingly sealed, detours 
and shortcuts, and breaking up or even scrutinizing any link is not an 
easy undertaking. That they are now almost unable to do anything 
about this shows how the TCA gains momentum early on and 
increasing amounts of effort are required to change this momentum. 
This transformation of the TCA from very specific translations, 
shortcuts and prehensions, in which the pre-existing security 
assemblage is still very visible, to more and more abstract legal points 
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goes hand in hand with an embedding in a network of precedent. The 
concrete and specific detail of the case becomes abstracted more and 
more which ties it in more and more firmly with the pre-existing legal 
assemblage. However this also means that the initial translations 
become less and less visible and deviations from the slow, hesitant 
and deliberate passage of law become supressed. 
6.5 Case Study I Conclusion 
In the case study of the Nasir TCA we observed how the legal 
assemblage operates in a terror setting to stabilise a small group of 
people as terrorists. The assembling of a sturdy chain of reference to 
articulate the terrorist fact passes through modalities of law as well as 
modalities of security. The terrorist is stabilised relationally through 
work and processes which involve very little of what we would 
consider the essence of terrorism. This stabilisation effort is hard and 
precarious. This difficulty and imminent possibility of failure clashes 
with the broad-brush definitional effort of the legal and popular 
concepts of terrorism. The consequence of this tension, in this case 
study, is an ever-shrinking group of people to which the definition 
applies. Increasing abstraction from the moment of terror makes the 
stabilisation of individuals as terrorists more and more difficult. 
Mediators play a fundamental role in translating the moment of terror 
into a stable terrorist. These mediators however are also translated 
from one instance to the next. Successfully enrolling actors as 
terrorists/counter-terrorists has powerful effects. We “should treat 
power as an effect of sets of variegated and differentially successful 
strategies to enrol others rather than as cause of that success” (John 
Law 1986, 5). The terror setting is a highly successful enrolment 
strategy, but one which is not new to the world with the GWOT. As 
a setting, terror, very often is successful even in the absence of coding 
for it. In other words, the success of enrolling others in their 
respective groups of counter terrorist and terrorist is successful even 
when these two groups are not pre-scripted in the law and no 
specialised security legislation is used. In this case study I have 
shown, through a number of examples, how the terrorist fact is made 
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to speak, articulated by a chain of reference crafted and refined 
through stages of the TCA. Terrorists are not inputs of terror court 
assemblages but are their outcome, precariously stabilised through 
work intensive processes of enrolment, choreography and the 
crafting of vincula. As the TCA churns on through the layers of 
appeals these initial processes of translation are more and more 
naturalised and buried under connections with the pre-existing legal 
assemblage. Retracing them has illustrated how precarious their 
stability is and how much work is required to choreograph the 
soldering of the pre-existing security assemblage with the pre-existing 
legal assemblage to make invisible their modalities. The next chapter 
turns to the second case study. Relating to an incident that took place 
before the Global War on Terror the Aftab TCA is nevertheless 
much more complex than the Nasir TCA. It reinforces the insights of 
the Nasir TCA while also showing how a much broader range of 
different incidents are linked to create one terrorist whole. 
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Chapter 7 – Case Study II / Aftab’s 
Stabilisation  
7.1 Chapter Introduction - Three Crucial Translations 
This chapter illustrates in a different context the stabilisation 
processes going into the making of a terrorist. The crafting of the 
chain of reference relies upon a proliferation of tiny vincula between 
the existing body of texts and insignificant events. This can be seen 
clearly in this case study. The sequence of translation, stabilisation 
and inscription can be seen when we follow “the trace left behind by 
some moving agent” (Latour 2007, 132). In this case the moving 
agent we follow is Aftab whose full name is Aftab Saeed Ahmed 
Shaikh. He is accused in the 1998 Mumbai Blast Case and is 
articulated by the TCA as a terrorist. The techniques necessary to 
articulate him as a terrorist fact, and to make him speak, are much 
more focused on crafting a chain of reference across time, vincula 
creation between legal categories and insignificant events and finally 
the way that the terrorist is made to speak his motive. The same 
caveat about the fluidity addressed in section 6.2.1 applies. 
Before we dive into the TCA, a few more remarks on the context are 
needed. The incident this case relates to takes place in the special law 
vacuum between the repeal of TADA in 1995 and the introduction of 
POTA in 2001. It is therefore a case of regular criminal law, taking 
place in a regular Court of Session. Nevertheless the actors, including 
the judges, talk about the accused as terrorist despite this not being a 
legal category in India at the time. This also applied to the first case 
study, but we have moved back in time another three years and 
therefore are faced with the lateral influence of another legal regime. 
The Terrorist And Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), despite being 
repealed, haunts the case. Its linguistic categories influence the way 
that the prosecution structures its arguments and in the way in which 
the judge formulates his opinion of them. If we reverse Latour’s 
words “if an actor makes no difference, it’s not an actor,” we have to 
conclude that TADA despite being repealed remains an actor in this 
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case (Latour 2007, 130). As such the Aftab case study illustrates the 
working of the TCA in stabilising Aftab as a terrorist using a variety 
of likely and unlikely actants. The stabilisation process takes the 
following route:  
a) a point-to-point connection is 
being established, which is 
physically traceable and thus can 
be recorded empirically; 
b) such a connection leaves empty 
most of what is not connected 
[…] 
c) this connection is not made for 
free, it requires effort […] 
(Latour 2007, 132). 
Latour adds a fourth category, which we will encounter below. In the 
process of this stabilisation we can observe many of the same, 
ordinary and mundane processes of translation that we encountered 
in the previous chapter. In a TCA the point-to-point connection is 
usually one of connecting a pre-existing body of text to an 
insignificant event, which we discussed before as a vinculum. For 
example, in the Nasir TCA the bullets found on scene are connected 
to an AK47 and this AK47 is in turn both connected to the accused 
and to the legal category of prohibited weapon. This vinculum 
becomes a link in the chain of reference recorded in the trial record. 
The inscription also makes it able to travel. Nonetheless, this leaves 
an empty field of virtual possibilities, the ‘not’-connections. In the 
realm of counterfactuals there are unlimited potential connections 
and it is only with the benefit of hindsight that the connections that 
are being made appear obvious. In the working this is not effortless, 
to not only make the vincula, but also inscribe the chain of reference 
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requires the effort of the TCA actants. For example, the police officer 
who collected the AK47, the ballistic experts who wrote their 
opinion, the prosecution who introduced it, the judge who accepted it 
and Nasir who contributed his capacity to be guilty of using a 
prohibited weapon. In fact affects towards other actants in the TCA 
is a good way of understanding participation in the assemblage. 
As we have seen above, interactions in the TCA take the form of 
translations and enrolments. The first crucial one is the initial 
translation of an actant on course to assemble the TCA. With 
hindsight this may appear like a chicken and egg moment, as it is at 
this point that the TCA begins to assemble. However, this is only so 
because each connection made via Latour’s points a) b) and c) is 
initially a precarious connection. Before it is stabilised it could fail, 
and many connections, which are not stabilised successfully, do fail. 
Since we are looking with hindsight at TCA’s which have been 
successfully stabilised (as TCA’s) both our case studies suffer from 
selection bias making this precarious nature of the initial translation 
invisible. Furthermore one of the most interesting processes in the 
TCA is that as a part of its stabilisation and inscription the very 
precarious nature of the processes in the TCA is naturalised and 
concealed. The crafted nature of the chain of reference gives way to 
facts which are made to speak for themselves. Ultimately the TCA 
produces artefacts, which are then inscribed into legal facts capable of 
traveling and connecting to other legal facts. 
The purpose of this case study is to illustrate the working of a TCA in 
a considerably more complex case than the Nasir TCA. It also 
underlines that while each TCA is unique, the difference between 
Aftab’s pre-9/11 TCA and Nasir’s post-9/11 TCA are not as great as 
we might expect. The Aftab TCA is pre-9/11 as its legal regime and 
background all come from the 90’s. We need to acknowledge that 
since the initial judgment was only handed down in 2004, 9/11 and 
the, for India, equally important parliament attack on 13/12 occurred 
about halfway through the proceedings. Nevertheless, the legal 
framework brought into tension with this TCA is not yet shaped by 
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the Global War on Terror, even if its interpretation might be.238 The 
processes taking place at the ground level of making a terrorist are 
just as ordinary as the ones taking place in any other trial but the 
repercussions are significant. A terrorist can be stabilised even in the 
absence of specialised laws. It also further illustrates how the moment 
of terror during the incidents travels and is connected to other 
moments of terror to map terrorism. In order for it to travel it needs 
to be translated and inscribed into a mediator, such as the judgment, 
which allows it to be transported. This is the second crucial 
translation. The third crucial translation is that of retracing the 
network as part of this account and to inscribe it into this inquiry. 
The chapter therefore proceeds with six more sections, first 
introducing the Aftab TCA specifically, then working backwards 
from the Incident. Our focus then turns to the translation and the 
inbuilt betrayals. Before section 7.7 concludes I propose an 
understanding of the judgments as mediators. 
7.2 Introduction to the Aftab TCA 
Much like the Nasir TCA, the Aftab TCA takes place in the 
aftermath of a terrifying incident, or rather in this case a series of 
incidents. As with the Nasir TCA the narrative of what happened is 
powerful but by no means uncontested or entirely coherent. Gaps in 
the chain of reference and occasional acceleration of the slow passage 
of law underscore the working of the TCA. Most importantly, and 
again this resonates with the previous chapter, we cannot take the 
narrative for granted. Rather we have to work backwards starting 
with the relatively stable account emerging from the inscriptions. 
Then we can move onto ever more precarious territory as we retrace 
the circulations. In tracing these circulations that make up the TCA 
we re-encounter the precariousness that has so successfully been 
                                                
238 The American led Global War On Terror following 
9/11 has had a profound impact of what is considered 
acceptable in democratic states fighting terrorism. 
From military tribunals in Guantanamo, to 
extraordinary rendition and torture memos the way 
that security assemblage and legal assemblage interact 
has been influenced. 
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concealed in the final inscription. By now the conundrum of 
recounting the story of an incident in order to gain access to the 
making of that very story is a familiar one. Nevertheless it is 
important to keep in mind that the overview of the incidents 
provided below is inextricably linked to the working of the TCA and 
needs to be regarded as an artefact of the interactions in the 
assemblage rather than as the source of the assemblage. The 
judgment and the coherent chain of reference which articulates 
terrorist facts to speak for themselves is a product of processes of 
translation, stabilisation and inscription. 
7.3 The Incidents – Working Backward 
The Aftab TCA is significantly more complex than the Nasir TCA. 
This complexity plays out in two ways. Firstly there is not one 
incident which then works its way backwards and forwards, there are 
six explosions. Secondly there are many more actants that play 
transient roles in the TCA. This leads to actors, for example the lead 
investigators of each individual blast, to show up briefly, leave a few 
traces and disappear again as the cases are consolidated. But the 
movement from perplexing complexity to articulate coherence is 
something that we can observe in this case as well. Additionally the 
chain of reference which articulates Aftab as terrorist makes him 
speak the motive for his actions through a laborious detour which 
stands in contrast to the shortcuts which are inbuilt.  
7.3.1 The Judgment 
On the 29/06/2004 and on the 09/07/2004 the Hon’ble Judge Shri 
Achliya delivered his judgment in the sessions cases Nos 643/1998, 
643-A/1998 (i.e. 160/2000) and sessions case no. 1135/1998. The 
inscribed narrative of the incidents emerges by working our way 
through the judgment. While this narrative is the final translation of 
the TCA (at least for the Court of Sessions, before traveling to the 
High Court and Supreme Court), it is the first step for our inquiry 
into the Aftab TCA. From the judgment we can work our way to 
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retracing the assemblage that made it arise and the inscription that 
stabilised Aftab as a terrorist. 
The terrifying incidents were six explosions in the city of Mumbai:  
1 28/08/1997 Jama Masjid 
2 23/01/1998 Kanjumarg / Vikroli 
3 24/01/1998 Goregaon / Malad 
4 27/02/1998 Golibar, Santacruz 
5 27/02/1998 Kandivali 
6 27/02/1998 Virar 
 
Spread out over several months, the explosions are divided into three 
episodes. The first isolated explosion at the Jama Masjid half a year 
before the next two blasts. The final three explosions took place 
within a day and one month after the previous two. Let us go 
through the incidents chronologically. The interweaving of the 
investigation and narrative of six incidents adds a layer of complexity 
not present in the Nasir TCA. Therefore each blast has its own 
subsection. 
7.3.2 Jama Masjid Blast 
On the 28/08/1997 a bomb blast occurred at the Jama Masjid, a 
mosque in Mumbai. The explosion occurred in the latrine of the 
mosque and caused no loss of life, minimal property damage and only 
minor injuries to one person. Following the explosion, the police’s 
Bomb Detection and Diffusing Squad deposed of one additional live 
bomb and a few detonators. The two police officers in charge, PI Ajit 
Deshmukh (PW 35) and PSI Shengle (PW 15), drew up a Panchnama 
for the evidence collected.239  They also took the statement of one Mr 
Deepak Seth (PW 6; The mosque’s janitor). But no inroads were 
                                                
239 The Panchnama is a safeguard in Indian procedural 
law that requires the police to collect the signatures of 
five (Panch means five and nam means name) 
independent witnesses on scene when taking in 
evidence to prevent its fabrication or the claim that its 
fabricated in court. While not enshrined in law itself it 
is considered to emanate from Sections 100 and 174 of 
the CrPC which govern police reports. 
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made into solving the case and it was eventually handed over to DCB 
CID, no date for the handing over is provided in the files of the case 
or the court. At the time the case was not considered high priority as 
the only injury was done to the person fiddling with the bomb, who 
the police presumed to be the bomb maker. Initially, this bomb 
explosion was not dealt with as terrorism, and only upon becoming 
tied in with the other five cases did it gain relevance for establishing 
the conspiracy over time which is an essential vinculum. 
7.3.3 Kanjumarg / Vikroli Blast 
Around 4 months later, on the 23/1/1998, another bomb exploded 
in Mumbai, this time on the railway track between Kanjurmarg and 
Vikroli stations. Initially this case was investigated by PSI Hanumant 
Chavan (PW 36) who later handed it over to PI Sangle. 
Unfortunately, PI Sangle could not be deposed in court as he passed 
away in December 2000. An important vinculum emerges when the 
investigators cause a chemical analysis of evidence to be undertaken. 
According to the prosecution, the analysis confirmed that Potassium 
Nitrite, Sulphate and Sulphate constituents were found on the scene 
(Exh. 178). In the absence of an expert the Prosecution argues that 
this is the expected finding after a gunpowder explosion has taken 
place. During my participant observation it became evident that 
contrary to expected practice, the court never cross-examined any 
representative of the chemical analysis laboratory to confirm their 
findings. The speculation amongst the lawyers in the office where I 
was a participant observer at the time was that this was due to a lack 
of active involvement of the defence attorneys in the Sessions Court 
trial. To the great frustration of the lawyers at Ms Nitya 
Ramakrishna’s chambers, such a passive behaviour by defence 
attorneys at the lowest level isn’t rare. In a parallel to the mechanism 
identified by Scheffer non-action at the lowest court prevents the 
appeals lawyers from making a strong case about evidence. (Scheffer, 
Hannken-Illjes, and Kozin 2007) The result of the way the procedural 
blueprint is set up for the courts is that once the findings have been 
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translated, stabilized and inscribed in the TCA it becomes very 
difficult to destabilize them again. 
7.3.4 Goregaon / Malad Blast 
One day after the explosion on the Kanjurmarg-Vikroli rail track, 
another explosion occurred on the railway tracks between Goregaon 
and Malad. This explosion caused damage to property, bending an 
electric pole and breaking the windowpane of a carriage, and a 
number of injuries to both the driver and passengers. Head Constable 
Devrao Sukale (PW 29) was the first officer on the scene and carried 
out the initial investigation. Subsequently the early investigation was 
taken over by PSI Ramakrishna Dhole (PW 14) who drew up a 
Panchnama with respect to the collected evidence and filed the 
offence as crime no. 31 of 1998 against Sections 3 & 4 of the 
Explosive Substances Act and under 151, 153 Indian Railways Act as 
well as Sections 437 and 337 of the IPC. PI Digambar Tajwe (PW 39) 
undertook the follow up investigation and visited the scene on the 
25th January. Satisfied that the explosion had occurred on account of a 
bomb, he recorded PSI Dhole’s statement and treated it as the FIR 
(Exh. 59). He also added section 5 of the explosive substances act 
and sections 437 and 337 of the IPC read together with section 34.240 
The investigation at this stage was undertaken in fragments with a lot 
of interchange of police personnel who each add to the layers and the 
complexity of the case. 
In the evening of that same day the statement of Bharat Palkar (PW 
7) was recorded, including a description of four persons. Palkar’s 
statement, his ability to identify the accused and his cross-
examination regarding the statement was relied upon by both 
Sessions and High Court. Additional statements were taken, but they 
                                                
240  Section five of the Explosive Substances Act 
prohibits the making or storing of explosives under 
suspicious circumstances. Whereas Section 437 of the 
IPC relates to mischief with intent to destroy or make 
unsafe a decked vessel; and Section 337 IPC relates to 
causing hurt by an act endangering life or personal 
safety; ultimately Section 34 IPC describes it as an act 
done by several persons in furtherance of a common 
objective. 
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were neither added to the evidence nor were their authors produced 
as witnesses in court. The selective translation, stabilization and 
inscription of the connection made through Bharat may have seemed 
obvious as a tactical choice to the prosecution. But it also means that 
other virtual connections go untranslated, unstabilised and 
uninscribed. The specific connection that contributes to the 
stabilization of Aftab and his co-accused as terrorist is selected by the 
prosecution and is the only one recorded. 
The discretionary nature of creating vincula that contribute to the 
stabilization is further illustrated in the way that expert reports are 
commissioned. The investigators ordered a chemical analysis of 
property and of blood found on the railway tracks. The blood at the 
Goregaon blast site, that most likely came from a victim was analysed 
by forensics. Whereas the blood found in the Jama Masjid, which was 
the blood of a potential suspect was not analysed. This illustrates the 
low priority with which the Jama Masjid blast was treated initially and 
in isolation. The chemical analysis was once more introduced to the 
court by the prosecution rather than the expert.  
Finally, following the arrest of 8 suspects by the DCB CID the 
Goregaon blast investigation was handed over to the DCB CID Unit 
Nr. VIII, on the 28/03/1998 in order to be linked with the other 
cases under their investigation. Linking all the explosions as a series 
of attacks, rather than isolated incidents strengthens the translation of 
these blasts as a terrorist conspiracy. 
7.3.5 Golibar / Santacruz Blast 
The first explosion causing fatalities occurred on the 27/2/1998 near 
the Bhura Qureshi Chawl in the Mumbai area of Santacruz. However, 
while this deadly blast was more severe than many of the others, later 
on during the trial the prosecution maintained that this was not an 
intentional part of the terrorist conspiracy.  Rather the prosecution 
presented it as an accidental explosion due to the tripping and falling 
of one of the suspects. 241  PI Ravindra Patkar (PW 43) initially 
investigated the explosion and on arrival found police from a 
                                                
241 P.15 Session’s Court Judgment. 
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different station at the scene. When the bomb squad was called, one 
further bomb was discovered and disposed of. It transpired from a 
statement made by an eye witness named Smt. Ahmedi Begam, that 
one person identified as Ashfaque was carrying a bomb and was 
severely injured on the scene when he tripped and fell causing the 
bomb to fall and explode. He was taken to hospital. According to the 
prosecution, a suspicion already fell at that moment on Ashfaque’s 
brother Aftab who would later be the main accused in the trial. It is 
unclear where this suspicion arose and whether besides general 
fraternal ties there is any additional basis to it. 
On the following day (28/2/1998), after filing of a FIR (Exh. 167) 
under sections 302, 307, 326, 427 read with section 34 of the IPC and 
Sections 4 and 5 of the Indian Explosive Substances Act, the 
investigation was handed over to DCB CID, Unit No. VIII. The 
investigating officer from DCB CID proceeded to interrogate 
Ashfaque immediately, who was recovering in Hospital from the 
massive injuries sustained on the previous day during the explosion. 
In addition to general trauma, he had lost both legs, one hand and an 
eye in the blast. According to the police, he cooperated and in return 
for a conditional pardon made a full confession/disclosure of facts 
incriminating both his brother and Pakistan’s ISI. A magistrate 
granted him approver status and issued a conditional pardon. The 
interrogation also led the police to search the house of Ashfaque’s 
brother Aftab (Accused No. 1) where chemicals were recovered. 
According to another (non-introduced) chemical analysis, these 
chemicals were of the same chemical properties as the explosive 
residues found on the scene, essentially gun powder.242 The vincula 
being created between stored chemical formulae and the matter 
found on the scene are a necessary detour to establish connection 
between the matter found in one place and matter found in another. 
Following the slow paced investigation into the first three blasts, 
things now take off. In summary the chronology of events: Ashfaque 
                                                
242 (Seizure memo Exh. 115 and referral to C.A. Exh 
198 and report Exh. 173). 
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trips in the market at around 1330 on the 27.2 he looses both legs as 
well as a hand in the blast which costs two other lives but does not 
cause the second live bomb on scene to explode. He is then taken to 
the Nair Hospital where he undergoes surgery including the 
amputation of the mangled limbs. On the following morning the case 
is handed over to DCB CID who immediately proceed to interrogate 
him in hospital. Just about 24 hours after the explosion the house of 
his brother is searched and the recovery of the white liquid and 
powder made which in subsequent chemical analysis is shown to be 
similar to recovered bomb materials. This recovery creates a 
procedural inroad for other evidence gathered contrary to procedural 
safeguards. For instance in the court records there is no indication 
that questions were raised at this stage about the confession of 
Ashphaque. Made within 24 hours of a triple amputation, arguments 
could have been made about the impact of shock, pain and 
anaesthetics on his capacity to make a reasoned confession. 
Nevertheless this is the first breakthrough with the investigation. The 
recovery of potential bomb materials has for now completely silenced 
any discussion surrounding the validity of the confession. For the 
first time the police actually have a suspect, Nasir. 
7.3.6 Kandivali Blast 
The fifth explosion occurred on 27/2/1998, at the Kandivali Railway 
Station. PI Tajwe (PW39) investigated this particular case. This blast 
cost one life, that of Mahendra Poonamchand Sanghvi, as well as 
causing a number of injuries and insignificant property damages. A 
crime was registered under 302, 307, 326, 325, 324, 427, 120-B of the 
IPC as well as 3, 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and Section 
151(1) and (2) of the Indian Railways Act. The FIR (Exh. 127) was 
also filed. While the High Court acquiesces that PI Tajwe was 
unsuccessful in his investigation, it also takes note of a Test 
Identification Parade undertaken by him with respect to the crime.243 
                                                
243 Test Identification Parades are essentially governed 
by section 162 of the CrPC – statements made to the 
police. This means that they are not generally to be 
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However, the results of the TIP are not further discussed in the 
judgment. 
7.3.7 Virar Blast 
The final explosion occurred on 27/2/1998 on the platform at Virar 
(West). PI Hemraj Choudhary (PW 41) was in charge of the initial 
investigation. It caused the death of one person, Sabestian Mendis. 
When the police officer arrived at the scene, he discovered that one 
body was lying amidst some debris. Some evidence was collected and 
the body dispatched to the Rural Hospital for a post mortem 
examination. PI Choudhary lodged a report that a crime had been 
committed by an unknown person under Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Indian Explosive Substances Act, under Sections 336, 304, 120-B of 
the IPC as well as Section 37(1) read with Section 135 of the Bombay 
Police Act. PI Choudhary proceeded to record witness statements, 
including the statement of one Kishore Shetty (PW 32). The identity 
of the deceased was established as Sabestian Mendis [sic], and his 
house was searched but nothing incriminating was found. It is at this 
stage on the 28/02/1998 that DCB CID became involved and that 
PI Choudhary learned that there had been arrests made in similar 
cases. Subsequently a Test Identification Parade was held at Arthur 
Road Jail and investigation was transferred to DCB CID, Unit Nr. 
VIII, which also submitted the charge sheet. The result of the TIP 
was not recorded, or at least its record did not make it into the case 
file. 
The character of Sebastian Mendis was rather puzzling. His 
appearance and role at the scene is not used for any connections, 
except to explain his own death as a casualty of the bomb – that is 
later attributed to the conspiracy between Aftab and co. According to 
the story presented by the prosecution based on the statement of 
Kishore, Shetty Sabestian died accidentally. In contrast to the barely 
alive Ashphaque, no attempt was made to explore Sabestian’s role 
                                                                                                         
used as evidence. For a discussion of their 
admissibility and evidentiary value see for example 
Amitsingh Bhikamsing Thakur vs. The State of 
Maharashtra (2007) 2 SCC 310.  
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any further. He died in the bomb explosion of a bomb he was 
carrying. Eye witnesses suggested that he was carrying the bomb in a 
back pack but no attempt was made by the police to link him to the 
conspiracy. There were two practical theories circulating in the office 
at the time of my fieldwork.  Firstly, that this was because there was 
no need/point in prosecuting him as he died on the scene. Secondly, 
this could be because there was some evidence suggesting his 
innocence. Another more conspiratorial theory leaves it as an open 
question: whether it is his Christian background that caused Sebastian 
Mendis not to fit with the overall conspiratorial framework. 
Before we turn our attention to the translation of the incidents and 
the making of legal connections, let me re-emphasize the complexity 
and heterogeneous nature of the Aftab TCA as we have encountered 
it from the case study so far. In contrast to the Nasir case study this 
one has a large number of moving parts. For six incidents taking 
place over an 8 month period, there are over ten investigating officers 
before all six cases are joined and handed over to unit VIII of the 
DCB CID. In this process connections are made, such as the one 
between Aftab and his brother Ashphaque. Others are unmade, such 
as the one between Ashphaque and the conspiracy, through his 
approver status. Yet more connections are never traced, such as the 
one between Sabestian and the conspiracy. Finally some connections 
are stabilized just long enough to allow for another connection to be 
made before falling apart. An example of this is the confessional 
statement of Ashphaque, later retracted, which incriminates his 
brother and the ISI. According to the prosecution this led to the 
recovery of the off-white liquid from Aftab’s flat. We are therefore 
presented with a multifaceted picture out of which some persons 
emerge as terrorists whereas others fade into the background. 
Following the laying out of the legal categories to which elements are 
connected we will focus on the IPC, the Indian Railways Act, The 
Prevention of Damages to Public Property Act and the Ghost of 
TADA.  
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7.4 Translations, Laws and Legal Categories 
The events are connected with a number of legal categories through 
carefully crafted vincula which allow the chain or reference to 
articulate terrorist facts. Some of these connections and translations 
are very similar to the ones encountered in the Nasir TCA, others are 
slightly different. Again it is important to note that there is no special 
counter terrorism legislation in use in this case study. The terrorist is 
made to by a chain of reference which detours via crimes under the 
Indian Penal Code, Railways Act and the Prevention of Damages and 
the Public Property Act. The pivotal legal machine connected to 
make the terrorist facts speak for themselves is conspiracy. 
7.4.1 The Indian Penal Code 
The provision 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) which relates to 
the crime of conspiracy was introduced at length in the previous case 
study. Just as a brief reminder, 120-B makes membership in a 
conspiracy to commit an offence punishable in the same manner as if 
the accused had abetted the said offence. Additionally Aftab and the 
other accused are charged with an array of other charges under the 
IPC. While it is the conspiracy charge that contributes most strongly 
to the terrorist stabilisation, the other charges contribute to stabilising 
the effects of the blasts as attributable to the conspirators, 
strengthening other vincula and solidifying the chain of reference. 
The first section used is murder under 302 of the IPC.244 The second 
section is 304 of the IPC, culpable homicide.245 This is followed by 
                                                
244  302. Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits 
murder shall be punished with death, or 
1[imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to 
fine. 
245  304. Punishment for culpable homicide not 
amounting to murder.-  Whoever commits culpable 
homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished 
with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either 
description for a term which may extend to ten years, 
and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the 
death is caused is done with the intention of causing 




attempted murder in section 307 of the IPC.246 Additionally section 
326 of the IPC is mentioned, this section makes punishable the 
voluntary causing of grievous hurt by dangerous weapon or means.247 
This is followed by the slightly less severe version in section 324 of 
the IPC.248 The final section of the IPC that is connected relates to 
causing mischief by fire or explosive substance in section 435.249 All 
                                                
246  307. Attempt to murder.- Whoever does any act 
with such intention or knowledge, and under such 
circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he 
would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which 
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to 
fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, 
the offender shall be liable to imprisonment for life, 
or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. 
 
247 326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous 
weapons or means – whoever, except in the case 
provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes 
grievous hurt by means of any instrument for 
shooting, stabbing or cutting, or by means of fire or 
heated substance, or by means of any poison or any 
corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive 
substance, or by means of any substance which it is 
deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, 
or to receive into the blood, or by menas of any 
animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, 
or with imprisonment of either description for a term 
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable 
to fine. 
 
248 324 Voluntary causing hurt by dangerous weapons 
or means. – Whoever, except in the case provided for 
by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of 
any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or 
any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is 
l ikely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated 
substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive 
substance, or by means of any explosive substance or 
by means of any substance which it is deleterious to 
the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive 
into the blood or by means of any animal, shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or 
with both. 
 
249 435. Mischief by fire or explosive substance with 
intent to cause damage to amount of one hundred or 
(in case of agricultural produce) ten rupees. – whoever 
commits mischief by fire or any explosive substance 
intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he 
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these offences which translate the violent magnitude of the incidents 
into legal categories of crime are read with the conspiracy charge. 
7.4.2 The Indian Railways Act 
The prosecution narrative aims at establishing infrastructure and the 
Indian public as the main targets of a terrorist attack. Those blasts 
that took place near the railways are additionally highlighted through 
the use of the Indian Railways Act of 1989. Sections 150 which 
criminalises acts in relations to railways that intentionally cause harm 
or death and 151 which aims at property damages are read in 
combination with 120B of the IPC to tie those to the conspiracy as 
well. 250 This adds another potential avenue to call for the death 
                                                                                                         
will thereby cause, damage to any property to the 
amount of one hundred rupees or upwards or (where 
the property is agricultural produce) ten rupees or 
upwards, shall be punished with imprisonment of 
either description for a term which may extend to 
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.  
250 150(1)Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), 
if any person unlawfully, - 
[…] 
(e) does or causes to be done or attempts to do any 
other act or thing in relation to any railway,  
with intent or with knowledge that he is l ikely to 
endanger the safety of any person travelling on or 
being upon the railway, he shall be punishable with 
imprisonment for life or with rigorous imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to ten years: 
[…] 
(2) If any person unlawfully does any act or thing 
referred to in any of the clauses of sub-section (1) – 
(a) with intent to cause the death of any person and 
the doing of such act or thing causes the death of any 
person; or 
(b) with knowledge that such act or thing is so 
imminently dangerous that it must in all probability 
cause the death of any person or such bodily injury to 
any person as is l ikely to cause the death of such 
person,  
he shall be punishable with death or imprisonment for 
life. 
151 of the Indian Railways Act reads: 
151. (1) If any person, with intent to cause, or 
knowing that he is l ikely to cause damage or 
destruction to any property of a railway refered to in 
sub-section (2), causes by fire, explosive substance or 
otherwise, damage to such property or destruction of 
such property, he shall be punishable with 
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sentence under 150 of the Indian Railways Act but more importantly 
it stabilises the incidents as targeted at critical infrastructure. 
7.4.3 The Prevention of Damages to Public Property Act and 
the Foreigner’s Act 
Two other Acts play a role in the Aftab TCA. Their role is important 
although they seem thrown in almost as an afterthought to the 
framing of charges. The first is Section 4 of Prevention of Damages 
to Public Property Act (1984).251 This reinforces the public as the 
target of these incidents. The second is connected only with  accused 
No. 9 Javed Gulam Hussain Shah but is crucial in stabilising the link 
to Pakistan. Section 14 of the Foreigner’s Act (1946) prohibits the 
overstaying of those on a visa and criminalises any action in 
contravention of the conditions of the visa. The inclusion of this, 
even though it is only linked with one of the accused reinforces the 
international nature of the conspiracy. More explicitly it allows the 
prosecution to repeatedly paint the terrorist attack as having a strong 
link to Pakistan. 
7.4.4 The Ghost of TADA 
With the crimes taking place in 1997 and 1998, the law applicable to 
this trial falls into the time period without an applicable law against 
terrorism specifically. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities 
(Prevention) Act (TADA) lapsed in 1995, and while the Indian Law 
Commission soon submitted a draft replacement, it sat on a desk 
until shortly after the dramatic attacks on the World Trade Centre in 
New York and Parliament in Delhi in 2001. The short succession of 
                                                                                                         
imprisonment for a term which may extend to five 
years, or with fine, or with both. 
 
251 4. Mischief causing damage to public property by 
fire or explosive substance. – Whoever commits an 
offence under sub-section  
(1) or sub-section (2) of section 3 by fire or explosive 
substance shall be punished with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 
one year, but which may extend ot ten years and with 
fine: provided that the court may, for special reasons 
to be recorded in its judgment, award a sentence of 
imprisonment for a term less than one year. 
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first 9/11 and then 13/12 facilitated the passing of the Prevention of 
Terrorism Ordinance into law in a joint sitting of parliament on the 
26th of March 2002 (Venkatesan 2002). However, the laws applicable 
to this trial, are only the ones applicable under normal criminal 
jurisdiction; i.e. a combination of the Indian Penal Code and Railways 
Act as seen above. This oddity further calls into question the need for 
specialized legislation. An idea often put forward by the defenders of 
that need is that criminal law is too lenient on the accused and too 
tough on the investigating agency/police to achieve convictions in 
terrorism cases. In this particular TCA, not only is the court very 
lenient on the lapses of the prosecution to follow the letter of the 
law, but also the language of the court remains influenced by the 
categories of TADA. The provisions of TADA are inapplicable. And 
the court does not try to apply the stringent reversal of the onus of 
proof, the police confessions and the other procedural differences 
from the IPC found in TADA. However, judicial discretion and 
judicial application of mind play a considerable role in the particular 
arrangement of connections in the TCA. If the Judge uses language 
lifted from TADA to arrange certain connections, this allows TADA 
to continue playing a role in ordering the TCA. The use of TADA-
influenced categories by the judge in his judgment, such as the 
reference to terrorist and disruptive activities in paragraph two of the 
Session Court judgment, is indicative of the lingering effect of special 
laws, even if repealed. Compared to the process and practice of 
adjudication in the TCA, the changes in the rules of procedure are 
generally of a somewhat abstract and distant character. Therefore 
even as the judge continues to phrase things in categories taken over 
from TADA the amended laws of procedure are followed in their 
letter if not their spirit. The language used by the court to categorize 
the offences committed in the TCA is not one of the categories in the 
Indian Penal Code (IPC) or Railways Act listed above, but rather one 
of the categories found in TADA. There are three instances in the 
Sessions Court judgment where terrorist and disruptive activities 
appear in the same sentence to describe offences committed by the 
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accused. 252  Neither disruptive activities nor terrorist activities are 
categories of offences under the general laws that do find explicit 
application. 
It is in this context that the important role of the Sessions Court is 
most evident. While the High Court and the Supreme Court both 
have the authority to re-appraise evidence, this is in practice very 
rarely done. Usually the evidence passed upwards from the Sessions 
Courts is accepted as collected in accordance with procedure. This 
creates a flow in which the inscribed connections, judgments, 
percolate up through the courts in a sequence of translations, as we 
have seen in the example of the AK47 and its travels in section 6.3. 
Information and evidence collected and initially translated by the 
Sessions Judge is inscribed into the judgment, which then acts as a 
mediator for subsequent translations. This shapes the range of 
information and plausible avenues of translation available for 
adjudication in all subsequent discussions. But as we have seen in this 
case, if the Sessions Court continues to operate with a mind set 
shaped by a repealed law, TADA in this case, then this shapes what 
translations are inscribed into evidence. That the translations and 
inscriptions effectuated at the Sessions Court are so difficult to 
reopen at the High Court and Supreme Court accentuates the risk 
emanating from the tension between translation and betrayal 
(trahison). The chain of reference inscribed in the judgment powerfully 
articulates the terrorist to make the facts speak for themselves. 
7.5 Traduction/Trahison 
The translations in section IV that focused on the connections 
between the incident and the pre-existing legal assemblage. In this 
section the focus shifts to three instances where the stabilisations are 
particularly apparent and a the modality of slow and deliberate law 
clashes with the modality of fast and prehensile security. The first 
section looks at the stabilisation that is narrated as the breakthrough 
in the investigation. The second section turns to the role of one 
                                                
252 Paragraphs 2, 110 and 200 of the Aftab Sessions 
Court judgment. 
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particular witness in making the terrorists speak their motive that is 
so crucial to both conspiracy stabilisation and terrorism. Finally the 
third section turns to the way in which Test Identification Parades 
(TIPs) are used to make connections but how the expected slow 
process is often supplanted by a shortcut. 
7.5.1 The Breakthrough – Accidents, Approver and Recovery 
The initial case of the prosecution is built on the statement made by 
Ashfaque Sayyed Khan (Ashfaque), the brother of the primary 
accused Aftab Sayyed Khan (Aftab). The prosecution connects this 
statement to allow them to seemingly make events speak for 
themselves. Ashfaque and two others were walking with their bombs 
when Ashfaque tripped over a pipe and fell. The bomb he was 
carrying in a shoulder bag, hit the ground and exploded, killing two 
bystanders and causing him severe injuries. His two co-conspirators 
were unhurt, and one dropped his bomb and both ran away. This was 
alleged to have happened on the 27th of February. When the police 
arrived on the scene, a Panchnama253 was drawn up and Ashphaque 
was taken to hospital. The bomb remaining on scene was defused 
and taken by a bomb disposal squad. On the day after, presumably 
only hours after Ashphaque had undergone major surgery, including 
the amputation of both of his legs, as well as other major injuries, the 
Police Officer in charge of the investigation at this stage interrogated 
him. At this point it is recorded that the investigating officer learned 
that Ashphaque was willing to become an approver. An approver is a 
member of a conspiracy who receives a conditional judicial pardon in 
return for their deposition in court. 
On this day Ashphaque shared the full extent of the conspiracy with 
the investigating officer. Stating that as a result of earlier anti-Muslim 
riots in which the mother of one of the accused had been killed and 
another of the accused lost his taxi they were singled out by agents of 
the Pakistani ISI and radicalized. In a trial run with a home made 
                                                
253  A panchnama is a piece of paper on which the 
police have to get five citizen signatures for their 
taking of evidence. It is a mechanism to prevent the 
manufacturing of evidence. 
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explosive device in 1997, one member of the conspiracy had been 
severely injured when an explosion was triggered when they 
attempted to fit the timer to the bomb in the toilet of the Jama 
Masjid. Following this failed attempt and with support from two or 
three mysterious individuals from Pakistan, a series of bomb blasts 
was planned for the following year, with the aim of causing maximum 
disruption through the targeting of the railway lines. According to the 
investigating officer, Ashfaque stated this and implicated another 12 
individuals, including his brother Aftab (Accused No. 1), in the 
conspiracy. Following this lead the police went to Aftab’s house and 
recovered some yellow/white liquid and some white powder. 
According to the chemical analysis undertaken later, these were 
components for gunpowder and could have been, although not 
conclusively, the components of the bombs used in the blasts.  
So far the prosecution story of what Ashfaque allegedly said. 
However none of this would have been technically admissible in 
court because Ashfaque revoked his confession. Once out of police 
custody and in judicial custody he withdrew his confession losing his 
conditional pardon and being tried in a separate case (643-B of 1998).  
As a result, the validity of Ashfaque’s testimony becomes 
questionable. However even inadmissible confessions can be used if 
they led to a recovery. For example if an accused makes a confession 
which leads to the recovery of the murder weapon the part of the 
confession relating to that recovery is admissible in Court even if 
procedure was not followed in obtaining it. In the case of Ashfaque 
however the key narrative provided by him is not supported by 
substantial other facts. Apart from the findings at his brother’s house, 
the implication of the other 12 individuals has only a very tenuous 
basis as without the confession it rests solely on Sanjay’s testimony 
which we will encounter below. However the court does not allow 
this to destabilize the choreography of the TCA. The chain of 
reference is maintained functional by short-circuiting the detour 
expected from the slow passage of law into a shortcut that connects 
event and person without stable vincula to a body of texts. 
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The confession contains the only concrete trace of ISI involvement 
in the incident. The Pakistan angle is of continuous relevance in the 
narrative of the case and crucial to the stabilization of the accused as 
terrorist. However the evidentiary value of the confession was 
questionable even before its retraction. It was made in a state of 
absolute vulnerability, without a lawyer (which is not unusual in 
India). Only 24 hours after losing his legs in an explosion, being in 
hospital presumably shortly after undergoing major surgery, under 
medication, it is hard to imagine a more vulnerable and less reliable 
state. In practice the retracted confession has an afterlife that makes 
its influence tenacious. While the parts of the confession not relating 
to the recovery have no further legal validity in court, the narrative of 
Pakistan’s involvement continues to form a stabilised pillar on which 
the prosecution and the judge rely extensively. The judgment 
continues to take Pakistan’s involvement for granted although there 
is no evidence outside of this confession. However because the 
confession is not technically admissible, there is no cross-examination 
of Ashphaque, and not even a critical discussion of the validity of this 
piece of evidence. The confession remains a stable anchoring point 
for other stabilisations while not being admissible itself. This gives it 
a status outside of technical legality, making it immune to 
destabilizing efforts of the defence causing the discussion around it to 
be extremely limited. Despite the lack of technical legal connection to 
the TCA, the narrative remains as the scaffold for the other 
stabilizing efforts of the prosecution. The retraced confession is a 
powerful stabilizing tool for the choreography of Aftab as terrorist. 
7.5.2 The Witnesses and the Motive – Star Witness Sanjay and 
the Suspicious Meeting 
Witness testimony constitutes the bulk of the evidence presented at 
the Trial Court. They are therefore also the primary mechanism by 
which the terrorist facts are articulated in the chain of reference. 
Vincula are created which connect the event of a person speaking 
before the court to bodies of texts. These small chains of reference 
which have to pass through trials of strength in court, incorporated 
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into the larger chain of reference which articulates the terrorist fact 
through he TCA. As we saw above, the role of the Trial Court in the 
initial translation of the case is pivotal. The interaction between the 
witnesses and the court is of particular importance, as it is the process 
in which the vincula are crafted that tie a layperson’s statement into 
the TCA and into the chain of reference. 
Contrary to my expectations my experience in India indicated that the 
witness statement is rarely taken down verbatim and that at the very 
least pauses, grammatical incongruences and aborted sentences are 
edited out. Rather, as observed on different occasions at the lower 
courts during my fieldwork, the witness tells a story usually in the 
language they feel most comfortable in, and the judge simultaneously 
translates that story for the record. However, this process of 
translation does not take place in isolation. The witness recounts their 
story in for example Marathi and the Judge dictates his English 
translation of what is being said to the court scribe who inscribes it 
into the record. At the same time both the prosecution and the 
defence are arguing with the judge about some key words in the 
translation. This prompts the witness to repeat himself or herself in a 
slightly different manner, or encourages the judge to pose a question 
to the witness.254 In addition to the cacophony of voices playing into 
the translation, the court scribe also plays a pivotal role with a 
number of transcription errors. Finally, the level of trust extended to 
individual witnesses ends up being a discretionary decision of the 
judge. 
In the Aftab TCA, the decidision making aspect of the court was 
structured into two separate tasks. Firstly, the Court needed to decide 
whether or not an offence actually took place. Secondly it needed to 
determine if the accused brought to the Court are the ones who 
committed it beyond reasonable doubt. It is usually the role of 
magistrates to weed out cases where no criminal offence has taken 
                                                
254 A hugely fascinating account of a similar process of 
hashing out evidence is analyzed and brought out by 
Thomas Scheffer in relation to the English crown 
courts. (Scheffer 2007) 
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place before they are brought to court. In this particular case, the 
prosecution directed a lot of the effort at proving that the actual 
incident did take place. It is only once this has been established at 
length that the prosecution turned to proving that the accused 
brought forward are actually the ones who committed the offences. 
This leads to a situation where at face value there are a lot of 
witnesses and a lot of evidence. There are 43 prosecution witnesses in 
total. However, only a small handful of those relate to the connection 
between the incident and the accused. In this particular case, the 
Sessions Court goes into whether or not the offence took place in 
some depth. 
The making of the specific accused into terrorists takes place in only 
three stabilization moves, the most important one of which uses 
Sanjay’s testimony. The majority of the courts work stabilizes a 
particular narrative of the incidents using legal procedures and 
exhaustive proof, the casting of the accused as terrorist is 
comparatively more limited. The making of the TCA is in the 
foreground and the making of the terrorist then becomes what 
emerges out of the TCA. 
The second issue that arose repeatedly during my fieldwork is that of 
‘got up’ witnesses. Which refers to a witness that is not genuine.255 
While I regularly encountered allegations of coaching, fabricating and 
inducing witnesses during my interviews, the court accepts witnesses 
with a great willingness to follow their account at face value, crafting 
it into the chain of reference. It is difficult to critique the court for 
accepting the word of a witness in good faith, as a presumption of 
honesty is just as fundamental to the operation of justice as that of 
innocence. Yet, this stands in contrast to the importance of giving 
credence to the widespread claims about the endemic corruption in 
the prosecution and police. As well as the significant numbers of 
cases where witness coaching and evidence tampering are discovered. 
                                                
255  This is something hugely interesting, all witness 
testimonials are artificial, but somehow the line is 
drawn somewhere and arguments are made over when 
a witness is genuine or not.   
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Ultimately this leaves the decision of whether or not to trust a witness 
in the hands of the Judge who may or may not feel a professional 
obligation of giving witnesses the benefit of the doubt. This of course 
makes the role of the defence attorney even more important, as it 
becomes their obligation to highlight lacunae and to confront the 
judge with potential contradictions and irregularities in the evidence. 
The adversarial system, per default, favours the stabilization efforts of 
the prosecution if the defence is passive.256 A weak defence at the 
lowest court not only contributes to the uncritical acceptance of 
witnesses by the court, but it also helps conceal some significant 
contradictions. Finally, the overall number of witnesses and the 
amount of evidence is unequally distributed between the establishing 
of the legal facts, and the establishing of culpability. There are two 
conjoined problems here. Firstly, evidence is mainly taken at the 
lowest court, which means that when cases move up for appeal very 
little new evidence is taken up by the High Court and the Supreme 
Court extremely rarely looks at anything new. Secondly, it is a fine 
balance between giving the benefit of the doubt to ordinary citizens 
who come in to the court to give evidence and accusing the 
prosecution of manufacturing evidence and witnesses. Ultimately, it is 
quite clear that the prosecution takes the path of least resistance, 
because even if an accused is lucky enough to have a good defence 
lawyer at the Sessions Court level, the traces relating to the incident 
are rarely disputed. This means that for the first year or so of the trial, 
the defence will be coming in, but rarely protesting anything, as the 
prosecution only establishes the incident. 
The laying of the facts and the establishing of the ‘objective’ narrative 
of the incidents is crucial in forming the TCA. The judge accepts the 
prosecution’s word unchallenged, as the defence will only be in 
attendance, without challenging much of what is being put before the 
                                                
256  The adversarial system uses the Judge as an 
independent arbiter between the arguments made by 
two adversarial parties, it is the predominant mode in 
anglo saxon legal systems whereas the inquisitorial 
model, with a proactive judge is better established in 
legal systems influenced by French or German law. 
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bench. This allows the prosecution to set up and stabilize 
connections that have the capacity to interact with the accused. The 
TCA emerges and desires, in the Deleuzian sense, a terrorist. Of 
course there is rarely a point (from the lawyers point of view when 
operating with very limited resources) in challenging the material facts 
of the case. But this procedure, of focusing very lengthily on the facts 
of the case, leads the judge to become a part of the TCA and 
particular circulations becoming territorialised. It is then after months 
of quiet acquiescence to the prosecution story that the defence all of 
a sudden wakes up for the last two or three witnesses and tries to do 
cross examinations. However, the momentum of the TCA favours 
the prosecution and actors are articulated as part of the TCA 
engaging in its maintenance. This is illustrated for example by the 
common practice to concentrate the most strenuous efforts of the 
defence during the cross examination of the witnesses establishing 
the guilt of their clients. All the while, the most strenuous efforts, at 
least in sheer amounts of evidence presented, by the prosecution goes 
into the establishing that bomb blasts did take place. The sequencing 
of the two works as follows. First the prosecution builds up the 
factual basis for the events. This is then in a second step underpinned 
by a few crucial witnesses to establish the link. The weighting seems 
to suggest, if not a prioritisation, then at the very least a difference of 
accessibility of materials. This weighting of the establishing of the 
facts versus the establishing of the responsibility, has a number of 
dimensions. On the one hand, the argument could be made that this 
is merely a coincidental temporal sequencing that leads to the 
majority of the effort being expended in the proving of the 
occurrence. On the other hand, one could argue that since criminals 
are by definition clandestine, it would only be normal that more 
evidence exists of the results of their actions than of the planning and 
conceptional stages of the crime. Without the need to dismiss either 
of these possible explanations, the establishment of the TCA, 
through the focus on the official narrative of the incidents, sets the 
machinery for the making of a terrorist in motion.  
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Therefore as the incident becomes stabilized as terrorism the accused 
are articulated as terrorist almost by extension. Intentionality is not as 
important as the consequences that include the establishing of a 
pattern of circulations. In this pattern the judges routinely subscribe 
to the story presented to them and follow the stabilizing efforts of 
the prosecution along the wide avenue of establishing facts. 
Returning to the issue of witnesses at the trial court we have seen that 
it is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, there is a high chance, 
and regular exposures lead to this conclusion, that corruption is 
widespread and many witnesses are coached, intimidated or fully 
made up, or made a ‘got up witness’ in Indian Court vernacular 
(Verma 1999; Rao 1997; Morrison 1974; Jaffrelot 2002; Fletcher and 
Sarkar 2007). On the other hand, the inherent distrust of the 
population towards the police, the extremely high risk of abuse when 
entering the police station even as a witness coming forward, leads to 
a scenario where very few people would actually volunteer to give 
evidence. In this particular case the depositions of witnesses aimed at 
establishing guilt, as recorded in the statements, were qualitatively 
different from the first batch of fact-establishing witnesses. As there 
also is a socio-economic dimension to this, while the first batch of 
witnesses, those relating to the proof of an actual incident were made 
up exogenously to the police practices and choices, in the sense that 
they were not people that the individual investigating officers would 
decide to bring in for questioning, but that would be made necessary 
to question through the exogenous facts of the case - were generally 
of a more affluent group than the ones brought in at the police’s 
initiative. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make an 
argument that goes beyond the cases at hand, it is possible that this is 
a result of the deeply enshrined distaste for participating in legal 
proceedings exhibited by the upper classes during colonial times 
discussed at length by Singha (Singha 1998). This goes so far that, 
although this is contrary to established procedure, the chemical 
expert who was in charge of the report on the recovered substances, 
was not brought in at all. These occurrences are a function of the 
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police’s role in society, where it is very difficult for them to exert 
influence over those who are well connected, affluent, educated, or in 
other words part of the newly powerful middle class. It is much easier 
for the police to bring in witnesses from an economically depressed 
area (Zoopadpati), not least because witnesses with a lower 
educational background are more likely to be susceptible to the 
police’s arsenal of threats and inducements. Not only are 
professionals better placed to resist being intimidated by the 
machinery of the state, but they are also more likely to successfully 
balk at the erroneous strain involved in participating in any trial 
before a Sessions Court. It is near impossible to exactly schedule the 
time and date of a deposition, and it is more likely than not to be 
changed repeatedly at the last minute causing a number of days of 
work to be missed, even for those who only depose as a witness. This 
is part of the character of the legal system under observation, which 
makes any interaction with it for lay people a tenuous exercise in 
patience and humility.  
Returning to the Aftab TCA, ultimately the conviction and the 
prosecution’s case hinge on the testimony of one key witness. Sanjay 
Chouhan (PW 42) somewhat mysteriously shows up at the last 
minute of the trial and is deposed as the very last prosecution witness. 
He gives a very long and elaborate, although at times ambiguous, 
testimony. The court decides to take his story at face value. The story 
Sanjay puts in front of the court brings all the accused together at one 
meeting of minds. According to his statement, PW42 worked as a 
tailor for Accused No. 1, Aftab. In late 1997 he was working late one 
day and saw a group of people sitting together on a Nallah (Drain 
pipe) outside their house/store in one of the more economically 
depressed areas of Mumbai. In passing, he heard one of the accused 
say that “the mistakes of the Jama Masjid should not be repeated” 
and that this time they should target something like train platforms to 
cause maximum disruption. When it was discovered that PW42 was 
listening, one of the accused, Yassinbhai, put his scissors to PW42’s 
neck and told him that he would be killed if he spoke to anybody 
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about the incident. Aftab subsequently fired PW42 from his tailoring 
job. According to PW42, he did not think anything of the incident at 
the time, and when he spoke to his two roommates, they told him to 
shut up and not talk about it. He then went to his village, and when 
he returned, found casual employment somewhere else. Only 
following the bomb blasts did he think of the incident at the Nallah 
again, and somehow found his way to the police and into the court. 
However, how exactly he made his way to court remains unclear. 
Further, PW42 did not identify all accused to actually have been there 
at the Nallah, nor is he able to determine who was speaking and if 
there was acquiescence, disagreement or discussion. Nevertheless, 
both the investigating agency, the prosecution and ultimately the 
court accepted this as “the meeting of minds” required for a 
conspiracy. The court decides that according to the standards of 
evidence, which boil down to whether or not a prudent person would 
believe the witness, PW42 is trustworthy. It is in this sense that PW42 
makes the crucial connection for the TCA between the incidents, the 
accused and the terrorist motive. His story essentially testified to the 
veracity of the prosecution version of events. 
However, there are still certain doubts remaining from the 
perspective of the defence. Firstly, according to his testimony PW42 
owed money to Accused Number One (A1) for a sewing machine he 
bought from him a little while back. Secondly, PW42 was fired by A1. 
Moreover, at the time, PW42 did not find the meeting particularly 
remarkable. Finally, none of the people he allegedly spoke to about 
the events of the night were produced before the court, even though 
this would have been easy for the prosecution, presumably, to 
produce his former roommates and to have them corroborate this 
part of PW42’s story. Although none of the remaining doubts about 
PW42 in themselves would be enough to fully discredit his story, 
there remain a number of questions regarding his inability to identify 
all the attendants at the meeting by the Nallah; he was unable to 
positively identify who was talking, he only overheard snippets and 
according to his own statement, about a third of the attendants had 
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their backs to him. Together with his fortuitous appearance in the 
final stages of the trial, the question remained amongst the lawyers 
whether this testimony in itself was enough for the harsh sentences 
handed down to all the accused. While this question remains open, it 
is clear that Sanjay Chouhan is of fundamental importance to the 
stabilization of the connection between the accused, the incidents and 
the TCA. It is his testimony that stabilizes the relation between the 
terrorist motive, the accused and the incident. 
7.5.3 TIPs and Connections between Witnesses, Incidents and 
Accused 
Throughout the process a number of Test Identification Parades 
(TIPs) have allegedly taken place. While TIPs are generally not 
considered to be very strong pieces of evidence they serve a very 
specific purpose. Through a TIP, stabilization is attempted in the 
relation between two persons and an incident. Additionally, a legal 
procedure exists, which prescribes how the TIP has to be conducted 
to be legally valid. If an identification takes place, the TIP becomes 
inscribed into a piece of paper that can be transported to the court 
and aid the prosecution in their wider stabilization effort. Even when 
a TIP has been successful in stabilizing a connection between the 
witness, the events they narrate and the accused, repetition of the 
identification in open court is routine. Yet, in my relatively short 
fieldwork I witnessed police attempting to ‘aid’ witnesses in 
identifying accused as the ones they saw.  TIPs therefore suffer from 
the same risks as witnesses in that the prosecution and police can 
influence them. In the Aftab TCA, there was one instance where a 
TIPs was allegedly undertaken in Mohar Jail, but the witness was 
unable to identify the same accused in open court. In another 
instance, there were two different TIPs conducted with the same 
witness who was asked to identify someone they had seen. However 
the witness identified a different person in each TIP. Of course all of 
these failings of memory can take place without tampering. However, 
other irregularities with the Panchnama in the TIPs and the frequent 
disregard for proper procedures during the TIP problematize them as 
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an effective tool for stabilization. Perhaps this is can explain why they 
so often fail. 
The strength of connections stabilized by identification in open court 
are also weakened by the allegation made by one of the accused that 
directly before the court hearing he was identified to a witness.257 A 
further example of how this seems to be a common practice is from 
my own observation during fieldwork. On the 27th of March 2013 I 
was at the Tiz Hazari Court in Old Delhi. The court was hearing 
witnesses for the 2008 Delhi Rickshaw Bombings. One of these 
witnesses was asked by the court to identify a specific accused he had 
seen fiddling with a dumpster that subsequently exploded. The 
witness raised his hand and let it trail over the chairs in the back of 
the room where all the accused were sitting. Hidden from the judge 
but in plain sight from my position (the only spectator) and the 
defence attorneys, the prosecutor stepped onto the witness’s foot. At 
this point the witness stopped and said, this is the person I saw 
putting something into the dumpster. In this particular case the 
identification was accepted by the judge despite the outcry and 
protest of the group of defence attorneys. 
The three stabilizations we have seen in this section are made to last 
by inscription into the judgment. This inscription not only makes 
them more lasting but also allows them to travel reinforcing the chain 
of reference which articulates the terrorist fact through the courts. 
Ultimately however its most important property is that it suppresses 
the precariousness of the steps of stabilization. 
7.6 The Judgments as Mediators  
The stabilising steps come together and the terrorist is stabilised most 
effectively in the inscription of the judgment. This stabilisation is very 
effective, because it is presented in a format that puts it into relation 
with the overall judicial system. But the format of the judgment also 
suppresses the traces of precariousness encountered in the step-by-
                                                
257 This was not recorded by the court but discussions 
about how to make the court take notice of this were 
on going during my participant observation. 
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step stabilisations before. The artefacts of the stabilisations 
encountered before are inscribed into the judgment as discovered 
facts. The inscribed judgment also becomes mobile, transporting its 
inscription from one court to the next and one context to another. It 
does so not as an intermediary, faithfully interacting in the same way 
every time, but as a mediator changing how it fits into new contexts 
dynamically. The same judgment can interact with different courts, 
with scholars and reports, defenders of security and champions of 
law and order. But perhaps more importantly within the TCA the 
judgment interacts differently with the accused/convicted, the prison 
authorities and the appeals lawyers. The judgment as mediator can 
travel up the ladder of appeal. In the Aftab TCA it travels from the 
Sessions Court to the High Court and from there to the Supreme 
Court. 
7.6.1 Percolating Up – Sessions Court, High Court, Supreme 
Court 
In each of these courts the TCA changes slightly. Changing actants, 
new Judges and lawyers influence this change. The chain of reference 
articulated in at the first instance is transported to the next court via 
the judgment and is rearticulated there increasingly suppressing the 
shortcuts which went into its original production. The role of the 
Court in the wider legal structure also slightly changes from Sessions 
Court, to High Court to Supreme Court. An increasing focus on legal 
deliberation disassociates and suppresses the security modalities 
visible in the sessions court, increasingly the slow, detoured and 
deliberately hesitant passage of law takes over centre stage.  
7.6.1.1	The	Sessions	Court	
Sessions Courts bear the brunt of the work within the criminal legal 
system. They are the ones who hear the vast majority of cases. 
Contrary to the predilections of many lawyers, they are also the end 
of the line for the vast majority of accused. Terrorism related cases 
are special in this regard, because they rarely stop at the Sessions 
Court. Appeals for high profile cases are the norm. Firstly, this is 
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because of the stiff penalties involved; there is a mandatory high 
court review for all death sentences. Secondly, these cases also 
enthuse lawyers, human rights groups and the public interest, making 
appeals far more likely than in crimes with less widespread emotional 
appeal. Therefore, despite the fundamental role of the Sessions 
Court, there is the inherent ambivalence in terrorism cases that the 
Court has to assume that the case will not stop here. Further, many 
accused and many lawyers assume that the court will reach a higher 
forum. Therefore, they essentially wait for this higher forum to get 
out the “big guns” or the high profile lawyers. The Sessions Court is 
both of absolutely fundamental importance to a case and is regarded 
with contempt by many lawyers of the higher courts. 
This ambivalence, of importance and neglect, reinforces the 
importance of the Sessions Courts in establishing the basis of the 
TCA. The Sessions Court is also the locus for the admission of 
evidence into the trial. In other words, nearly all the evidence that is 
used during a trial is entered during the Sessions Court phase. Later 
admission of evidence at the High Court level is possible, albeit very 
rare. Finally, the chances of successfully submitting new evidence to 
the Supreme Court are very slim in the absence of ground breaking 
new developments or gross malpractice. Most importantly it is almost 
certain that no re-examination of evidence submitted at the Sessions 
Court will be permitted. If a cross examination has been done in a 
mediocre manner at the Sessions Court, it will be near impossible to 
call this witness back at a higher instance. Systemically this makes 
sense, as the higher courts cannot become the primary locus of trials 
without defeating the entire purpose of a three-tiered judicial 
apparatus. However, this also means that if the defence was not 
operating optimally at the first instance, this will continue to hamper 
subsequent attempts at defending the accused throughout the second 
and third tiers. Finally, it means that something different is happening 
between the TCA-Sessions Court and the TCA-High Court/Supreme 
Court. To follow the terrorist in the making through the process, I 
treat them as three modes or phases of the same assemblage. 
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Different actants come together to get to work on the same person, 
making the terrorist facts speak, first at the trial Court then at the 
High Court and finally at the Supreme Court. 
The TCA during the Trial Court mode sets the standard, the initial 
trajectory, according to which the rest of the trial proceeds. Laying 
out both the evidence and the narrative from which the appeals then 
must make an effort to differ. The lack of resources at the initial 
stages of the trial in combination with the disdain many lawyers have 
towards the lower courts overshadows the fundamental part these 
courts have to play in the overall process. 
7.6.1.2	The	High	Court	
A few things change at the High Court, but what takes place is mainly 
stabilization through re-iteration. The Session’s Court judgment has 
acted as a mediator and the TCA reconfigures around the locus of 
the High Court. This reconfiguration goes hand in hand with a 
number of new actants. For example the appeal gains a new case 
reference: Criminal Appeal No. 1324 of 2004. This ties it into a new 
reporting structure which allows the judgment to travel farther. It 
now becomes accessible over the High Courts website. This wider 
availability increases the reach of the stabilization as well as the 
affects, abilities to interact and be interacted with, of the judgment. 
The judgment’s scope also becomes more focused as two of the 
original accused play no part any longer.258 The TCA becomes more 
                                                
258  (No.1 Aftab Saeed Ahmed Shaikh; No.2 Asgar 
Kadar Shaikh; No.3 Afzal Abdul Hamid Khan; No.4 
Mohammed Iqbal Mohammed Hanif Shaikh; No.5 
Sayyed Kadir Mohammed Shafi Sayyed; No.6 Sahid 
Khalil Ansari; No.7 Farooque Mohammed Yusuf 
Shaikh;No.8 Mohammed Yaqub Abdul Majid Nagul) 
The appeal is joined with Criminal Appeal No. 1059 of 
2004 regarding Mohammed Sagir Mohammed Bashir 
Chauhan (Accused No. 8 In the sessions court 
judgment); Criminal Appeal No. 1520 of 2004 
regarding Javed Gulam Hussain Shah (Original 
Accused No.9) as well as Criminal Appeal No. 951 of 
2004 regarding Jaffar Abdul Haque Shaikh (Original 
Accused No.5) and Criminal Appeal No. 1168 of 2012 
regarding Farooque Mohammed Yusuf Shaikh 
(Original Accused No. 12). 
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consolidated and the number of terrorists to be stabilized becomes 
smaller. Accused No. 1-9, as well as accused No. 12 and 13 of the 
original Trial have appealed against the Sessions Court Judgment. 
Accused No. 10 did not appeal to the High Court, because his 
sentence consisted of acquittal and subsequent deportation to 
Pakistan. By the time of appeal he had already been deported. 
Accused No. 11 passed away during the process of the Sessions 
Court trial. Therefore, the trial against him stood abated. That 
everybody else chose to appeal shows the significance of the High 
Court in the TCA. For the accused it is the only chance to challenge 
and destabilize their status as terrorist. Within the TCA it however 
also permits the reinforcing of the choreography already underway 
from the Sessions Court. Throughout the High Court judgment the 
narrative from the Sessions Court is picked up and reiterated 
eliminating some controversy except in respect of accused No 7. 
Who after reviewing the evidence and judging it weak is acquitted by 
the High Court. During the proceedings at the High Court two more 
of the accused, no. 3 and no. 6 have passed away. Ultimately 
therefore the prosecution narrative at the High Court is whittled 
down to the core group of Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 12. 
Accused No 13 is acquitted for offences relating to the bomb blast at 
the Jama Masjid but his conviction upheld on all other grounds. The 
stabilization now excludes the Jama Masjid completely as all charges 
relating to the Jama Masjid bombing have been overturned. This is of 
particular relevance to the choreography. Despite the Jama Masjid 
blast featuring prominently in the prosecution timeline establishing 
the terrorist conspiracy it has now almost completely disappeared 
from the judgment. The High Court focuses instead on the core 
stabilisations surrounding the two eyewitnesses: Bharat and Sanjay. 
This means that we can observe a trend where contentious pieces of 
evidence, weakly stabilized connections are edited out of the 
judgment. At the same time in the previous judgment these weak 
connections were necessary to hold together the stabilization of what 
later on emerges as strong connections. More explicitly, the 
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conviction of accused 7 and 13 for the Jama Masjid blast is essential 
for corroborating the reference to the Jama Masjid in Sanjay’s 
account. That the convictions in relation to the Jama Masjid at the 
High Court are overturned, has by this point become insulated from 
the trustworthiness of Sanjay. The terrorist stabilization emerges like 
a building from its scaffolding, increasingly able to stand on its own. 
The last opportunity for the defence to challenge this stabilization 
before the TCA becomes closed and the judgment ultimately 
inscribed is at the Supreme Court. 
7.6.1.3	Preparing	for	the	Supreme	Court	
In this case I was involved in drafting the SLP, which was then 
submitted to the Supreme Court for consideration. At the time of 
writing the SLP has been accepted but the criminal appeal is still 
pending before the Supreme Court. As part of my Participant 
Observation, I helped Ms Ria Singh Sawhney to draft the Special 
Leave Petition (SLP) for this particular case and the three appeals 
handled by Ms Ramakrishnan in regards to Accused No.1, No.2 and 
No.8. Before the highest tier of the judicial system takes up a case, 
the Supreme Court needs to be petitioned for the right, or leave, to 
appeal the High Court Judgment. 
An SLP is a curious actant in the TCA. It needs to frame the points 
that the appealing party would like to have impugned by the Supreme 
Court in language that highlights fundamental questions of law. In 
other words, for the Supreme Court to take interest, the particular 
issues have to be framed so as to have a wider relevance, beyond the 
single case. Therefore, we are confronted with a mode of the TCA 
where the previously destabilizing defence is required to engage in a 
sanitizing effort. In other words, by the time a TCA gravitates to the 
Supreme Court it is firmly territorialized by the pre-existing legal 
assemblage. The arguments that have to be made in the SLP no 
longer involve the tensions between incident and pre-existing legal 
assemblage but focus on the tension arising between the specific 
TCA and the wider pre-existing legal assemblage. The lawyers 
petitioning the Supreme Court need to show how part of the 
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stabilization runs counter to a previously passed judgment, law or the 
constitution. This broader outlook by necessity involves the defence 
in drafting the appeal in such a way that the details and contradictions 
of previous stabilizations are suppressed. By tying the case at hand 
into wider questions of law, the specifics are necessarily edited out for 
the benefit of making connections to a whole network of laws and 
precedents as well as the constitution. The Supreme Court then hears 
the SLP and decides if the appeal is allowed to go ahead on those 
issues or not. Hence, it is of utmost importance to phrase these issues 
as broadly as possible and to make them acutely relevant to the 
broader judicial field. At the same time the drafters of the SLP need 
to include all potentially interesting points that could be argued 
before the court later. Layered on top of this is the considerable 
amount of paperwork that is amassed by the TCA up to this point. 
The lawyers drafting the SLP have to read, understand and keep in 
mind the information that is mediated to them through all the 
inscriptions undertaken in the two other modes of the TCA. 
All in all, without taking into account potentially interesting and 
relevant jurisprudence, the case file in this particular case was over 
2500 pages, in 2 files and 11 folders. These included the two 
judgments, the records of all the witness depositions, the expert 
reports, records of injunctions, petitions and other court proceedings, 
and the statements made by the accused. Further difficulties were 
added by the often-confusing organisation of the files. This 
highlighted the paramount importance of the role office staff play in 
the TCA. Keeping track of files, organising them and making sure 
nothing is dropped becomes as important to the 
stabilizing/destabilizing efforts as technical knowledge of the law. 
When dealing with these volumes of information, a piece of paper 
falling under the table could be of vital importance and easily missed. 
In addition, there were irregularities with the listing of pieces of 
evidence. The index, the language of reports, judgments and witness 
depositions were often marred by poor language leaving grammatical 
ambiguities and substantial spelling mistakes. This links back to the 
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process of translation/inscription and illustrates further what a 
critical process this is in the early TCA. It was the sheer importance 
of these documents that prompted Ms Ramakrishnan to always insist 
on one of the junior lawyers staying behind and to check that the 
record would be kept accurately. He/she would then leave the room 
only after ensuring that the record was sealed without being tampered 
with by the prosecution; something that apparently happens with 
some frequency. 
Finally, despite repeated requests, soft copies, of the judgments were 
only made available after weeks into the process, making searching 
for particular witness statements, etc. all the more difficult. Carefully 
combing through all the materials to really understand the case takes 
the hardworking lawyer days. Even with additional staff, it is simply 
astonishing how judges are meant to be able to really understand a 
case coming to them for appeals within hours, if not minutes. It 
seems highly likely that judges at the higher courts, are unable to look 
at much more than the judgments of the lower courts and the 
petitions made before them when sitting on an appeal. To go through 
the evidence would not only be redundant but purely impossible 
from a practical perspective. However, this Makes the mediating 
function of the judgment(s) all the more important. In my experience 
of the courts, the record is always something negotiated, something 
that does not reflect all that is happening, but rather reflects what the 
judge ultimately sets as the final version of events. This translation 
through mediation demonstrates again how important the early 
trajectory of the TCA is. Many lawyers believe that the trial courts are 
only a hurdle to be taken before real arguments being made at the 
High Court or the Supreme Court. However the early translations 
and the actants introduced early on into the TCA are very difficult to 
supplant. Arguments in the upper two tiers are limited by the 
evidence and the record introduced and made at the Sessions Court. 
7.6.2 The Roles of Prosecution, Judge and Defence 
The prosecution and defence play a crucial role in the TCA. It is the 
tension between these two actors through which other actants are 
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leave their trace on the TCA or don’t. The judge in turn is the 
choreographer whose efforts ensure that the TCA does not fall apart 
and that what it produces remains coherent with the pre-existing legal 
assemblage and balanced with the pre-existing security assemblage. In 
their interactions these three actors, or rather classes of actors, also 
provide the work that goes into the stabilisation of the terrorist. 
Because of this they are also ambiguous actors, their actions 
contribute to the continued existence of the TCA but they are also 
trying to influence territorialisations and stabilisations. 
7.6.2.1	Prosecution	
The role of the prosecution in the TCA is an ambiguous one for two 
reasons. Firstly, similar to other parts of the judicial system, the 
prosecution in India is underfunded and stripped of even the most 
essential resources, maybe even worse. Secondly, the role of the 
prosecution in common law systems is an inherently ambiguous one. 
All advocates are in the court with the primary obligation to help the 
judge reach an informed decision. However, the vested interest of the 
parties is inherent in the adversarial system and enshrined in the 
modus operandi. This interest is reinforced by the most common 
measure of success for a prosecutor being their conviction rates. In 
other words, despite their obligations to the court and the judicial 
system as a whole, the prosecution is bound to end up on the side 
favouring stabilization of the terrorist along with the investigating 
organs pushing for a conviction. 
Thirdly, in addition to public pressure, there is political pressure on 
the prosecution. This is partly caused by proximity between the states 
lawyers and the investigating and enforcing agents that are part of the 
government. The cooperation between the prosecution and the 
investigating agencies is what brings forward potential actants for the 
stabilization of the accused as terrorist. It is more or less the 
investigating agencies that are in charge of bringing those actants to 
the TCA and the prosecution, which then proposes a translation and 
connection to the court. The court then either inscribes that 
translation or changes it. However, in this process all that is not 
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connected stays vacant. This means that there remains a plethora of 
potential connections, virtual in the Deleuzian sense, which are never 
concretely brought into the TCA. One such unmade connection 
could have served to corroborate Sanjay’s statement about telling the 
night’s events to his two flat mates.259 Sanjay mentions that after 
overhearing the alleged conspiracy, he discussed the events with his 
co-workers. This came out in cross-examination, but no effort has 
been made by either the prosecution or the defence to locate his co-
workers stabilize or destabilize his account. The absence of work 
from an actor can also contribute to stabilization; or rather avoid 
destabilizing connections being made. 
7.6.2.2	Judge	
The role of the judge in the TCA is another element of ambiguity. 
Generally understood in adversarial legal systems the judge is the 
neutral arbiter between the two parties arguing (Jonathan Law 2015). 
The role of the judge is then to preside over proceedings and to hear 
the evidence, to apply their mind and their discretion in order to 
adjudicate. However, in the Aftab TCA, the Sessions Court judge 
acted to expand upon the prosecution’s story, to include 
unsubstantiated allegations into the wider narrative, taking the lack of 
protest from the defence as enough evidence in favour of following a 
particular line of reasoning. While we cannot necessarily deduce from 
this that this is the norm, the judge is clearly more involved in the 
TCA than the role of the neutral arbiter would suggest. Judges, and 
this is especially true at the Special Courts, and prosecutors are both 
key repeat players. They generally have a professional relationship 
that extends beyond the matter at hand. This potentially blurs the line 
between TCAs and therefore makes it difficult to regard matters on 
an exclusively case-by-case basis. Furthermore, as I picked up during 
my participant observation, this difficulty makes it unlikely for the 
judge to rigorously apply procedural law in every case that would go 
against the investigating agencies, as this could cause serious obstacles 
                                                
259 See for example p.30 of the High Court Judgment. 
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for them in the future.260 On one hand stretching cases over even 
longer periods and on the other hand forcing the judges to throw out 
a number of cases out of hand on procedural grounds. 
7.6.2.3	Defence	
There are uncountable numbers of potential defence lawyers in India. 
However, in TCAs this number is often drastically reduced for the 
following reasons. Firstly, there is a small pool of lawyers whose 
proved record of competence makes them the primary choice for 
such cases, if they can be convinced to take them. Secondly, in cases 
where the word terrorism is flying around early on and tempers are 
high, Indian bar associations frequently encourage their members not 
to defend the terrorist.261 The strategy chosen by the defending lawyer 
at the trial court has a fundamental impact on the trial, as it is in the 
trial court that evidence has to be questioned, its stabilisations 
resisted and translations/inscriptions influenced. 
There are frequently as many defending lawyers as there are accused. 
This makes sense, both from a judicial and a common sense point of 
view. It is important for each accused to be defended to the best in 
their own right. Furthermore, if there is a lawyer for each accused 
then nothing really ties the accused together, except the allegations of 
the prosecution. However, despite its advantages, this scattering also 
poses a problem, not only in terms of expended resources and 
efficiency, but also in terms of strategy and joint planning. During my 
time observing the case there were no lawyer to lawyer contacts with 
either the lawyers who represented the clients previously at other 
courts or the lawyers who were in charge of the other SLP’s. This 
lack of communication is to such an extent that, while I am not sure 
if Ms Ramakrishnan was aware of other appeals, the other lawyers 
could not tell me if there were appeals filed by the accused not 
represented by her. 
                                                
260 Interview XLII, Fieldwork II. 
261 For example in the case of Afzal Guru see various 
contributors in (Roy 2006). 
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At the Sessions Court stage, what was visible from the work of the 
defending lawyers was absolutely minimal. There was very little 
effective cross-examination and many questionable pieces of evidence 
were not challenged. This posed a problem in the second and third 
tier of the TCA, because one then needs an additional reason to 
challenge them and to explain why they were not challenged before. 
Additionally, while the closing arguments on behalf of the accused 
were not recorded, it is at the discretion of the court whether or not 
to include these in the record. Therefore it is potentially impossible to 
positively ascertain what was being said and if the defence effectively 
challenged the prosecution narrative. 
Furthermore, the adversarial style of holding court makes a creative 
and proactive defence paramount to success. In theory the principle 
of in dubio pro reo would be sufficient to ensure that stonewalling by 
the defence could work in the light of an imperfect prosecution. 262 
However it is increasingly becoming clear, in this case and others, 
that the judge is more sympathetic to the difficulties of the 
prosecution and investigating agencies than to the ones of the 
defence. An active defence is therefore crucial from the outset. While 
the resources of the defending lawyers are extremely limited, it is 
interesting to note that in the Aftab TCA not a single defence witness 
was produced. My inquiries regarding this fact were met with a 
certain amount of surprise, suggesting that it is not the norm in 
criminal cases to produce defence witnesses. Clearly it is not the role 
of the defence to undertake their own investigation. However the 
absence of neutrality from the investigating organs and prosecutor 
suggest that it would only make sense for the defence to produce 
witnesses. Either to prove an alibi or to cast doubt on some of the 
more far fetched parts of the prosecution’s narrative, destabilizing 
actants introduced by the defence are extremely rare however. 
                                                
262 In dubio pro reo  can be roughly translated as in case 
of doubt, favour the accused and is one of the basic 
principles of law. For example it is recognized as a 
basic human right by the Indian Supreme Court in 
Narendra Singh & Anr vs State of M.P, Criminal 
Appeal 298 of 1997 (2004). 
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Further there is no guarantee that such a strategy would be 
successful, or even be permitted by the judge. However, it is clear 
that the current strategy of denying everything short of the validity of 
the trial itself, without proactive involvement is not the most effective 
destabilization.263 
One would have to consider the consequences of the defence 
bringing their own set of evidence, witnesses and narrative to the 
table. On the one hand, it could level the playing field and help the 
accused. On the other hand, it may very well serve to advance and 
legitimise the undermining of the presumption of innocence if it 
became common practice for accused to have to provide a plausible 
alternative explanation of events. These risks stand opposed to the 
risk of allowing the judge to be confronted for years with only the 
version of events presented by the prosecution. Such deep immersion 
in their thinking and narrative, can cause a certain susceptibility to 
their way of thinking. While wrapping my head around the work 
going into the SLP’s, I found it difficult to keep all facts in my head 
without linking them with some kind of narrative Even accounting 
for a more practiced judicial mind of a judge, the fact load of such a 
case is simply overwhelming, and the appeal of a narrative to fit it all 
together and to disregard some bits while highlighting others is very 
strong.  
The defence strategy at the Sessions Court according to the High 
Court consists of a mixture of stonewalling and attempted 
discrediting of witnesses, such as Sanjay (PW 42). According to the 
defence, it is highly unlikely that a conspiracy would be hatched in so 
public a place as the Nallah. Sanjay was also produced and examined 
very late in the trial. According to the prosecution this was because 
his whereabouts were unknown. This defence is disregarded by the 
Court. This is probably because the court sees this not as something 
casting a doubt on the prosecution story but rather simply as the 
                                                
263 The strategy of denying the validity of a tribunal is 
a common occurrence in war crime tribunals. See for 
example the chapter on the politics of truth in 
(Koskenniemi 2011). 
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choice of location for the conspiracy. The High Court also attests 
that they have engaged in detail with the evidence given by PW 42 to 
make up their own mind, and they also come to the conclusion that 
Sanjay is trustworthy. The cross-examination of Sanjay contributes to 
this conclusion. While undertaken to weaken his argument, the 
defence lawyers inadvertently gave him the platform to iron out 
weaknesses in his statement. An inexpert cross-examination, aimed at 
destabilizing a circulation, in this case backfired to its opposite. This 
would be innocuous enough if it were not for the fact that, according 
to my interviews, the defence at the lower courts frequently pursues a 
course of action that actually weakens their clients’ position.264 In 
addition there are reported cases where the accused have been cajoled 
by the police to stick to one particular lawyer. 
The defence, the prosecution and the Judge are three of the most 
important classes of actors in the TCA. However their roles are far 
from straightforward. The Judge plays a choreographing role in 
ensuring that the TCA does not fall apart and stays coherent with 
pre-existing assemblages. The prosecution and defence are both 
trying to stabilize/destabilize the casting of the accused as terrorist. 
Roles are changing from Court to Court. Furthermore the 
destabilisations and stabilisations often occur unpredictably through 
backfiring strategies or accidental mistakes. 
7.7 A Tale of Two Assemblages - Chapter Conclusion 
The Aftab TCA is more complex than the Nasir TCA. Six bomb 
blasts occurring in 1997 and 1998 are translated and stabilised into a 
chain of reference which articulates Nasir and his brother Ashfaque 
as terrorists. The successful enrolment of Nasir as terrorist hinges on 
a combination of heterogeneous actants. Most important in that 
stabilisation are the recovery of alleged bomb materials from his 
house and the witness statement by Sanjay which are connected via 
vincula to the law of conspiracy. But the role played by the successful 
translation of the incident into categories from the pre-existing legal 
assemblage should also not be underestimated.  
                                                
264 Interviews XLII, Fieldwork II. 
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One thing that is particularly striking about the Aftab TCA is how 
invisible the role of Aftab is. The entire assemblage has to articulate 
the chain of reference in order to make him speak. While he is the 
main object of the TCAs stabilisation and his emerging as the 
terrorist out of the modality of the Sessions Court, he only 
contributes capacities rather than action and the assemblage has to 
come together to make him speak. Throughout the chapter traces left 
by Aftab have appeared and disappeared but it is often the 
stabilisation of those traces that the other actors of the TCA are after. 
The stabilisation/destabilisations and the tensions arising between 
different nodes of the network take place largely between actors and 
actants other than the accused. Three most vocal actors engaging in 
providing the work for the TCA are the prosecution, judge and 
defence. The accused on the other hand are present and leave traces 
but it is their capacity to be stabilised as terrorist that they contribute. 
It is almost as if they are caught in the net, the nodes of which are 
stabilised through the TCA. Despite the final appeal for this case still 
pending at the Supreme Court the stabilisation of the incident as 
terrorist and the enrolment of Aftab and his co-accused as terrorist 
has already successfully taken place. In order to do so actants have 
come together in a choreography of circulations that has generated 
stability.   
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
Against embattled and positional definitions of terrorism I have 
pushed for a concrete understanding of the terrorist as contingently 
stabilised. The stale definitions and pitched battles that pre-occupy so 
many judges and jurists, legislators and policy-makers are red 
herrings, distracting from the inbuilt dimensions of power and 
morality of the concept. No definition that does not turn to the 
process of stabilisation is more than one actant in a wider assemblage. 
By engaging with the process of stabilisation of two concrete 
terrorists I trace a processual understanding of terrorism through 
participant observation in and outside of Indian courts. Terrorist 
facts require the TCA in order to be made to speak. Once the 
terrorists are articulated by the meticulously crafted chain of 
reference, the layers of inscription ensure that the facts appear to 
speak for themselves. The TCA draws on both the slow, deliberate 
and hesitant passage of law and on the quick, short cut oriented, 
prehensile modality of security to make the terrorist speak. Vincula 
carefully connect insignificant events to the wider body of texts, but 
the individual chain link that shows the crafted chain of reference in 
all its artifice becomes invisible through layers of suppression. 
My work is only a beginning, as it builds on the findings of seminal 
studies by Latour but goes beyond the passage of law to show that 
actors speculate about unexpected shortcuts by making reference to 
security. Challenges included incomplete or inaccessible records, files, 
evidence and actors and last but not least the limitation of time. 
Despite these limitations and challenges my inquiry opens 
opportunities for understanding that bypass the bogged down 
debates surrounding definitions of terrorism as jurisprudential 
exercises in truth finding to show the heterogeneous processes of 
truth making. It also goes further than the literature that looks only at 
common characteristics of people who have become stabilised as 
terrorist. Further using assemblage thinking to explore the 
stabilisation of the terrorist enables us to appreciate all involved 
actants without silencing them, while at the same time appreciating 
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how the stabilised terrorist herself is increasingly silenced in every 
aspect that is not the deed itself. That terrorism is propaganda of the 
deed is therefore also inbuilt into the processes that disenfranchise 
and silence the person as they are turned into the terrorist. All the 
while the terrorist facts are being made to speak. However this 
theoretical turn does not force us to disregard the evil of individuals 
who engage in the planning or perpetrating of terrifying incidents, 
neither are we called upon to judge professionals of the security 
assemblage who zealously overstep in their attempt to secure. Finally 
it allows us to understand the members of the legal assemblage as 
hard working individuals who are intensely engaged in enrolling, 
choreographing, stabilising or destabilising relations between actants 
to craft vincula and build a chain of reference. It is through these 
processes that we can explain surprising results, rather than to take 
recourse to accusations of incompetence, corruption, malevolence or 
conspiracy. Ultimately the stabilisation of terrorists through the 
courts emerges out of the interactions between actants leaving behind 
numerous traces, these traces however have, contrary to our deeply 
engrained, modern belief, no propensity to be mappable on a smooth 
and continuous narrative. This requires translations and stabilisation 
of some traces at the destabilising expense of others. The smooth 
narrative of the incidents is only possible once the chain of reference 
can be made to hold together and serves to articulate the terrorist 
fact. 
8.1 A Summary 
One of the questions with which we started this inquiry was: Why are 
we confronted at the same time with sayings like one man’s terrorist 
is another man’s freedom fighter and relatively stable consensus on 
who terrorists are? I have tried to answer this question with regard to 
the interplay between stability and fluidity, structures and actants, 
humans and non-humans. First establishing a theoretical frame and 
toolkit through assemblage thinking and the TCA, I have then traced 
these processes of stabilisation through two concrete case studies. 
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Throughout this thesis I have proposed and applied an assemblage 
thinking based approach to understanding the role courts play in 
stabilising individuals as terrorist. Starting from the premise that 
terrorists are products of working processes taking place amongst 
actants, I have traced these processes in the particularly coded 
environment of two Indian case studies. Terrorists are made to be, 
speak and act, by careful crafting and manipulation of a chain of 
reference that articulates them. To show how this chain of reference 
comes into existence I have used the Terror Court Assemblage that I 
have developed in the second chapter of the thesis. The TCA is a way 
of understanding the associations that form in and around a court, 
through a specially developed combination of tools from ANT and 
assemblage thinking. In addition to tracing the processes that result in 
a stable terrorist the TCA illustrates another aspect. Contrary to 
much of the literature which places both theoretical understandings 
of terrorism and practical responses into two opposed camps: one of 
security and one of law and order the TCA allows me to show that 
while these two approaches stand in tension with each other they are 
both part of the chain of reference that articulates terrorist facts. In 
the working TCA I have shown how these two tendencies, to 
understand the terrorist as pertaining to security, or to understand 
them as pertaining to law and order form territorialisations in the 
circulations that constantly churn in the assemblage. 
The Terror Court Assemblage is expounded in chapter two. I 
propose a fusing of some of the elements of assemblages drawn from 
Deleuze and Guattari with the more recent ANT literature associated 
predominantly with Latour, Mol, McGee, Scheffer and Law. It forms 
the backbone of my theory and takes account of the roles played by 
the actants involved in the stabilisation of the terrorist in court. 
Through the choreographed relations that are then inscribed in the 
judgment a stable chain of reference emerges that suppresses the 
heterogeneity and messiness of the traces found before. 
This theoretical model is explored further with reference to other 
theoretical approaches to the relation between security, law and 
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terrorism. However in this context it is important that I come to the 
conclusion that assemblages are best suited to the incorporation of 
various theoretical approaches. In other words the role of these 
theoretical accounts can be incorporated in the making of terrorists 
within the assemblage approach. Assemblage thinking has deep 
reaching implications for the method that we can follow to gain 
insights. The focus here is on the tracing of actants. This is discussed 
in more detail in the methods chapter, after all this is first and 
foremost a fieldwork driven work. The fifth chapter draws on my 
interviews to explore the messy face of multitudes of associations 
that contrast so strongly with the smooth account of the terrorist 
emerging out of the TCA. It is in this chapter that the actors 
interviewed speculate on the tensions between shortcuts and detours 
in the crafting of the chain of reference. 
Subsequently I trace the stabilisation of Nasir and the chain of 
reference that articulates him and his associates as terrorists. They are 
made to speak through the complex interplay of legal and security 
actants. To trace these actants I draw on my participant observation 
at the Supreme Court stage of his appeal as well as the un-reported 
judgment of the Sessions Court and the publicly available judgment 
of the High Court. The Nasir TCA shows the stabilisations going 
into the making of terrorists, while at the same time containing only a 
limited number of moving parts and a relatively straightforward 
incident – the Calcutta 2002 shooting at the American Centre. 
In contrast the Aftab TCA is significantly more complex. Again, I 
draw on my participant observation at the Supreme Court stage and 
the prior judgments and other evidence available to the lawyers 
drafting the Special Leave Petition to trace actants, their enrolment 
and associations which result in the stabilisation of Aftab and his 
associates as terrorist. In contrast to the Nasir TCA this case study 
relates to a series of six bomb blasts taking place in Mumbai in 1997 
and 1998. 
Both case studies show how the TCA articulates the chain of 
reference causing the terrorist facts of the two cases to speak for 
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themselves. The careful choreography, building on vincula, and other 
means of making the terrorist speak, brings together modalities of law 
and modalities of security. However as the judgment moves up the 
courts and is re-inscribed both the artificiality of the chain of 
reference and the security elements are increasingly suppressed. At 
the end stand terrorist facts which speak for themselves, explaining 
the wide spread agreement on who the terrorists are despite the 
absence of an agreed definition. 
8.2 Assemblage Thinking, Terrorism and Courts 
We started on this journey with a number of caveats in mind, perhaps 
the most important one was that in applying assemblage thinking and 
inscribing the findings in a text we were making a fixed point against 
fixity. Inscription lends a temporal transportability to relations that 
are contingent and predicated on momentary associations in a 
constantly churning flux. This tension between linear, inscribed and 
stable text and associations which are ephemeral and constantly 
performed is inevitable, and it is our obligation as author and as 
reader to keep in mind that a series of inscribed snapshots of fluid 
associations are always an irony. Yet this should not deter us from 
trying to trace these associations and to begin to understand the 
mechanisms that are taking place when we listen to a judge telling us 
that a particular incident is terrorism. Unless we unearth these 
mechanisms and begin to understand them as a continuous 
preformation of the concept of terrorism through the practices of 
making terrorist facts we will remain drawn to shallow conclusions 
and pitched battles over cul-de-sac definitions. 
Terrorists are made and stabilised in everyday practices articulated by 
carefully and laboriously crafted chains of reference, this is why 
indeterminacy remains at the point of the definition. The legal 
definitions of terrorism that I have encountered remain vacuous and 
only subsequently become filled by actants enrolled, articulated and 
choreographed through hard work.  Indeterminacy also remains at 
the point of the incident which also only subsequently becomes 
stabilised with actants and, again, hard work. Persons who become 
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stabilised as terrorists surely most of the time are horrible people, but 
there are horrible people who are not terrorists and we treat them 
differently. At some point after an incident one becomes one or the 
other. This has far reaching consequences – on the flipside this also 
means that if ‘we’ are playing a role in making some people terrorist 
and not others (policing the borders of terrorism and by extension 
the borders of the non-terrorist ‘us’) then something else is 
disappearing whenever we claim that terrorists are self evident. An 
act of power is dissimulated. 
Throughout this thesis I have attempted to slowly trace associations 
from a micro perspective. Showing the formation of vincula between 
insignificant events and a body of texts, the slow, deliberated and 
hesitant passage of law but also the quick, responsive and prehensile 
modalities of security. Tuning in to the traces of individual actants 
left behind in forming associations and circulating in various 
assemblages. It is time now to return to the much more precarious 
birds eye perspective by drawing a few tentative conclusions from the 
mechanisms observed in the two specific TCAs. Assemblages are 
capable of bringing together actants dispersed both in space and in 
time but require attention to how this distance is overcome. This 
usually requires translations but since translations are ubiquitous the 
affects, the propensities to interact and be interacted with, of a given 
assemblage are not necessarily limited by territorialising influences 
such as national borders. 
8.3 From India to the Wider World 
The case studies are drawn from India. Stabilisations of terrorists 
through the courts are taking place around the world on a day-to-day 
basis. Therefore to understand terrorists as made and stabilised in 
courts, articulated by a crafted chain of reference, has far reaching 
implications around the world too. The interaction between the 
stabilised carrier of the idea of terrorism and the wider phenomenon 
and its response are shaping much of global affairs, domestic policies, 
legislative activity not to mention the hundreds of thousands of 
people world wide on whose day to day activity terrorism has a 
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bearing. Part of my contention is that we cannot adequately deal with 
terrorism unless we understand how terrorists come into being. As 
long as we fail to understand that there are precarious and contingent 
processes of stabilisation just beneath the surface of every stable 
terrorists, and that hard work is required constantly to keep the 
tensions from spilling out, we will miss a crucial piece of the puzzle. 
Either this can result in the wholesale dismissal of the idea of 
terrorism as an almost conspiratorial tool of global governance.265 Or 
in the blind acceptance that if we only increase the sophistication of 
our counter terrorism technologies terrorism can be defeated. 266 
Neither one of these, admittedly hyperbolic, dismissals of the 
mechanics of terrorist becoming are an adequate basis for the 
development of practices which decrease human suffering. Through 
unpacking the mechanics of terrorist becoming we can identify 
critical points for intervention. If we fail to understand the ways in 
which tensions are choreographed through TCAs we risk at best 
inefficiency in our attempts to alleviate the suffering caused by 
human perpetrated terrifying incidents. At worst however we risk that 
attempts and policies aimed at curbing terrorism play a continuous 
part in its maintenance. In other words, attributing terrorism entirely 
to individual human agency and understanding it entirely as a product 
of structure both lead us into a cul-de-sac. Through the TCA we are 
able to bypass this dichotomy and understand the stabilisation of 
terrorists as taking place through the relations between actors/actants 
in a fluid structure. This leads to three important conclusions: First 
terrorists are not essential categories of the world, they are stabilised 
through an assemblage of actants. Secondly, these stabilisations are 
precarious, contingent and laborious drawing on a crafted chain of 
reference to articulate the terrorist. Thirdly once complete they are 
stable categories of the world that we need to work with, and the 
barrier between fact and artefact melts into irrelevance. Except that in 
                                                
265 For an emphatic defence of this position see (Roy 
2004). 
266  This drive to make bad ideas work with more 
sophistication or dedication is traced all the way back 
to the Vietnam war (Cable 1993). 
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order to understand some of the paradoxes involved in terrorism we 
need to bring this stabilisation back into focus. If we want to get out 
of the bog of definitions of terrorists and vicious fighting over the 
racialised overtones of counter-terrorism policies and practices we 
need to unpack the making of terrorists as a process rather than a 
discovery. 
8.4 Implications for Practice and Forward Looking 
Research 
Ultimately let us think about what the conclusion that terrorists are 
the stabilised products of assemblages means going forward. There 
are both practical and theoretical implications of the argument made 
in this thesis. On one hand the theory of the TCA offers itself for 
further exploration in different contexts. Not only could the toolkit 
assembled here help to explore the stabilisation of terrorists in 
contexts other than Indian courts. But it may also offer itself for an 
exploration of other assemblages ranging from medieval witchcraft 
trials to the modern corporation. The realisation that much of what 
we are currently treating as inputs are actually products has far 
reaching consequences for questioning and re-exploring some of the 
most puzzling and divisive problems of our times. Questions of how 
our lives change when we see cornerstone concepts as produced, 
rather than naturally occurring, require urgent exploration. In the case 
of terrorists, persons are stabilised as terrorists in courts even in the 
absence of counter terrorist legislation. Nasir and Aftab become 
terrorists without the use of specific counter terrorism legislation. 
More importantly Nasir and Aftab become terrorist through 
processes, which are better described drawing on registers of 
choreography and stabilisation than through discovery. The absence 
of a legal definition or even a consensus of what terrorism is does not 
stop both Nasir and Aftab to emerge as terrorists out of the court 
assemblage. This stabilisation shows the large number of actants 
required and the multitude of diverse processes involved in making a 
terrorist. 
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On the other hand we should not close ourselves off from drawing 
lessons from theoretical understandings by maintaining a separation 
between theory and practice. If we first and foremost understand 
theories as processes, which govern our making of causality claims we 
cannot get away from our thinking being ‘theory’, driven. 
Understanding the making of terrorists as a multi-layered and 
complex process allows us to explore purposefully where the most 
promising avenues for intervention lie. Furthermore it allows us to 
begin thinking about what influences stabilisations and how we 
participate in the re-preformation of the terrorist and by extension 
terrorism. Dismantling the stabilisation of specific terrorists as 
contingent processes of enrolment and inscription, rather than as the 
discovery of naturally occurring phenomena encourages us to ask 
questions about the power relations that are also re-performed and 
re-inscribed through these processes. Only if we are acutely aware of 
these implications and underlying assemblages can we design a 
forward looking research agenda as well as form sound political 
judgments about appropriate ways to increase overall welfare in light 
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